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This dissertation investigates the development of the soft drink market in China 
from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century, with particular attention 
to the rise of Coca-Cola. It examines how soft drinks competed with traditional Chinese 
summer food and beverage such as watermelons, herbal tea, plum juice, and nutriments 
which were believed to have medical properties for people’s summer health, and 
eventually became one of the most popular types of beverages in the country. Over one 
hundred years in the Chinese minds, soft drinks changed from an exotic but unsavory 
beverage to a popular drink and a symbol of modernity. This dissertation argues that 
western science competing with traditional Chinese medicine has been a driving force in 
shaping beverage consumption in modern China. There were constant politics played by 
the state, businesses, and consumers on production, marketing, and consumption of soft 
drinks, making a bottle of drink not merely a commodity but one that embodied science, 
modernity, and identity in Chinese society.  
Following the introduction chapter, chapter 2 of the dissertation delineates the 
clash between Chinese and western food culture in the late nineteenth century. It shows 
how traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) including the yin-yang theory and the concept 
of medicine-food homology played a role in shaping Chinese food culture for centuries. 
By analyzing advertisement, chapter 3 examines how soft drinks, which were considered 
by Chinese people as an unpleasant and unhealthy drink according to TCM, were 
marketed and gradually accepted as a hygienic and healthy drink under the rhetoric of 
modernization. Since foreign-brands such as Coca-Cola were luxuries, cheap imitations 
provided ordinary Chinese people, especially urbanites, opportunities to experience 
 x 
“modernity.” Chapter 4 discusses the culture of imitation in modern China in regard of 
soft drinks. In the first half of the twentieth century, consumption were politicized in 
National Products Movements, in which soft drink brands were categorized into either 
Chinese or foreign and people’s loyalty to the nation was, to some extent, judged by their 
brand choice. However, there was something far more than nationalism that played a role 
in the picture. Taking the Shanghai Coca-Cola protest of 1947 as a case study, chapter 5 
reveals that Chinese nationalism in National Products Movements in the late forties was 
used by Chinese businessmen to advance themselves in business competition. When 
political conflicts became a major theme in Maoist China, Coca-Cola was criticized as a 
symbol of imperialism and driven out of China. Nevertheless, science-driven 
consumption did not fade away. Chapter 6 shows that instead of promoting Coca-Cola, 
the People’s Republic of China “invented” salty soda as a prevention and treatment of 
heat stroke and widely distributed it among workers as a socialist welfare in summer. The 
final chapter discusses the return of Coca-Cola in the post-Mao era. It shows that science 
and modernity was a consistent subject in production and consumption in China, where 
the state promoted it cautiously due to political sensibility while ordinary Chinese people 








 When I was a child in China (in the 1980s), my happiest moment in summer 
was following my father to the roadside fruit stall watching him picking watermelons. 
Each summer, my father bought watermelons in lots of hundredweights and stored them 
in our living room. Every day, I patrolled in my “melon field,” imitating my father in 
thumping each melon to pick the ripest one. Father told me that there is a proverb, “have 
watermelons in summer, keep the doctor away.”1 If there were no ripe melons, my 
mother would force me to drink mung bean and lily soup, which tasted a little bit bitter. 
Although I disliked it and refused to drink every time, my mother once and again told me 
that it was good for health and it was known as “an elixir in summer” in traditional 
Chinese medicine (TCM).  
 These summer foods are not special in my family diets. For centuries, 
watermelons, mung bean soups, herbal tea, and sour plum juice, foods and drinks that 
were believed to contain certain medical properties, were favorite summer refreshments 
in China. Many of them even became summer necessities for Chinese families. Food and 
food-related proverbs derived from TCM were passed down from one generation to the 
next. Adages such as “having mung bean soup in sanfu (hot summer) days, you will be 
                                                 
 
 
1 “Re tian liang kuai gua, yao wu bu yong zhua.” (热天两块瓜，药物不用抓) Shui, Thousands of 
Proverbs about Health, 45.  
 2 
fine even if you were in the oven;”2 and “having radishes in winter and ginger in 
summer, you don’t need doctors anymore”3 were widely spread in the Chinese society. 
Although not every Chinese was a physician nor was an expert in TCM, ordinary Chinese 
people were familiar with these proverbs and basic TCM concepts, which were used as 
guidelines for everyday diets and healthcare in traditional Chinese families.   
 The food-related folk knowledge, which largely came from TCM, dominated 
Chinese food culture for thousands of years until the modern times when they were 
challenged by western competitors. After 1840 when the late Qing government was 
forced to open treaty ports, numerous western products were introduced. Chinese people 
marveled at and welcomed many of modern products such as bicycles, cars, trains, 
running water, electricity, telephone, and telegraph, which were carriers of modern 
science and technology and dramatically changed the ways of people’s living and 
thinking. Chinese food and foodways, though highly resilient in culture, were also 
significantly impacted. No matter how incompatible between the West and the East in 
regard of food culture, western food such as chocolate, bread, and coffee became new 
desires of the Chinese. Among them, soft drinks, Coca-Cola in particular, competed with 
traditional summer refreshments, becoming a symbol of modernity and progressiveness 
in twentieth-century China. 
                                                 
 
 
2 Sanfu is the hottest period in summer. It usually begins in mid-July and ends in mid-August. “San fu bu li 
lv dou tang, tou ding huo pen shen wu yang.” (三伏不离绿豆汤，头顶火盆身无恙) Shui, Thousands of 
Proverbs about Health, 58. 
3 “dong chi luobo xia chi jiang, bu yong yisheng kai yaofang.” (冬吃萝卜夏吃姜，不用医生开药方) 
Zhao, Kexue yangsheng. Vol. 8 (2005): 40. 
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 However, the change of food culture in China was long and complex. Since the 
Opium Wars in the 1840s, China was commonly recognized as lagging far behind the 
western world in heavy industries such as transportation, mining, chemistry, and military, 
whereas Chinese food culture has been viewed as the pride and the treasure of Chinese 
civilization. Supported by sophisticated medical philosophies, Chinese food and 
foodways were regarded as more than something to eat and drink, but a belief, a culture, 
and more importantly an alternative medication that help families stay healthy. Although 
western medicine gradually became compelling in Chinese society since the late 
nineteenth century, the notion that “foods has more tonic effect than medicine”4 and what 
is known as “medicine food homology”5 remained dominating in people’s minds. As to 
soft drinks, its cold and fizzy taste, which was unacceptable in traditional Chinese 
medicine, made people believe that these beverages were neither tasty nor healthy. In the 
light of the reputable position of traditional Chinese medicine in Chinese food culture, 
why and how soft drinks became a desire in modern China becomes an interesting 
question. After all, what made Chinese people turn their back on their rich food culture 
and instead pursue something expensive and incompatible to their tradition? Put it more 
broadly, what was the driving force behind the change of consumption in modern China? 
These are central questions that this research is trying to explore.  
 Currently, there is an increasing scholarly interest in food studies and 
consumption in the western world. Questions like how food and foodways were changing 
                                                 
 
 
4 “yao bu bu ru shi bu.” (药补不如食补) Shui, Thousands of Proverbs about Health, 1. 
5 Hou and Jiang, “Origin and Concept of Medicine food Homology and Its Application in Modern 
Functional Foods,” 1727-1741.  
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and how food was socially and culturally constructed become what most scholars are 
interested. When exploring the answers, the relationship between food and identity is the 
most frequent issue addressed in food studies. It is often said “we are what we eat.” This 
notion has been widely recognized by scholars in academia. Historian Sidney Mintz said 
that “in the modern western world, we are made more and more into what we eat, 
whenever forces we have no control over persuade us that our consumption and our 
identity are linked.”6 Mintz’s work has been significantly influenced by Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s world system theory. Mintz revealed that sugar consumption in modern 
Europe was largely shaped by market prices determined by the global economic system, 
during which sugar was used as an emblem identifying consumers’ social status. Pat 
Caplan’s edited book, Food, Health, and Identity, also highlights the idea that food 
becomes a marker of identity and difference in the western world. Allison James’s paper 
in this collection argues that French food consumption marked the middle-class identity 
in Britain, which enabled the middle class “recreating, reordering and sustaining old 
social divisions along class and educational lines.”7 Lynn Harbottle’s article in the 
collection, however, points out that food produced by Iranian immigrants was not used to 
strengthen their Iranian identity, but to disguise their nationality by selling non-Iranian 
food in British society.   
How political environment influenced food and food consumption is another 
important subject in food studies in the English-speaking world. Several articles in Pat 
Caplan’s book reveal that healthy eating became a political issue in twentieth-century 
                                                 
 
 
6 Mintz, Sweetness and Power, 211.  
7 Caplan, Food, Health and Identity, 81. 
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Britain. One argument goes that in the twentieth century “the government’s commitment 
to promoting healthy eating policies has clearly been shaped by the interests of the food 
industry and the responsibility for healthy eating has been placed on the consumer.”8 This 
argument resonates with Harvey A. Levenstein’s research on American diet. Levenstein’s 
books: Paradox of Plenty, A Social History of Eating in Modern America Revolution at 
the Table and The Transformation of the American Diet, show how science became the 
lever of transformation of American diet in the modern era, and how institutions such as 
universities, research centers, government, and big corporations played a significant role 
in shaping American diet.  
Comparing to the rich and dynamic literature of food studies on the western 
world, there are fewer book-length academic researches on Chinese food and culture, 
despite the fact that Chinese cuisine is widely seen as one of the richest culinary 
traditions in the world. For a long time, most people believed that Chinese food culture as 
its 4000-year uninterrupted history was somehow static. This argument had not been 
challenged until the 1970s when anthropologists such as K.C. Chang and E.N Anderson 
pointed out that Chinese food has always been a part of global culinary tradition, deeply 
affected by international trade and by the dissemination of foodstuffs across the world. 
History shows many Chinese foods have a foreign origin; some of them could be even 
told from their names. For instances, one of the major foods in China—sweet potato—is 
known as “fanshu” in which “fan” literally means “foreign.” Sources indicate that the 
                                                 
 
 
8 Ibid, 176. 
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date for the introduction of the sweet potato is the late 16th century mainly via the sea.9 
Likewise, cabbages and onions have the Chinese prefix “yang,” known as “yang bai cai” 
and “yang cong,” which indicate their foreign origins. 
However, it is a blessing that currently there is a growing body of research on 
Chinese food and foodways, though a significant portion of it has been done by 
anthropologists who conducted a large number of interviews and presented unique 
perspectives. Their topics on Chinese food and culture cover a wide range of realms 
including: how are Chinese foods traditionally produced, prepared, preserved, and 
consumed; globalization and localization of food culture; food and identities in Asian 
societies, and so on.10 Like any high-quality research on food culture in the western 
world, these works successfully present Chinese food culture into a dynamic dialogue, 
bringing out fresh perspectives to China Studies. In the history field, research on Chinese 
food studies is also growing. As with works done by food anthropologists, historians in 
food studies are particularly interested in social and cultural meanings of Chinese food 
and foodways. Recent works in this field include: Yong Chen’s Chop Suey, USA: The 
Story of Chinese Food in America, which discusses the rise of Chinese food in the United 
States and how Chinese food played an important role in defining community, social 
class and identity; Mark Swislocki’s Culinary Nostalgia: Regional Food Culture and the 
                                                 
 
 
9 Ho, “The Introduction of American Food Plants into China,” 191-201. 
10 On Chinese food production, preparation, preservation, and consumption, see Frederick Simoons, Food 
in China: A Cultural and Historical Inquiry. On globalization, localization and identities, see David Y. H. 
Wu and Sidney C. H. Cheung ed., The Globalization of Chinese Food. The book discusses how Chinese 
foodways changed over time and how it provided a lens for understanding contemporary identities 
throughout Asia. David Y. H. Wu’s another book coedited with Tan Chee-beng, titled Changing Chinese 
Foodways in Asian, also investigates the impact of globalization on Chinese food. James Watson, Golden 
Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia, instead, discusses how western fast food localized on Asian soil. It 
also examines how fast food becomes a symbol of social and cultural identities.   
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Urban Experience in Shanghai, which shows how Shanghainese used regional food and 
foodways to differentiate themselves and the city from other people and places; and Q. 
Edward Wang’s Chopsticks: A Cultural and Culinary History, which illustrates the role 
of chopsticks in the development of Asian cuisine.  
 
Food as a Cultural and Political Symbol and an Insignia of Science and Technology  
Food is the key to help people stay healthy. It provides calories and nutrition 
according to western science, while maintains yin-yang balance according to Chinese 
science. The purpose of my research is to examine the diverse roles that soft drinks 
played in modern China: soft drinks as a commodity and a business, as a political 
symbol, and finally as an insignia of science and technology marked by nationalities. 
Focusing on the development of the soft drink market in China from the late nineteenth 
century to the early twenty-first century, this research has a particular attention to Coca-
Cola. As China more and more integrating into the global market, Chinese consumers 
associated brand-name soft drinks with social status and turned them into a sort of 
insignia of identity.  
This study can also be seen as a business history of soft drinks in modern China. 
It examines how Chinese businessmen, who frequently organized into a sort of civil 
society, which sometimes collaborated and sometimes negotiated and confronted with the 
state. For nearly half a century after 1949, the communist state regulated beverage 
consumption with implicit economic and political intentions. As China growing into the 
second largest economy in the contemporary world in recent years, many scholars 
become interested in Chinese business history. William C. Kirby focuses his research on 
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the development of China’s state-owned enterprises, Chinese corporate laws and 
company structure.11 Sherman Cochran emphasizes the role played by Chinese 
businessmen, pointing out that Chinese entrepreneurs already had the capacity to shape 
consumer culture in the early twentieth century.12 Parks Coble, who is interested in 
business and government relations, argues that the flourish of Chinese businesses in the 
nationalist era was due to the weakness of the government.13 Karl Gerth, who studies the 
development of Chinese consumer culture in modern times, points out that Chinese 
nationalism had significant impact on consumption in modern China.14 Most of these 
thought-provoking researches studied companies marked with clear national identities 
and treated the Chinese business history as a part of regional and national history. This 
dissertation, however, tries to place the history of Chinese soft drinks into a globalizing 
context. When multinational Corporations and the franchising system were gradually 
becoming popular in the global economy, the structure of a company became 
complicated and the nationality of a company and its products became blurred. This new 
business environment in the modern times leaves us more room—as what will be 
partially revealed in this dissertation—to further examine the agency of Chinese 
businessmen: their pragmatism and business acumen in the globalizing world. 
Finally, this research aims to offer a fresh perspective on history of science and 
technology in modern China. Eating properly was particularly important in China, since 
                                                 
 
 
11 Kirby, State and Economy in Republican China.  
12 Cochran, Chinese Medicine Men.  
13 Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and Nationalist Government and Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New 
Order.   
14 Gerth, China Made. 
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according to traditional Chinese medicine “diet was closely linked to health and was seen 
as the most reliable path to good health and longevity.”15 As in the modern western world 
where calories and vitamins are buzzwords in food consumption and food policies,16 
when studying food culture in China, how science and medicine relate to food cannot be 
ignored. This research examines how soft drinks, which were regarded as neither healthy 
nor palatable in the Chinese minds, competed with traditional Chinese foods such as 
watermelons and herbal tea, foods that were believed to have medical properties in 
traditional Chinese medicine, and eventually became one of the most popular drinks in 
the society. I must point out that science here is not merely defined as modern western 
science, but includes all kinds of human knowledge regarding nature. Alternative science 
and local science, which is traditional Chinese medicine in this case, significantly 
influenced how people view and behave in the world as well as in consumption.  
Although traditional China is commonly considered as lacking behind the 
Western world in science and technology, there are a few path-breaking works that have 
challenged the notion. Joseph Needham is one of the most renowned forerunners in the 
field, who for the first time, put history of science and technology in China into the 
academic research.17 His famous question “the Needham riddle,”18 which is “why 
modern science had not developed in the Chinese civilization but only in Europe,”19 has 
been profoundly influencing future scholars. Historians such as Benjamin A. Elman, 
                                                 
 
 
15 Waley-Cohen, “Taste and Gastronomy in China,” 103.  
16 Caplan, Food, Health and Identity.  Levenstein, Paradox of Plenty and Revolution at the Table.  
17 Needham, Science and Civilization in China (book series 1954-2008).  
18 Amelung, “Historiography of Science and Technology in China,” 57. 
19 Needham, “Science and Society in East and West,” 385-408.   
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Francisca Bray, and Charlotte Furth have offered fresh look of the role that Chinese 
science and technology played in late imperial China. Others like Ruth Rogaski and 
Zuoye Wang focus on how western science and technology impacted modern Chinese 
society.20 Science and Technology in Modern China, 1880s-1940s, a conference volume 
edited by Jing Tsu and Benjamin Elman presents new approaches in the field by 
addressing intraregional and global histories, encouraging people to “rethink the impact 
of nationalism, the ways in which ideas and technology interact and circulate, and new 
intersections between local episteme and global knowledge.”21  
Inspired by the above-mentioned researches, this dissertation studies the flow of 
knowledge through the history of beverage in China, in which eastern science and 
western science interacted and conflicted. It also shows science in general has been a 
concept and an ideology, helping to shape business, consumption, and the building of a 
nation-state. In other words, this research sees science in modern times as a commodity, 
which could be promoted, marketed, and consumed. Embedded in concrete products such 
as soft drinks, “science” was consumed by various social groups in everyday life: 
consumers saw science consumption as a way to identify social status, the government 
encouraged consumption of “Chinese science” to build a consolidated nation-state, and 
pragmatic entrepreneurs integrated science in the language of marketing to promote 
business.  
                                                 
 
 
20 Rogaski’s book Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China illustrates 
how the western concept of hygiene was accepted then became popular in modern China. Zuoye Wang 
focuses on how western-trained Chinese scientists and engineers help to shape China’s modernization. See 
Wang, “The Cold War and the Reshaping of Transnational Science in China” in Science and Technology in 
the Global Cold War, The MIT Press, 2014.  
21 Tsu and Elman, Science and Technology in Modern China,1. 
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Consuming Science for Modernity 
Science and technology have played a crucial role in history of the modern world. 
It has been recognized in the English world as the lever of the riches that replaced 
religion, drove economic progress, and therefore became a measure of human society in 
the modern times.22 Western societies represented by the United States developed them 
into modernization theories and ideologies, placing them at the center of state policies at 
home and abroad.23 Science, technology, and modernity were particularly manifested in 
material culture, the flow of which across national borders carried the idea of modernity 
from one place to the other. On the path of search for modernity, Chinese people 
underwent a process from building machines and learning technologies to studying 
scientific theories. The search started with the Self-strengthening Movement in the 1860s 
after China’s humiliation in the Opium War. Confucian scholars like Li Hongzhang in the 
Qing government paid particular attention to advancing military facilities, though they 
remained believing the Chinese Confucian order was superior and should be kept intact 
and carefully maintained. When the movement was proven as a failure in the first Sino-
Japanese war, Chinese intellectuals launched more comprehensive reforms, since they 
realized what need to be changed in China was not merely armaments and machinery, but 
social ideas and values. Yan Fu, an influential scholar in the late imperial China, pointed 
out that “armaments and machinery are external forms, whereas the essence lies in 
                                                 
 
 
22 Mokyr, The Lever of Riches. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men. 
23 Latham, Modernization as Ideology. 
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science.”24 He suggested one of the best ways to revitalize China was physics, because he 
believed science was accurate and rigorous and it could change people’s values.25 
Similarly, Liang Qichao (1873-1929), one of the activists in the late Qing reforms, also 
saw science as one of the fundamental ways to save China. He chanted the coming of the 
modern era: “with the considerate improvement of machine power, human beings could 
conquer nature.”26 In a public speech, Liang enthusiastically elaborated the issue of 
modernity. “Where is the root of modern culture?” he asked, and his answer was “without 
question, everybody knows it is science.”27 
Although the destruction that modern science brought to human societies in the 
First World War prompted Liang Qichao and some other Chinese intellectuals to rethink 
the meaning of science and restored Chinese tradition to some extent,28 science as an 
ideology still prevailed in Chinese society. In the May Fourth Movement of 1919 after 
the war, Chen Duxiu and his colleagues championed “Mr. Science” and “Mr. 
Democracy,” both of which, to Chen, derived from the western world. In the New Youth 
journal, the center of the New Cultural Movement, Chen vigorously supported the 
western ideas of science and democracy; thereby he persuaded the public that “we have 
                                                 
 
 
24 Yan, “lun shi bian zhi ji,” (论世变之亟) in Wang, Yan fu Ji, 2. 
25 Yan, “lun jin ri jiaoyu ying yi wuli kexue wei dang wu zhi ji,” (论今日教育应以物理科学为当务之急) 
in Wang, Yan fu ji, 282. 欲变吾人心习， 则一事最宜勤治：物理学是已。夫不佞所谓科学，其区别至
为谨严，苟非其物，不得妄加其目。 
26 Liang, Yin bing shi zhuan ji, 113.  
27 Liang, Liang ren gong xueshu yanjiang ji, 53-61.  
28 Liang Qichao traveled to Europe after WWI, during which he witnessed the destruction of the war and 
the depression of Europe. When he came back, he wrote a travelogue titled Ou you xin yin lu 欧游心影录, 
in which he provided a critical view to science and argued that traditional culture should not be completely 
discarded. Many China scholars saw this book reflecting Liang’s conservative attitude toward western 
science and reforms, though the statement is still controversial in the academia.   
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to oppose Confucianism, traditional ethics and politics, old arts and religion,”29 which of 
course included traditional Chinese medicine. Like Chen Duxiu, many Chinese 
intellectuals at that time such as Liang Qichao, Liang Shumin, Sun Yat-sen, Hu shi, and 
so forth criticized traditional Chinese medicine as lacking scientific support. Among them 
Lu Xu called it “an intentional or unintentional cheater”30 and in his early age he decided 
to go to Japan and study western medicine. Comparing to these active intellectuals in the 
Republican era, Mao Zedong was much tolerant to Chinese medicine and even, perhaps 
jokingly, listed it along with the classic novel, Dream of the Red Chamber ,and the 
Chinese game—Mah-jongg—as the three greatest contributions that China has made to 
the world.31 However, he still placed science and technology at the center of the CCP’s 
policy, among which Maoist “mass science and technology”32 fundamentally influenced 
modern Chinese history. 
What was notable in modern China is the influence of science as an ideology has 
gone beyond the political level and profoundly impacted everyday consumption. 
Consumption is a complicated human behavior that engages with multiple factors. 
Besides economic calculation, desire probably plays the most important role when people 
choosing one product over the other. Karl Marx pointed out that desire comes from 
fetishism of a commodity, which reflects the social relations of people, institutions, and 
                                                 
 
 
29 Chen, “Xin qing nian zui Zhuang zhi da bian shu,” 10. 
30 Luxun, Na han, 6.  
31 Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, 82. 
32 Paltemaa and Juha A, “Regime Transition and the Chinese Politics of Technology: From Mass Science to 
the Controlled Internet,” 1-23.  
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discourses that are manifested in capitalism.33 Accordingly, researchers studying on the 
globalization of Coca-Cola pointed out that American cultural imperialism and 
advertisement were the driving force.34 Comparing to other countries, the biggest 
obstacle of Coca-Cola in China was probably the traditional Chinese medical ideas: food 
and medicine homology. Therefore, science was one of the important issues that one 
must consider when discussing changes in Chinese food culture.  
By exploring the development of the soft drink market in China, one of the main 
arguments of this research is that science and technology has become used as an ideology 
for consumption in modern China. This is not to say that science and technology was the 
only force that shaped consumption. Other factors such as economics, politics, tradition 
and so forth still played a role. Rather, it indicates that science as a concept was often 
consciously or unconsciously consumed when people were choosing between 
commodities. This was especially apparent in food consumption and in fact has been 
familiar to Chinese people for hundreds of years. Besides taste preferences, Chinese 
people’s food choice was largely influenced by folk knowledge and TCM theories. To 
stay healthy and achieve longevity, people carefully kept the balance of diet: eating 
certain food in certain season, cooking certain food in a certain way, and choosing 
appropriate food for appropriate gender and age. In food history of China, exotic foods 
adopted by Chinese cuisine were all somehow compatible to the “local science.” For 
example, the previously mentioned sweet potato which was introduced in the late 16th 
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century was listed in a Chinese medical classic, Ben Cao Gang Mu, as: “sweet potato 
could increase strength, improve digestive system, and nourish kidneys.” Cabbage was 
also recommended to eat by Chinese medicine because “it increases vitality and improves 
eyesight.”35 
In contrast, soft drinks, when introduced, were regarded as unhealthy based on 
traditional Chinese medical knowledge. Chinese medical classics warn people to keep 
away from coldness, as “exogenous cold and cold drinks impairs the lungs, which make 
people sick.”36 While Chinese people were hesitant to drink soft drinks, western science 
as a vital component of modernization educated them that soft drinks were healthy and 
good summer refreshments. Consumption thereby transformed from choosing between 
foods to choosing between sciences. The confrontation between Chinese food culture and 
the West thus became a clash between indigenous Chinese science and newly introduced 
western science. During the process food was labeled as either “traditional” or “modern,” 
and consumption, a previously neutralized concept, as what happened to science, was 
politicized. People’s choice implicitly indicated consumers’ state of mind: whether he or 
she stubbornly sticking with “tradition” or actively searching for modernity. In this sense, 
what was consumed here was not simply the product per se, but science. In other words, 
replacing traditional Chinese science, western science embedded in commodities was 
consumed as a form of modernity in China.  
 
Consuming Science and Nationalism 
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In modern China, modernization was developing in tandem with nationalism. 
James Townsend once pointed out that “the history of modern China is one in which 
nationalism replaces culturalism as the dominant Chinese view of their identity and place 
in the world.”37 Zuoyue Wang also proposed a concept called “scientific nationalism,” 
which he referred science entangling with Chinese nationalism has been viewed as a way 
to modernize China.38 From the Self-Strengthening Movement in the 1860s to China’s 
human spaceflight project in the twenty-first century,39 Chinese government vigorously 
sponsored scientific research and modern industries, in which “Chineseness” or “made in 
China” was particularly high-lightened. In consumption, the state has offered such a 
strong support on national products that in surging National Products Movements in the 
first half of the twentieth century every commodity was labeled as either “Chinese” or 
“foreign” and Chinese nationalism became a category of consumption. According to Karl 
Gerth, all social forces including state apparatuses and consumers worked together to 
define and regulate consumerism, channeling consumption into acceptable nationalistic 
pleasures.40 One nationalistic consumer who was highly praised as a national hero at that 
time was China’s well-known writer, Zhu Ziqing (1898-1948), who refused to eat 
American flour despite the fact that it was cheaper and better in quality than Chinese 
flour. 41  
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Given that nationalism has played an important role in everyday consumption, 
when joined with modernity, nationalism became even more influential. Comparing to 
flour, soft drinks in modern China, as I have discussed earlier, was not only an exotic 
commodity, but a symbol of modernity, upon which modern technology trampled over 
tradition, western science smashed TCM. Believing modern soft drink industries 
shouldered the rise of the nation, Chinese entrepreneurs opened a number of national soft 
drink companies across the country. Facing intense competition on the beverage market, 
they on the one hand industriously advertised health merits of soft drinks in the language 
of science and modernity; on the other hand they integrated nationalism in marketing by 
urging people to buy national products. Chinese businessmen fulfilled their nationalistic 
ambition by adopting western science and technology to modernize their industries. 
Meanwhile, they aroused and extended nationalism by encouraging the public to buy 
only national products. The Chinese businesses, as Robert J. Foster put it, became “a 
distinctively non-democratic though not always negative form of contested governance in 
which corporations use their resources to act like states while consumers use their market 
role to act as citizens.” 42   
Foster’s statement resonates with Park Coble and Sherman Cochran’s arguments 
on the role of Chinese entrepreneurs in business history. In National Products 
Movements, Chinese businessmen played a critical role in shaping nationalistic consumer 
culture in modern China. However, given that some pragmatic consumers bought foreign 
products regardless of nationalism, we cannot help pondering whether businessmen who 
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vigorously promoting national products were real nationalists? In history studies, 
nationalism has been a very popular topic. Many researches adopt a linear model of 
nation-state history, in which they saw nationalism as a natural product as history 
progresses into the stage of colonization and it was essential for a nation’s modernity and 
independence. Nevertheless, Prasenjit Duara reminded us that there is a “bifurcated 
history” and “the study of nationalism should include more than overtly national 
movements. Its scope must be broadened so as to include nation-views and other 
narratives of the nation.”43 In the first half of the twentieth century, Chinese National 
Products Movements powerfully epitomized Chinese nationalism. The movements were 
exuberant and on such a large-scale that Karl Gerth claimed that nationalism even has 
become a category of consumption. Yet, Duara’s theory suggests that Gerth’s story was 
just one of many narratives about Chinese nationalism and consumption, one which 
ignores how each social class visualized nationalism differently.  
To demonstrate the “bifurcated history” of Chinese nationalism, Duara presented 
conflicting narratives of nationalism between repressed subjects and statist nationalists. 
My research, by contrast, tries to reveal the utilitarian narrative of Chinese nationalism. 
By exploring the history of Coca-Cola business in China and Coca-Cola boycotts in the 
late forties, this study shows that in free market nationalism became a pretext and a toll in 
business competition. Much like the yellow press had done to Americans during the 
Spanish-American war in the late nineteenth century, nationalism was used by Chinese 
businessmen to incite Chinese people’s nationalist sensation and thus eliminate 
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competitors. Here, I must point out that I do not mean that Chinese nationalists were 
hypocritical and National Products Movements had hidden commercial agenda or were 
simply fictitious; rather, I suggest that nationalism as an analytical mode must not be over 
generalized, but should be carefully scrutinized in different circumstances.   
 
Consuming Science for Identities 
 The relationship between food and identities has been widely discussed in 
academia, which has long acknowledged food as a maker to identify gender, region, 
ethnicity, class, and so forth. In food history of China, prices and availability usually 
determined the popularity of a particular food in the society. Expensive and rare foods 
such as bird’s nest, ganoderma, and ginseng were favorites to the elites who considered 
them as a symbol of their social status. Similarly, when soft drinks were introduced to 
China, they were first welcomed by the upper class. Gradually soft drinks were accepted 
and desired by ordinary people due to the copy culture which in Frank Dikötter’s words 
“allowed price demand and luxury demand to exist side by side, transforming the 
extravagant into the ordinary over time, gradually turning the luxury surplus into a daily 
necessity: a market dominated by a large number of relatively poor people forced 
producers to come up with cheap goods.”44 Copy culture, as Dikötter argues, “produced a 
two-tier economy, in which the rich and cost-conscious acquired imported goods to 
signify wealth and status, while the poor and cost-conscious were restricted to buying 
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local imitations.”45 Although copy culture satisfied the grassroots’ desire, most cheap soft 
drink imitations were unsanitary and some of them were even toxic. They became a 
serious sanitary problem that the Republican Government could hardly regulate. This 
leads to questions about whether class identity and the grassroots imitation culture were 
the only reason for the popularity of soft drinks in modern China. Did the symbolic 
meanings of soft drinks stay the same over time?   
This research shows that the relationship between soft drinks and identities was 
complicate one. It was more than a linear correlation between social class and 
commodities, but was multiply associated with education, politics, gender, age, and so 
forth and it changed over time. In addition to the upper-class identity, soft drinks in 
modern China also represented consumer’s educational identity, indicating whether one 
had accepted modern education or at least understood science and modernity. Educational 
capital, a concept underlying soft drinks, has long been the focus of study by sociologists 
and anthropologists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Arjun Appadurai. They commented that 
“commodities represent very complex social forms and distributions of knowledge.”46 
Although advertisement in the modern times played an important role in producing 
knowledge, as Timothy Burke argued, “this knowledge is always produced from 
something already known, that acts as a guarantee, in its anteriority, for the ‘truth’ in the 
advertisement itself.”47 Only when people had the knowledge, i.e. understanding soft 
drinks were good and not as unhealthy as what has been described by traditional Chinese 
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medicine, could they resonate with soft drink advertisement and consume. Taking soft 
drinks therefore meant abandoning traditional notions on science while welcoming and 
consuming modern science. Although poor people who imitated the upper-class to take 
soft drink as a common beverage did not really understand modern science, they 
entertained the idea that they became modernized and educated when consuming soft 
drinks.  
The symbolic meanings of soft drinks kept changing in modern China. While 
Coca-Cola was considered as a life style of the elites in the first half of the twentieth 
century, it became a symbol of a corrupted capitalist life style and imperialism in the Mao 
era. In the meantime, cheap imitations, especially the one with slight changes in the 
recipe called salty soda, was vigorously promoted by the Communist Government. In the 
challenging food situation from the sixties through seventies, salty soda served as a 
medical prevention of heat strokes for factory workers in summer, which reflected the 
continuous science-driven mentality on consumption. What’s more important, however, 
was this mentality entangled with Marxist theory of social classes, generating a new 
symbolic meaning for salty soda, that is, it became an emblem for proletariat identity. 
Taken as a social welfare, consuming salty soda, the cheap imitation that used to be 
banned on the market in Republican China, became a privilege and an honor for the 
working class.  
Chapter Outlines 
This is the first book-length history of soft drinks in China. Centering on the 
history of Coca-Cola, this research investigates the development of the soft drink market 
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in China from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century, exploring how 
soft drinks competed with traditional Chinese foods and eventually became one of the 
most popular drinks and a new representation of social identity in the country. It treats 
commodities as representation of science, technology, and modernity, which played an 
important role not only in everyday social life but also in state-building. Consumption, in 
this sense, was stimulated not only by practical needs but also by the desire for a 
fulfillment of modernity.  
In modern China, science and modernity in the soft drink industry was 
manipulated in various ways by three parties: the state, businesses, and ordinary 
consumers. The state tried to channel the beverage consumption with certain political 
agenda in the name of modernization, nationalism, and socialism. Pragmatic consumers 
associated soft drinks with social status and turned it into a symbol of identity. The 
business community, which was in the middle of this spectrum, was the third major force 
shaping the consumer culture. Based on their interest, they sometimes collaboratively 
implemented government policies, but sometimes organized as a civil society challenged 
the authority. The following is a chapter-by-chapter outline of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 “Encountering the Exotics” delineates the clash between Chinese and 
western food culture in summer in the late nineteenth century. The first half of this 
chapter introduces some basic theories of Chinese medicine such as yin-yang and 
homology of medicine and food, based on which Chinese people carefully and rationally 
chose their everyday food. In summer they drank plum juice, herbal tea, and had 
watermelons, foods which were considered as “cold” in TCM knowledge, to relieve 
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summer heat. The second half of the chapter traces the genealogy of soft drinks, also 
known as “Dutch water,” in China. It depicts Chinese people’s initial responses toward 
the exotics and briefly describes the early development of soft drink business at turn of 
the twentieth century.    
Chapter 3 “Cultivating Desire: Advertisement, Modernity, and Consumption” 
explores how soft drinks became gradually acceptable and then popular in China. By 
analyzing advertisements, education articles in journals and newspapers, this chapter 
reveals how science and technology as ideology of consumption remade subjectivity and 
shaped people’s consumption in the modern times. During this period, soft drinks 
companies extensively expanded their market and collaboratively created a “scientific 
drinking” culture. Efforts of Chinese companies were especially apparent and influential. 
Through advertising, they not only educated the public about medical merits as well as 
sanitary advantages of soft drinks but also demonstrated modernity by using assembly 
lines, bottling machines, and modern transportations.  
While brand-name soft drinks, which were considered as luxury, were largely 
consumed by the elites, the copy culture in China allowed Chinese grassroots to have 
opportunities to experience “modernity,” though it usually ended with unexpected 
consequences. Chapter 4 “Ambitious State, Unruly People: State Regulations and Social 
Violations” shows how cheap imitations, which were perfectly integrated into local 
culture, on the one hand provided business opportunities for street peddlers and quenched 
the thirst of the Chinese poor, while on the other hand led to serious social problems such 
as brand infringements and public health issues.  
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Chapter 5 “Nationalism Revisited: The National Products Movement in the Soft 
Drink Industry” uses Shanghai Coca-Cola protest in the late forties as a case study to 
rethink the relationship of the state, businesses, and nationalism. It sketches out the 
changing identity of Watson’s Mineral Water Company depicted by the Chinese Business 
Association in National Products Movements in the first half of the twentieth century: 
from a patriotic Chinese company to a “traitor” who jeopardized the national economy. 
The chapter reveals that political activities participated by businesses such as National 
Products Movements did not necessarily reflect nationalism. The meaning of nationalism 
embedded in political movements has been constantly defined and redefined by the 
society where different representations of the nation contested and negotiated with each 
other. Nationalism in the business domain was not merely spontaneous nationalistic-
consciousness; instead it contains contests, negotiations, compromises, and sometimes 
became a means of business competition.  
Chapter 6 “Coca-Cola Versus Salty Soda, How Summer Became Cooler under 
Socialism, 1949-1978” extends the analysis of nationalism to the communist society, in 
which Coca-Cola was criticized as a symbol of “capitalism in bottle” and was driven out 
of the country. At the same time, a variety of local-made soft drinks generally known as 
“salty soda” (yanqishui) were produced with very simple and crude equipment. This 
Chinese “invention” was used as a socialist welfare and widely rationed among factory 
workers working in high temperatures in hot summer. In a small but concrete way, it 
served as an effective tool for socialist nation-building. By delineating the transition from 
the Coca-Cola fever to the salty soda frenzy in China from 1949 to 1978, this chapter 
shows how production, distribution, and consumption of salty soda cooled off the 
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Chinese in summer; however, it was also a unique, creative response to a challenging 
food situation. Comparing with Coca-Cola, a symbol of capitalism, imperialism, and 
colonial power, this chapter discusses how salty soda provided by the state played an 
important role in the socialist construction during the Cold War era. 
As a perceived symbol of capitalism, Coca-Cola, had completely disappeared in 
the Chinese market for over two decades since the establishment of the People’s 
Republican of China, but the Coca-Cola Company never gave up its China dream. 
However, its efforts to reenter Chinese market were fruitless until 1978, when Deng 
Xiaoping came to power and opened the door to western countries again. Through long 
and difficult negotiations, in 1981 Coca-Cola finally became the first foreign company 
entering Communist China. Focusing on the tortuous process of Coca-Cola’s return after 
China’s opening up, chapter 7 “When Coke Knocked on the Door: China’s Reform and 
the Return of Coca-Cola, 1979-1990” reveals the pain in Sino-US cooperation even after 
China’s reform and shows how the state and Chinese intellectuals actively participated in 
shaping China’s consumer market. By shifting the perspective from the state to the 
masses, the second part of this chapter reveals a huge disparity between the state’s 
intention and grassroots’ interpretation on consumption. Rather than being politically 
sensitive, ordinary consumers were pragmatic. They placed importance on the social 
function of Coca-Cola rather than any political symbolism of the soft drink, which 
departed significantly from what the state had originally envisioned. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ENCOUNTERING THE EXOTICS 
 To stay healthy, westerners are used to calculating calories of every meal. 
According to western medicine, people believe appropriate amount of calories and 
balanced nutrition in diets are the essence of keeping a healthy life. Modern western 
medicine developed in the Renaissance. The development of theories on calories and 
nutrition was even later. “The thermal calorie was not fully defined until the 20th century, 
by which time the nutritional Calorie was embedded in U.S. popular culture and 
nutritional policy.”48 In contrast, for thousands of years in China, people have already 
known how to eat scientifically. There are two basic concepts in traditional Chinese 
medicine (TCM): the holistic concept and “medicine and food homology.” The first 
notion indicates that human body cannot be separated from the outside world, but is an 
integrated part of it, constantly interacting with its surrounding environment. The second 
theory teaches people that foods contain medical values and are able to fight diseases. 
Accordingly, Chinese people consciously adjusted diets based on their body conditions, 
environment, and climate change. Each season, there are certain foods and drinks that 
must be eaten to prevent from seasonal diseases.  
Summer is a time when people easily get sick due to high temperatures and 
humidity. Traditional Chinese medicinal texts collect a series of foods that are highly 
recommended in summer. These foods categorized as “cold food,” having been beloved 
by Chinese people for thousands of years, generating a dynamic summer food culture. 
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When western soft drinks known as the Dutch Water were introduced in the late Qing, it 
formed as a resistant force against the change. Meanwhile, however, nineteenth and 
twentieth century was a time of change in China. Under the rhetoric of modernization and 
out of curiosity as well, Chinese people began to imitate western life-styles and consume 
western products. In the eyes of western entrepreneurs, China was a huge potential 
market.  
 
Heat and Food in Traditional Chinese Medicine 
In traditional Chinese medical theory, human body is a microcosm of the 
universe. It possesses qi, a body’s “vital energy” or “strength,” which is reflected in the 
macrocosm and vice-versa. Internal qi is seen as pervading a person’s body and enabling 
him to meet the needs of life and maintain good health.49 It is changing with external qi—
six distinct energies—found in the atmosphere, which are named after and reflected in 
climate: dampness, dryness, heat, wind, cold, and summer-heat (shi 湿, zao 燥, huo 火, 
feng 风, han 寒, re/shu 热/暑). Each of the six energies is a distinct influence that 
characterizes the environment that is surrounded by. One’s internal qi may be enhanced 
or adversely affected by exchanging with external qi, and sometimes develops a 
malfunction on its own. If a malfunction occurs, a person must take action to set things 
right, but if possible “that condition should be prevented by constantly maintaining one’s 
body in a state of balance among the forces, both internal and external, to which it is 
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subjected.”50 According to TCM, all illness is caused or exacerbated by imbalance of qi. 
To maintain health, qualities or valences of internal qi must be kept in balance.51  
Essential in maintaining one’s balance are the opposing forces of yin and yang, 
which is understood by the Chinese as the basic elements of the universe. The concept 
originally indicates the shady and sunny side of a hill, respectively. By extension, yin 
stands for what is cool (or cooling), dark and moist, and generally associated with female 
qualities, while yang represents what is hot (or heating), bright and dry, qualities 
generally regarded as male. Yin and yang are not regarded as diametrical opposites but 
complementary poles on either end of a spectrum. Any given item, for example, food, 
would be defined as containing more yin or more yang. TCM believes that food provides 
energy for the body and plays a crucial role in keeping balance of yin-yang in the body. 
Different amounts of energy are contained in different foods, and the energy takes 
different forms. “Some foods are extremely strengthening; others are weakening, if eaten 
to excess.”52 In general, foods are divided into cooling and heating types according to 
their effect on the body, but not the temperature at which they are served.53 There is no 
unanimity in China as to which foods are hot and which are cold. Most foods are 
regarded as neutral or only slightly hot or cold, with rice conspicuous among these. Foods 
commonly classified as hot are (1) fatty flesh, such as mutton and dog, and oily nuts, 
such as peanuts; (2) spices, among then chili peppers and ginger; and (3) strong alcoholic 
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drinks. Foods commonly classified as cold include most fruits and bland, low-calorie 
vegetables, especially water plants such as water cress and seaweed.54  
Believing in “medicine and food homology” as well as yin-yang theory, Chinese 
people were particularly cautious about their diets, especially when they were sick or 
seasons changed. They believed the internal imbalance in the body, which appeared in 
diseases, was triggered by external influence, weather evil/heteropathic qi (xie qi), or 
atmospheric emanations of an electrical nature.55 Even westerners who stayed in China 
before the late nineteenth century blamed that diseases were caused by miasma, or a 
combination of miasma and invisible fermenting agents that rose from the soil or climate 
of a region.56 Believing that foods have medical values, people carefully either ate or 
avoided certain food under certain conditions in order to maintain the internal balance in 
the body. For example, cold foods were used to treat fever, rash, sores, red places, and 
other over-hot or burn-like conditions, as well as constipation and other binding 
symptoms. Hot foods were used to treat low temperature (as from shock or chronic 
tuberculosis), pallor, frequent chills, wasting, weakness, and diarrhea.57 When winter 
came, people, especially those who have the cold physiques,58 were advertised to eat 
more hot food to enhance their yang side, while in summer when yang became strong, 
cold/cooling food was recommended by Chinese doctors to nourish yin.  
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Summer heat (re/shu 热/暑), one of the six energies in TCM texts, is particularly 
strong in summer and thus has the biggest influence on people’s health. Although the six 
energies are natural components of macrocosm, when excess, they become evil qi 
(weather evil, which known as xie qi in Chinese) that break the internal balance of the 
body and cause diseases. Summer heat is a yang pernicious influence that typically 
occurs in hot and humid summer, which is also known as shu xie (暑邪). It is uprising 
and spreading out, affecting head, causing thirst, red face, and headache. Sweating, which 
is considered the fluid of the heart, cools down the body, but in the meantime it consumes 
a large amount of vital qi and yin fluids. Excessive sweating leads to dark, concentrated 
urine and depletion of yin can occur. On the other hand, extreme heat also affects the 
heart, leading to restlessness, coma, or heatstroke. Summer heat usually combines with 
dampness in humid weather. Too much dampness will disturb digestion and elimination, 
which leads to a loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and fatigue.59 Generally 
speaking, the most common summer disease—heatstroke—could be divided into two 
categories: yang shu (yang heatstroke) and yin shu (yin heatstroke). Yang shu is usually 
seen among manual workers who are exposed under the sun for a long time. Patients may 
feel dizzy, thirsty, and hot. If they do not have a rest and drink water promptly, they will 
go into heat exhaustion and shock, which are life-threatening symptoms. Yin shu, 
however, refers to the condition that the body contains summer heat inside but gets 
dampness outside. A typical example of getting yin shu is a person working in the hot sun 
                                                 
 
 
59 Schoenbart and Shefi, “Traditional Chinese Medicine Causes of Illness.”  
 31 
suddenly gets wet in a rainstorm or takes a cold shower. The rain cools the body down 
but meanwhile blocks summer heat inside the body.  
Summer heat, a yang pernicious influence, is extremely strong in hot weather, 
during which qi is easily weakened and yin is impaired due to sweltering. It can affect 
spleen and stomach, decreasing of people’s appetite and disturbing digestive functions. 
To keep balance of yin-yang and nourish the body in summer, people are suggested to eat 
cold/cooling foods, which are believed to relieve summer heat, tranquilize the body, and 
nourish qi and yin. Cold foods like winter melons, gorgon fruit, lotus root, lotus seeds, 
herbal tea, green tea, and so on are the best summer food therapies, among which 
watermelons, mung bean soup (绿豆汤), and sour plum juice (suanmeitang 酸梅汤), are 
the most popular foods across the country.   
 
Traditional Ways to Stay Cool in summer 
Today people’s favorite food in summer is ice. So did the ancient Chinese, though 
ice was considered as a luxury of the day. Three thousand years ago, Chinese people 
already tried to store ice in winter for the coming summer. However, consuming ice in 
ancient China was a privilege of elites and rich people. In the Zhou Dynasty, there were 
government positions which were in charge of cutting and storing ice. The officials were 
called “ice man” (冰人)60, who were responsible for cutting ice from frozen rivers in 
December on the lunar calendar and storing them in icehouses in January.61 Ice, for 
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thousands of years, was a court food in summer and was used as a reward from the 
emperor. Annual Customs and Festivals in Peking records that every summer the Qing 
emperor awarded court officials different amount of ice according to their ranks.62 Later, 
businessmen opened private icehouses and started to sell ice on market. As ice business 
was growing, prices decreased and more and more people could afford ice. In the late 
Qing, it became very common that in summer children from poor families were peddling 
ice in the streets in big cities like Beijing.63 
The most common use of ice was to ice food and drinks. Qu Yuan, a poet and a  
minister who lived during the Warring States period of ancient China, commented in his 
famous masterpiece—Chu Ci, Zhao Hun—that the iced rice wine was particularly cool 
and delicious.64 Since the late Qing, there were four popular iced foods, watermelon 
juice, sour plum juice, almond tofu, and assorted fruits. They were particularly popular 
when people treated guests in summer.65 In addition, iced plum wine66 雪泡梅花酒, iced 
litchi cakes67 凉水荔枝膏, mung bean soup mixed with ice 雪泡豆儿水,and lotus root 
slices mixed with ice shavings68 冰调雪藕丝 were also people’s favorites. In fact, ice 
cream in China appeared much earlier than westerners came in the nineteenth century. In 
the Yuan Dynasty, there was a court food known as “bing lao”冰酪, which probably was 
the earliest ice cream in China. A poet and an official named Chen Ji 陈基 of the Yuan 
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dynasty was once awarded a piece of “bing lao” by the emperor. In his poem, Chen said 
“bing lao was served on a gold plate; the white and golden colors match each other, 
showing emperor’s great grace.”69  
Since the Ming dynasty ice cream for ordinary people was called Xue Hua Lao 雪
花酪, which perhaps was a variation of “bing lao,” and in fact, it was equivalent to 
today’s shave ice. When recalled summer in old Beijing, a renowned Chinese writer, 
Xiao Qian, compared Xue Hua Lao, a children’s favorite, as a symbol of summer.70 
When hawkers were peddling Xue Hua Lao in alleyways, children begged adults for 
several coins and rushed out with a big bowl in their hands. Their eyes were widely open, 
looking at the ice crystals shaved from the ice chunk, on the top of which were dressed 
with red, yellow, or green syrup. While watching the hawker making Xue Hua Lao, 
children stood near the ice bucket as close as possible in order to feel the cold from the 
ice, as if they had already tasted Xue Hua Lao. Sometimes hawkers were teenagers. They 
carried a big insulated bucket swinging at the side and sang in alleyways to attract 
customers.71  
                                                 
 
 
69 Chen, “Ji Ge Zixi Yang Jimin,” in Qian Qianyi, ed. Lie chao shi ji, 1514.  
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 Xiao, Beijing chen za yi,10.  
71 For more description on ice peddling, see Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 203. 
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Figure 2.1:  A peddler is selling Xue Hua Lao.  
The outside wooden bucket is filled with ice, inside of which is a smaller iron bucket 
filled with boiled water, juice, and dried fruits, etc. The seller constantly rotates the 
smaller bucket to make the inside water freeze into ice crystals.  
Source: Wang Luping. Hua shuo lao Beijing. P. 51. 
 
Although ice was the most effective way to stay cool in summer, few people ate 
ice or iced food frequently. One reason was the high prices. Even though since the late 
Qing, ice became cheaper than earlier times, ordinary families still could not afford ice 
every day. In poor families, occasionally six or seven children in the family shared one 
bowl of Xue Hua Lao together, which, of course, was the happiest moment for them. The 
other reason, which was even more important, was the medical knowledge about iced 
food. TCM texts point out that iced food was very harmful to people’s health. Medical 
cases showed that many emperors who over-ate iced food were attacked by serious 
illness and some of them even died. The chapter “Biography of Shi Shidian” in History of 
the Song, records that during the conversation with Shi Shidian, Xiaozong of the Song 
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(eleventh emperor of the Song) suddenly passed out after drinking several cups of iced 
water.72 Ben Cao Gang Mu also records that Huizong of the Song (the eighth emperor of 
the Song) got a series stomach ache because of eating too much ice.73 Therefore, to most 
of the Chinese, ice and iced food were lovely but dangerous. People should eat with 
special care.  
Comparing to ice, a more common, affordable, and safer food for the ancient 
Chinese in summer was watermelons. It is not only delicious, but also healthy. In Ben 
Jing Feng Yuan 《本经逢原》, watermelon is listed as an herb that helps to clear 
summer heat and generate fluids. Watermelon in classical Chinese medical texts is also 
called the natural baihu decoction (also known as Gypsum Combination),74 because it 
extracts heat in the body and leads heat out through the intestines and the bladder; 
therefore watermelons are perfect medicine for treating and preventing heat stroke or heat 
exhaustion in summer.75 Its sweet taste and juicy texture is loved by people of all ages. In 
summer, every family bought and stored over a hundred pounds of watermelons at home. 
To make the melon taste cool and fresh, people soaked it in well water for hours, 
sometimes a whole day, before cut. In hot days when people are easily losing appetite, 
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watermelons became the main food. Instead of eating regular meals consisting of rice and 
dishes, some people just ate watermelons for the whole day. More people ate 
watermelons as a snack or a dessert after dinner, during which the whole family gathers 
together, talking and enjoying the cool breeze after a day’s heat. As the market demand 
increased in summer, the whole food market became dominated by watermelons. They 
were sold in grocery stores located in virtually every block of residential areas where 
shrewd dealers seasonally shifted their business to watermelon selling. Street venders 
probably were the main watermelons sellers in summer. They set up stalls along streets, 
selling watermelons either by pound or by slice. Hanchao Lu depicts these vendors in 
Shanghai as “great masters of the art of slicing the melons into uniform pieces of the 
smallest actual size with the biggest appearance.” “They sliced watermelon on a crude 
collapsible table under the shade of a tree or a huge parasol. As he did the cutting, the 
hawker sang at fortissimo: ‘Fresh, cold, and sweet! Ten-cash apiece!’”76 
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Figure 2.2: Watermelon stall in the early Republican era.  
On the top there is a poem saying: street peddlers are peddling watermelons which are as 
round as the globe. It is very shocking that watermelons are cut into pieces very quickly. I 
hope traitors do not dividing our country as cutting watermelon.  
Source: Yin Ye Xie Zhen Bai Tu, vol. 2, 1919. P. 1. 
 
Mung bean is another highly recommended summer therapy in TCM. Mung beans 
in TMC were commonly used to treat prickly heat rash, heatstroke, and summer heat 
syndromes including restlessness, irritability, and thirst. It was also a widely known 
antidote for food and drug poisoning. It was particularly effective for arsenic poisoning. 
TCM indicates that yang pernicious influence in hot days generates excessive toxic heat 
in the body, which usually reflects in erysipelas, carbuncles, boils, swellings, and sores. 
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Ben Cao Gang Mu advises people to eat cool-natured mung beans every day in summer, 
as it accelerates metabolism and helps the body to excrete the toxicants.  
There are a variety of foods in China made of mung beans. A common one is 
mung bean soup 绿豆汤), a favorite refreshing summer treat in hot seasons. “Combine 1 
½ cups washed and drained mung beans, 1 ½ gallons water, and ½ cup sugar (or brown 
sugar) and bring to a boil on high heat for 15 minutes. Turn heat to low and simmer for 1 
hour, or until the beans are very soft. It is ready to serve when it gets cold.”77 To improve 
the taste, southern people add lotus seeds or tremella fuciformis, both of which are 
nutritious and commonly used to “clear heat.” Since it is sweet, cool, and easy to prepare, 
mung bean soup was widely sold in restaurants and street stalls. In summer, many 
families prepared the soup by themselves. Every morning, mothers and wives made the 
soup for the whole family. In the afternoon when family members waked up from a nap, 
the soup had cooled down and ready to serve. During extremely hot days, some 
pharmacies, temples, and big companies distributed mung bean soup to the public for 
free. Philanthropists put a big bucket filled with the soup in the front of their gates. There 
were several bowls and spoons and pedestrians could use as they wish.  
If add rice into the mung bean soup, it becomes mung bean congee, which is a 
common breakfast and supper across China. The cooking process of congee is slightly 
different from making a soup. “Combine ½ cup washed and drained mung beans, ½ cup 
short grain rice, ½ cup very coarse cracked wheat, 10 cups water and bring to a boil. 
Cook it for 10 minutes on high heat, then turn to medium-low heat and cook for 1 ½ 
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hours until the mung beans are split in the middle. To avoid burning, stir occasionally and 
reduce the heat as the mixture thickens. In North China, people often add sweet potato 
and cut it into 1-2 cm cubes. Rice is usually replaced with millet.”78  
While mung bean congee was a common food in ordinary Chinese families, sour 
plum juice (suanmeitang), another popular summer drink, was often recognized as a 
beverage of noble birth. It is made from sour plums (specifically, smoked Chinese 
plums/black plum 乌梅), brown sugar, and sweet osmanthus. Producing process is 
simple: first soak sour plums in water, then add brown sugar and sweet osmanthus and 
boil them together. After the beverage is cooled off, it is ready for serve.79 For better 
taste, people add rose or iced water.80 Smoked Chinese plum is an herbal medicine in Ben 
Cao Gang Mu, which has long been used in China. It contains sour and neutral 
properties, and is good for spleen, lung, and large intestine meridians. In TCM, black 
plums are used to stop prolonged, phlegmy coughs, restrain the intestines, clear heat, help 
digestion, and promote production of body fluids.81 Sour plum juice was once very 
popular at the Qing court. In the famous Qing novel, Dream of the Red Chamber, the 
main protagonist, Jia Baoyu, the heir of the wealthy and aristocratic Jia family whose 
ancestors were made Dukes and given imperial titles, craved for sour plum juice after he 
was beaten by his strict Confucian father.82  
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Many people believed that sour plum juice was invented by Zhu Yuanzhang, the 
first emperor of the Ming dynasty. It was said that at the end of the Yuan dynasty Zhu 
Yuanzhang survived a plague because he accidently ate sour plums. Later he boiled 
plums in water and distributed the juice to the public. Although there were many 
loopholes in this story and there were no historical evidence, to commemorate the 
inventor, Zhu Yuanzhang, who grew up in a Buddhist temple, peddlers often put a 
monk’s spade (月牙铲) in front of their booths when selling sour plum juice (fig. 2.3). 
What’s unique of the spade was the character “日” (the sun) engraved in the center, 
which indicated the Ming dynasty.83 Street criers also used two small copper bowls and 
struck them against each other to attract customers. The two copper bowls were called 
“bing zhan”84 (冰盏, ice bowls), which were derived from the Buddhist instrument—
prayer singing bowls.85 Every summer when people heard the sound of “bing zhan” and 
songs like “sour plum juice is delicious; the water is from Yu Quan spring; the juice is 
iced by the ice from Shi Cha Lake, clean and healthy…,”86 they knew that the sour plum 
juice peddler was coming. From the Ming dynasty to Republican of China, striking “bing 
zhan” was a unique advertisement for cold and iced food, which was especially common 
in north China.  
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Figure 2.3: A peddler is selling sour plum juice.  
There is a monk’s spade standing next to the booth. The peddler is singing and 
meanwhile his right hand is playing “bing zhan.” 
Source: Wang Luping. Hua shuo lao Beijing. P. 52.  
 
 Other people argued that the inventor of the sour plum juice was Qian Long, the 
sixth emperor of the Qing Dynasty. Before came to Beijing, Manchus were nomads and 
used to eat sour food such as fermented cornmeal to help digestion. But fermented 
cornmeal could not be eaten too much after meals. After Manchus conquered China 
proper, Qian Long asked court chefs to develop new products of better taste. One 
invention was sour plum juice and it was Qian Long’s favorite drink. However, historical 
documents show that black plums, which were produced in south China, had been a 
common food since the Ming Dynasty. In fact, for food security, court chefs barely made 
bold innovations. Instead, they made some changes on folk foods and turned them into 
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new products. Plum juice in Beijing was especially well-known was because the Qing 
court made the juice with the best spring in China—Yu Quan spring.87  
 In China there were two famous sour plum juice brands: Xin Yuan Zhai 信远斋
in Beijing and Zheng Fu Ji 郑福记 in Shanghai. Among all of cold foods in Beijing, sour 
plum juice was the most popular one in summer, during which a variety of signboards 
marked with “iced sour plum juice” were seen everywhere. The best-known place was 
Xin Yuan Zhai, located at Liu Li Chang 琉璃厂, a flourishing cultural center in Beijing 
for scholars, painters, and calligraphers, who gathered together to write, compile, and 
purchase books and antiques. They, of course, were the main customers. The secret of 
Xin Yuan Zhai’s success was their juice was sweet, rich, and cool, tasted like rich wine. 
After drinking a small bowl, few people could resist a second one.88 It was said that at 
Xin Yuan Zhai people drinking eight or ten bowls of sour plum juice was very common. 
Once upon a time, two well-known Peking opera amateurs in the early twentieth century 
named Zhang Rennian 张稔年 and Zhang Zepu 张泽圃 came to Xin Yuan Zhai, and 
made a bet on how much sour plum juice they could drink. Finally, Zhang Zepu drank 
fourteen bowls, whereas Zhang Rennian drank twenty-six bowls.89  
 Initially, sour plum juice was a northern drink and popular in Beijing. Later, it 
was then introduced to Shanghai by four Peking opera singers, one of whom was Zheng 
Faxiang 郑法祥(1892-1965), who was born in Zhi Li 直隶 (today’s Hebei province). In 
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the Republic era, Zheng was known as the southern Monkey King because he was good 
at playing Sun Wu Kong 孙悟空, the most popular figure in Journey to the West.90西游
记 With other three northerners, Zheng opened Zheng Fu Zhai next to the Shanghai 
Great World 大世界, the biggest entertainment center in China. At the beginning, the 
store served for Peking opera singers, who worked very late in the evening. Since most 
singers were northerners, in addition to sour plum juice, Zheng Fu Zhai also sold well-
known Beijing snacks such as pea cakes 豌豆黄. Shortly, the store became popular 
among local Shanghainese. When people came to the Great World to watch Peking 
operas or movies, they would like to stop by Zheng Fu Zhai and have a bowl of sour 
plum juice and some snacks. Zheng Fu Zhai, therefore, became a must-see place in old 
Shanghai.91 
Sour plum juice was an alternative to tea. In further south of China including 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Fujian province, herbal tea (liang cha 凉茶) was more popular 
among the public. It was a decoction infused from 18 or more kinds of wild plants 
collected locally and used for removing minor physical defects and correcting 
physiological irregularities. Herbal tea contains multiple ingredients including plants with 
laxative properties, with stomachic actions, with diuretic and antipyretic effects, and so 
forth. People had to boil small amounts of many ingredients in large quantity of water for 
many hours until the decoction creates certain chemical changes. Summer of South China 
is very long, hot and humid, during which epidemics prevail and people are easily 
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attacked by heat strokes. For protection, southern people regularly drank herbal tea to 
keep healthy.92  
In summer, almost every southern family prepared herbal tea. People bought 
herbal tea bags from pharmacies or nearby herbal tea houses and boiled at home. In 
addition to home-made drinks, there were numerous herbal tea houses on market. They 
were family business and had particular recipes and brands which were passed down 
from one generation to the next. Today’s well-known brand Wang Lao Ji 王老吉, one of 
the most powerful competitors to Coca-Cola in contemporary China, was one of them. It 
was opened in the Qing dynasty. Like Coca-Cola’s secret recipe, recipes of brand herbal 
tea were also a secret, only known by the key family members.93 Unlike ordinary 
teahouses, herbal tea houses were very simple and small. There were no tables and chairs, 
but a large front desk, on which placed huge teapots, the symbol of herbal tea business, 
and several bowls covered by a piece of glass that kept flies away. When people passed 
by, they dropped several copper coins, drank one bowl and left. Cheaper herbal tea was 
sold by street peddlers who changed their business seasonally. In summer, they carried 
boiled herbal tea in big ceramic jars and peddled in streets.  
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Figure 2.4: Liang cha pu ji shi (Story of Herbal Tea House).  
“Da You Yi” was one of the oldest brands in herbal tea business opened in Guangdong in 
the Qing. It was a pharmacy, but selling boiled herbal tea as well. In the picture, a 
customer is drinking while standing in front of the stall. On his left, a mother is feeding 
her son with herbal tea. 
Source: Zhongshan Daily, Oversea Edition, vol. 203, page A5, March 15, 2009. Also see 
on-line http://www.zsnews.cn/backup/2009/04/23/1088534.shtml, accessed by July 9, 
2014. 
 
  Herbal tea was a regional drink, tasted a little bit bitter and smelled like medical 
decoction. In contrast, ordinary tea, which also possesses cooling properties, was more 
widely accepted across the country. Tea promotes body fluid production, quenches the 
thirst, clears heat and phlegm, and promotes digestion and urination. In traditional 
Chinese medicine, tea is used as a beverage to relieve indigestion and smooth bowel 
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movements. It is known as an antidote to clear toxic heat and used to relieve headaches, 
dizziness, heat stroke and sleepiness. Chinese people from north to south drank tea all 
around the year. They not only drank at home but also in teahouses, which generated a 
dynamic Chinese tea culture that has been fully studied by many scholars.94  
 
Dutch Water 
 Compared to thousands of years of tea culture as well as traditional Chinese 
summer foods and drinks, soft drinks were new to the Chinese. Soft drinks can trace their 
history back to mineral water found in natural springs, which had long been considered to 
have curative powers in many civilizations. In the sixteenth century when Europeans 
were exploring for mineral resources, geologists found the naturally effervescent waters 
from springs were extremely cool and thirst-quenching. Scientists soon discovered it is 
gas carbonium or carbon dioxide helps to create bubbles in the water. In the seventeenth 
century, interested in mineral water’s therapeutic values, European scientists began to 
develop carbonated beverages. The first drinkable, man-made glass of carbonated water 
was created by an Englishmen, Doctor Joseph Priestely in the late eighteenth century by 
infusing water with carbon dioxide by a pump. Because of its pleasant taste, carbonated 
water soon became very popular in Europe. Later on in the century, flavors were added to 
the water. By 1833, carbonated lemonade was sold in England. Forty years later, ginger 
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ale became a popular drink.95 In May, 1886, Coca-Cola, which was conceived of as a 
headache remedy at that time, was invented by Doctor John Pemberton, a pharmacist 
from Atlanta, Georgia. Within decades, with successful advertisement campaigns, Coca-
Cola became the most popular soft drink in the world.  
 In the late nineteenth century, aerated water was introduced to China by foreign 
merchants. It was sold at the price of four silver dollars per dozen and two silver dollars 
afterwards in foreign restaurants in treaty-port cities along the southeast coast.96 At first, 
the Chinese called it Dutch water (He Lan shui), because they believed it was invented by 
the Dutch and was imported from Holland.97 A second explanation for the name was the 
Chinese at that time called most western products “Dutch something,” so soft drinks as 
an exotic commodity were also named after Dutch.98 There was a third legend, saying the 
name was introduced by the oversea Chinese in Southeast Asia where most soft drink 
businessmen were Dutch. In Southeast Asia, soft drinks were called “Air Blanda.” In 
Malay, “Air” means water, and “Blanda” means Dutch.99 However, other people 
disagreed with the Southeast Asian interpretation, arguing that the name of Dutch water 
came from Japan. In the early nineteenth century when Japan was opened by western 
imperialists, Dutch merchant ship appeared in Osaka. Japanese people at that time were 
short and small. When they saw the tall and blond Dutch, they were astonished and 
curious about their commodities. Thereafter, the Japanese named everything western after 
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Dutch, and even called western learning “Dutch learning.” After the Japanese 
government established formal diplomatic relation with China in 1862, Sino-Japanese 
trade began to grow. The earliest Dutch water appeared in China was mainly imported by 
Japanese businessmen and they were only sold in Japanese stores.100 Regardless the 
various versions of explanation on the name, soft drinks became familiar to the Chinese 
in the early twentieth century, while the name—Dutch water—retained and was 
continuously used by Chinese people for several decades.  
 The major soft drink consumers in the early period were foreigners. They 
dominated China’s soft drink market until the early twentieth century. In summer when 
the sun was scorching and the whole world felt like a big oven, the Chinese refreshed 
themselves by eating watermelons and lotus roots, which had been soaked in the cool 
well water, while the westerners preferred drinking Dutch water.101 In the late imperial 
China when worship of things western was prevailing, some Chinese, especially the 
elites, saw drinking Dutch water as a symbol of social identity that distinguished 
themselves from the masses. It was said that Li Hongzhang 李鸿章, the leading 
statesman of the late Qing, who was best known for his generally pro-modern stance and 
importance as a negotiator with western countries after wars, treated his guests with 
Dutch water at home.102 Kaihong Ou, who used to be the servant of Sun Yat-sen, recalled 
that Sun Yat-sen liked Dutch water, too: Mr. Sun was a westernized person. In Yue Xiu 
Lou, the former residence of Sun Yat-sen in Guangzhou, there was an electricity 
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refrigerator. Every day when Sun was taking a walk with his wife Song Qingling, he 
always carried a bottle of Dutch water.103  
However, for ordinary Chinese at the turn of the century, Dutch water was still 
mysterious. Although people knew that Dutch water could drive away impurities and 
prevent heat stroke in summer, they believed according TCM knowledge it would 
weaken strength and vitality in the body because of its strong gas and coldness. The 
phenomenon that gas comes out from the stomach after hiccups after drinking was 
understood by the Chinese as a process of losing the inside vigor, which was extremely 
dangerous for physically weak people such as children and seniors.104 In addition, Dutch 
water was characterized by Chinese people as cold food and harmful. Deeply impacted 
by the yin-yang theory, which argued cold drinks upset the digestive system, the Chinese 
“did not care for, or rather dared to take too much cold drink. Even wine, observed by 
foreigners, was drunk warm in winter in China.”105  
Besides the medical harms, more dangers lurked in the bottle. A Confucian 
scholar in the Qing named Ge Yuanxu noted in 1877, “When opened the bottle, the lid 
flies off, and care should be taken not to be hit in the face or eyes.”106 Similar scenario 
was also seen in Li Boyuan’s Nan Ting Bi Ji, a collection of anecdotes in the late Qing 
Dynasty, in which the flying-off lid totally broke the traditional social etiquette in the 
public. The accident happened in the imperial civil service examination supervised by the 
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Prime Minster Wang, who was an outstanding talent and well-known for his elegance. 
During the exam, one examinee opened a bottle of Dutch water, the lid of which flied off 
and hit right in the face of Prime Minster Wang. The examinee was so intimidated, but 
Wang remained calm, just wiping his face with a handkerchief.107 Urban legends about 
dangers of Dutch water were very vivid and real, surviving well into the twentieth 
century. For instance a story circulated in the late Qing saying that a shop owner died 
after being hit by the flying cork of a bottle that broke in an accident.108 Explosions of 
soft drink bottles were much more frequent in soft drink factories, which made the jobs in 
soft drink industry one of the most dangerous occupations. Workers in the factories all 
wore safety masks made from thick iron wires in order to protect from physical injuries. 
To ensure the safety during the transportation, soft drink bottles were placed upside 
down.  
In the early time, Dutch water was neither palatable nor healthy for most Chinese 
people who were deeply rooted in their traditions. People believed that Dutch water was 
from the foreign devils and could not be drunk. In 1930 when worship of everything 
foreign became common in Chinese society, many people were still not quite comfortable 
with soft drinks. When explaining the ingredients in soft drinks, the description in an 
article published in an education magazine made people feel sick. It says “Put it bluntly, 
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maybe you will be unhappy, what you drink every day is what you breathe out…The gas 
in the bottle is not the usual air but carbonic acid gas.”109  
Perhaps because of the unpalatable and unfriendly taste, the Chinese phrase—
drinking He Lan Shui—in traditional China became a synonym of a cruel punishment. It 
referred to hanging a person upside down and pouring pepper water mixed with kerosene 
and ammonia into his nose. It was widely seen in many literature works and often 
mentioned with other punishments such as the torture rack and whipping. Particularly 
when describing how brutal the ruthless landlords, the greedy capitalists, and the 
Japanese invaders were, drinking He Lan Shui, sitting on the rack, and whipping were the 
most frequent phrases that were used. In addition, the bottle of Dutch water became a 
symbol of evilness, too. After Zhang Xun, a Qing-loyalist general, failed to restore the 
abdicated emperor Puyi, a cartoon created by Ma Xingchi vividly and sarcastically 
portrayed the scenario that Zhang took refuge in the Dutch legation. In the Cartoon, a 
man who wore a Qing official headwear and a court robe awkwardly cowered in a bottle 
of Dutch water, with his long braid exposed outside the bottle.110  
 
The Early Soft Drink Business  
 As the name—Dutch water—indicated, soft drinks in the early period were all 
imported from foreign countries, among which Japan, France, and Hong Kong were the 
top-three exporters. The amount of the imports was still large even in the twenties when 
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Chinese soft drink industry started. The net imports in 1925, 1926, and 1927 were 
1,878,696 bottles, 1,755,096 bottles, and 1,701,780 bottles respectively and Japan was 
the largest exporting country (See table 1.1). Soft drinks were imported through treaty 
ports, port cities that were opened to foreign trade by unequal treaties since the Opium 
War. Dalian (Dairen), Shanghai, and Tianjin (Tientsin) were three customs that imported 
the largest amount of soft drinks in the 1920s. From 1925 to 1927, the annual import 
through Dalian custom was over 480,000 bottles, which ranked the first among all port 
cities in China. Shanghai was the second largest port with an annual soft drink imports 
around 456,000 bottles. Tianjin ranked the third place in the country, importing over 
120,000 bottles every year. (See table 1.2) One decade later when domestic soft drink 
industry began to expand, the imports decreased dramatically. In 1935 there were only 
417,696 bottles imported to China. In the following year the number further decreased to 
192,804 bottles. In the thirties Shanghai replaced Dalian, becoming the largest importing 
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Table 2.1: Analysis of Foreign Trade: Imports on Aerated and Mineral Water112 








net imports from all 
foreign countries (dozens) 
1925 65,120 34,085 34,559 156,558 
1926 72,373 42,407 18,163 146,258 
1927 68,759 32,594 22,225 141,815 
 




The considerable decreasing of soft drink imports over the early twentieth century 
was largely due to the rapid development of soft drink industry in China. Seeing soft 
drinks as a potential lucrative business opportunity, foreigners began to open soft drink 
factories on the Chinese territory (most of them were in treaty-port cities along the 
coastline), though the development of the new business varied across regions. In South 
China, the earliest soft drink business was run by an American merchant who opened 
Guangzhou Pharmacy in Guangzhou in 1828. Thirteenth years later, it was sold to an 
Englishmen, Dr. Alexander Skirving Watson, and was renamed as Watson & Co. Ltd. 
after moving to Hong Kong.  
                                                 
 
 











1925 41,737 13,929 37,869 14,937 5,361 3,094 4,565 2,485 2,833 2,798 
1926 41,676 15,257 39,172 1,828 693 12,785 4,838 2,564 6,188 2,294 
1927 47,362 10,859 38,399 3,183 7,442 2,480 3,104 376 4,386 188 
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In North China, history of soft drinks began with the establishment of the British-
owned International Mineral Water Company in Tianjin in 1902. It was registered in 
Hong Kong and a year later merged with a soft drink workshop near the Shanghaiguan 
Railroad Station run by Jing Feng Railway Bureau (京奉铁路局). Although registered in 
Hong Kong, the Company had all its business in Tianjin, supplying soft drinks to British 
railroads. After mergence, the whole Company was moved to Shanhanguan where the 
Railroad Bureau provided space, invested 5,000 liang of silver, and assigned the 
representative of the Railroad Bureau, J. Burton, as the honorary chairman to the 
Company. The Company also got discounts on rail freights. In 1906, the Company 
merged with Tangshan Beer and Soda Company and changed its name to Crystal Mineral 
Water Co. ltd, and meanwhile established branches at Tianjin, Shanhaiguan, and Beijing. 
The contract between the Company and the Railroad Bureau was not renewed after 
expiration in 1918. Instead, this British soft drink company started to import Coca-Cola 
concentration and produce Coca-Cola between 1927 and 1930. The production was 
suspended between 1931 and 1945 due to the Japanese occupation. After the surrender of 
Japan, the Company resumed Coca-Cola business, starting to supply Coke to U.S. Army 
in Tianjin. 114 Qingdao was another city in North China where early soft drink business 
emerged. The Laoshan Iltis Mineral Water Company opened by German businessmen in 
1905 was the first soft drink company in the Shandong Province.  
The earliest and the most rapidly growing soft drink business in China was in 
Shanghai, the largest metropolis in twentieth-century China and one of the five or six 
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biggest cities in the world. The British pharmacy—J. Llewellyn and Co. Ltd—established 
in 1853 was the first company starting aerating water business in Shanghai.115 It was one 
of the three pharmacies in Shanghai under the name of the British Chemists (China) ltd. 
registered in Hong Kong.116 It started with small startup capital, but soon grew into one 
of the biggest soft drink suppliers in the city. The second influential soft drink company 
was also initiated by a British merchant, J. Macgregor, who later became the chair of the 
municipal committee. In 1871, J. Macgregor built a brewing house in Tilanqiao where he 
started soft drink production. In 1923, under the assistance of HSBC Bank, J. Macgregor 
imported soda producing equipment, a bottling line with a capacity of bottling 25 bottles 
per minute, and built a soft drink plant—Aquarius Mineral Water Company, which later 
became well-known in the Jiangnan area (mainly refers to Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
provinces).117 About the same time, the British firm Watson & Co. Ltd. in Hong Kong 
opened a soft drink branch—Watson’s Mineral Water Company—in Shanghai, the scale 
of which was smaller than Aquarius but its products were equally competitive in 
Shanghai.    
Soft drinks were highly seasonal products. Except big companies, most soft drink 
companies only opened in summer. Usually soft drink companies sold their products to 
local wholesale dealers who then distributed the drinks to retailers. In general, every 
dealer had contracts with specific suppliers. Take the biggest soft drink market—
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Shanghai—for example, De He Hao (德和号) located in the British concession was a 
Chinese dealer contracted with Llewellyn and Co. Ltd. The dealer rented a store in Dagu 
Street, which served as an office as well as a warehouse. Tong He Hao (同和号), having 
two stores and twenty employees in Ningbo Street, was a dealer for Aquarius. Fu Tai Ban 
Zhuang (福泰办莊), running business on soft drinks, wines, and beers, was a contractor 
with Watson’s. It, in the meantime, was also searching for cooperation with Aquarius. 
Dealers bought soft drinks from soft drink companies, and then sold to retailers such as 
restaurants, cold drink shops, cafés, and grocery stores (Tobacco-Paper Stores 烟纸店).118  
In early twentieth-century China where modern industry including glass industry 
was just starting, soft drink bottles, many of which were imported from overseas, were 
the largest asset in the industry. Therefore, bottle recycling became very important in the 
business. To make sure that production would not be interrupted, soft drink companies 
required all dealers and retailers to return bottles before purchasing more drinks. If there 
was any breakage, penalties would apply. In most cases, soft drink companies calculated 
the cost of bottles into retailing prices and then refunded customers when bottles were 
returned. Since glass bottles were heavy and fragile and the frequency of bottle recycling 
directly affected productivity, most soft drink companies and dealers restricted their 
business in a local area. Take Tong He Hao, for example, over half of its business was in 
Shanghai, while the rest was in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, two provinces that were closed to 
Shanghai. Their main target cities outside of Shanghai were Nanjing, Hankou, Ningbo, 
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and Wuxi.119 Except Hankou, the other three cities were no more than 200 miles from 
Shanghai.  
Generally, soft drink companies produced all kinds of soft drinks, but big 
companies always had their flagship products. In Shanghai where big soft drink 
companies clustered, flagship brands were well-known among the local people. Aquarius 
Mineral Water Company was known for its lemonade soda; Watson’s Mineral Water 
Company was good at producing sarsaparilla (its taste was closed to Coca-Cola, which 
did not come to China until 1927) and soda water; and Llewellyn was famous for ginger 
ale.120 Compared to prices of food, soft drinks were pricy commodities in the early 
twentieth century and the prices varied among manufacturers. In 1937 Shanghai, Coca-
Cola was sold at 2 yuan a bottle and the rest soft drinks produced by Watson’s were 1.40 
yuan a bottle. Products of Llewellyn were sold at 0.90 yuan a bottle. Products of Yili Soft 
Drink Company, the fourth biggest soft drink company in Shanghai, were 1.00 yuan per 
bottle.121 As reference, 1 yuan in 1936 Shanghai could buy any one of the following 
products: 14 pounds of rice, 3.5 pounds of pork, 2 pounds of cotton, 7.5 pounds of 
kerosene, 20 soaps (Guben brand), 21 boxes of cigarettes (jinshu brand), almost 3 pounds 
of tea, 42 eggs, 4 pounds of bean oil, 2.5 pounds of lard, 9 pounds of salt, or 4.9 pounds 
of sugar.122 
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Soft drink business developed especially fast in vibrant cities like Shanghai. After 
the establishment of the three big soft drink companies—Llewellyn, Aquarius, and 
Watson’s, soft drink companies mushroomed in Shanghai. Within a few decades, many 
new soft drink companies including Yili, Meihua, and Zhongyang opened one after 
another, leading to a fierce competition in the industry. Companies that were poor in 
management or lacked capital investment faced particularly severe challenges. Even the 
founding father of Shanghai soft drink industry—Llewellyn—could not survive easily. 
Without appropriate marketing strategies, Llewellyn’s products were not welcomed by 
the public. The Company only had less than 180,000 bottles, which impeded efficient 
circulation and thus led to an ultimate failure.123 In July 1933, the British owner of 
Llewellyn felt himself too old to manage the business under such a harsh condition and 
declared bankruptcy. Although the Company shortly was taken over by a Chinese 
technician who was used to work in the Company, Llewellyn never regained its previous 
glory. By the late thirties, the leading soft drink company in Shanghai was Aquarius, 
whose influence extended to the whole Jiangnan area. It was followed by Watson’s, Yili, 
Llewellyn, Zhongyang, and Meihua.124  
 
Conclusion  
 TCM was a well-established indigenous science in traditional China. It was not 
only used in treating diseases but also closely associated with traditional Chinese food 
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culture. When soft drinks were introduced, the majority of the Chinese chose to stick to 
their own belief, whereas a very small group of people—the intellectuals—dared to try 
the exotics. The pioneer Chinese consumers like Li Hongzhang and Sun Yat-sen were all 
western-educated and familiar with western products, but most Chinese people in the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century knew nothing about the western world. When 
an exotic product came, Chinese consumers were less influenced by product descriptions; 
they made their choices based on their knowledge. Every season, ordinary Chinese 
people, most of whom knew Chinese medical theories very well, adjusted their diets 
according to their body conditions and climate. Their consumer behavior indicated that 
Chinese people were rational consumers who did not blindly imitate others. When 
purchasing a product, they not only considered economic values but also scientific and 
social merits. The split between common Chinese people and the intellectuals, however, 
revealed the stratification of the society. China was not only stratified by class or wealth, 




CULTIVATING DESIRE: ADVERTISEMENT, MODERNITY, AND 
CONSUMPTION 
 Soft drinks were introduced to China in the nineteenth century, but they were not 
well received by the Chinese until half a century later. After 1911, fizzy drinks rapidly 
spread in large coastal cities. In the 1940s, soft drinks, especially Coca-Cola, became so 
popular that they were not only summer necessities but also symbolized people’s social 
status. With regard to the growing number of Chinese soft drink customers, Frank 
Dikötter argues “the availability of raw materials, including sugar and fruit, the 
improvement in transportation, the use of advertisements and the advent of new forms of 
leisure account for the popularity of soft drinks.”125 However, if the Chinese were not 
interested in the beverage in the first place, even there were abundant raw materials and 
excellent distribution networks, the result would be completely different. Yet Frank 
Dikötter was right that when encountering exotic commodities, Chinese people 
“marveled at mechanical objects as if they were animate, whether the wonderful sight of 
running water or the simple switching on of a light: exuberance and enchantment in 
technological devices was widespread, leading to low levels of resistance against 
novelty.”126 This lack of resistance and craving for modernity was also apparent in the 
change of foodways.  
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  After the Opium War, Chinese people were awakened from the dream of the 
Celestial Empire and realized that they significantly lagged behind the western world in 
weaponry, especially in science and technology. Domestic and international crises forced 
Qing courtiers to launch the Self-strengthening Movement to safeguard the ruling. They 
began to examine and translate “Western Learning,” in which science and technology 
were given a particular attention. During the movement, western science and languages 
were studied, modern schools were opened in big cities, arsenals, factories, and shipyards 
were established based on Western models, and students were sent abroad by the 
government in hope that national regeneration could be achieved through application of 
Western practical methods. Although the movement did not save the Qing Empire, 
science and technology as an ideology deeply influenced the history of modern China.    
 The collapse of the Qing Empire ended the entire millennia-old framework of 
dynastic rule, but did not save China from imperialism. Japan’s Twenty-One Demand and 
the Versailles Peace Treaty, in which China lost not only territory sovereign but also 
economic right, infuriated Chinese people. Some intellectuals realized that China’s 
tragedy was not merely due to the backward political system, but more importantly was 
caused by the “backwardness” of the traditional values. Chen Duxiu, the founder of the 
journal New Youth, a leading forum for debating China’s politics, led a revolt against 
Confucianism in the early twentieth century. They called for creation of new Chinese 
culture based on western standards, with a particular emphasis on democracy and science. 
Democracy soon became a vital tool for intellectuals who were frustrated with the 
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unstable condition of China, whereas science became a crucial instrument to discard the 
“darkness of ignorance and superstition.”127  
 Encouraged by these new ideas, TCM, a representative of Chinese traditional 
culture, was treated as a symbol of China’s backwardness by many western-educated 
intellectuals and was under fierce attack in the early twentieth century. Intellectuals such 
as Yu Yunxiu 余云岫 and Wang Qizhang 汪企张 suggested that TCM, also known as old 
medicine, was fraudulent and should be abolished. In 1929 Yu’s proposal on abolishing 
TCM was presented and discussed in the Guomindang Government. Although the radical 
proposition was not implemented due to protests from traditional Chinese doctors, the 
debate had a tremendous impact on people’s general attitude toward TCM. Even though 
not directly related, the criticism on TCM also influenced people’s diets, especially 
Chinese people’s views to soft drinks, a product which was regarded as unhealthy 
according to TCM. As Chinese intellectuals were vigorously questioning the old way of 
doing things and advocating science and modernity, western life style, which was 
regarded as scientific and modern, became what people imitated and desired. 
Accordingly, western products including soft drinks transformed from something bizarre 
and mysterious to something modern and superior.  
 Mao Zedong said “a new world will be created by condemning the old world.”128 
Acceptance of soft drinks in modern China was also based on smashing people’s bias on 
soft drinks and the bias was largely acquired from China’s indigenous science, TCM. 
This chapter, first of all, discusses the debate between TCM and western medicine, which 
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fundamentally shook people’s epistemology on cold and fizzy drinks. The second part of 
the chapter discusses when sanitation of drinking water in summer was a problem in 
many Chinese cities in early twentieth-century China, soft drinks, which were advertised 
as healthy, clean, and modern drinks, served as an alternative choice of summer 
refreshments for Chinese consumers. Besides medical merits, soft drinks in the early 
twentieth century were regarded as an epitome of modern science and technology. Driven 
by the desire for modernity, Chinese people not only accepted soft drinks, but warmly 
welcomed soft drinks. The final part of this chapter shows under the banner of 
modernization in twentieth-century China, how soft drinks, with a particular focus on 
Coca-Cola, became a new symbol of summer. 
 
Debates over TCM and Western Medicine in the Early Twentieth Century 
 As western science, technology, and medicine were introduced after the Opium 
War, TCM was regarded by many Chinese intellectuals as one of the biggest obstacles on 
the way of modernization.  Believing his father’s death was caused by misdiagnoses by 
TCM, Lu Xun at his early age devoted himself to studying western medicine in Japan. 
Another active intellectual, Fu Sinian 傅斯年, who received higher education in Europe, 
agreed with Lu Xu that TCM was backward and not scientific. Fu’s articles such as “the 
so-called national medicine” (suo wei guo yi) and “talk about the so-called national 
medicine again” (zai lun suo wei guo yi) clearly demonstrated his opposition to 
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TCM.129130 Fu said “I would rather die than ask TCM, because otherwise my western 
education would be totally a waste.”131  
Fu’s statement somehow was later proved by Liang Qichao. In 1926, Liang was 
diagnosed with a kidney tumor by Peking Union Medical College Hospital, one of the 
earliest modern hospitals and medical research centers founded by Rockefeller 
Foundation in modern China. Doctors in the hospital suggested Liang removing the left 
kidney, while doctors trained in TCM suggested him drinking decoctions. Many Liang’s 
friends opposed surgery since surgery was scary to most Chinese people at that time, but 
Liang firmly trusted western medicine and decided to follow doctor’s advice. After the 
surgery, Liang did not recover. Rather his health became worse and worse, and he finally 
died in January, 1929. Rumors said Liang’s death was due to a failed surgery, during 
which the doctor removed the wrong kidney: the right one not the left. After the surgery, 
Liang’s brother Liang Qixun 梁启勋 published an article entitled “hospital notes” 
recorded the surgery: “when the bad kidney was taken out, we could not see any tumor 
and the kidney seemed as good as a healthy one…”132 Although no one could prove 
whether the surgery was successful or failed and Liang’s medical case remains to be a 
myth today, the surgery provoked a controversy on western medicine in the society in the 
late 1920s. As a believer and promoter of western science, Liang Qichao firmly defended 
western medicine, even though his health became even worse after the surgery. He said 
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“we cannot question science just because we know very little. Although the result of my 
surgery is worse than what doctors expected, it might be an exception. I believe that each 
medical case must be strictly inspected by western medicine, rather than be randomly 
guessed by the yin-yang theory in TCM. I hope people do not use my medical case as a 
pretext to obstruct modernization of our country.”133    
Debates over TCM and western medicine initially were between radical 
intellectuals and conservatives. Later on, the Republic Government leaders took the 
individual bias into legislation. In 1929, Yu Yunxiu and Wang Qizhang presented a 
radical proposal in the first session of the Central Health Committee meeting: “A Case 
for the Abolishment of Old Medicine to Thoroughly Eliminate Public Health 
Obstacles.”134 The proposal argued that “the theories of yin and yang, the five elemental 
phases, the six atmospheric influences, the zang-fu systems, and the acupuncture 
channels are all illusions that have no basis in reality” and warned that “old medicine is 
still conning the people with its charlatan, shamanic, and geomancing ways.”135 The 
proposal aggressively suggested the Government banning TCM: “severely limited the 
advertising and practice of Chinese medicine and prohibit the establishment of Chinese 
medicine schools.”136  
Yu Yunxiu’s radical proposal aroused fierce protests from Chinese medicine 
practitioners who saw the proposal as a highly political-sensitive action. TCM 
practitioners united with TCM pharmacists, claiming that TCM advocated Sun Yat-sen’s 
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three people’s principles and whether abolished TCM or not directly related to whether 
supported the three people’s principles. They believed the proposal was “an imperialists’ 
new approach to invade China,”137 and Yu and Wang were imperialists’ lackeys who 
must be overthrown. To save TCM, practitioners and pharmacists argued that the purpose 
of promoting TCM was “to promote health and strengthen the nation.” Their slogan 
“promoting TCM practice to prevent from cultural imperialism and supporting TCM 
pharmacy to prevent from economic imperialism” were widely circulated in the society, 
which imposed a heavy pressure on the Guomindang Government.138  
Thanks to thousands of protesting TMC practitioners and pharmacists’ endless 
effort, the proposition was not implemented in the 1920s. However, the production of 
anti-TCM sentiment in an official document exerted a tremendous impact on the image of 
TCM in the society. As the debate over TCM and western medicine continued in the 
following decades, TCM as a fundamental guide in having a balanced diet and keeping 
healthy was shaken. When people drank cold and fizzy drinks, they no longer felt as 
uncomfortable as they were in the past, because the TCM knowledge became 
controversial and western science showed that diseases were caused by bacteria rather 
than imbalance of yin-yang. Victory of western science and medicine over TCM in the 
early twentieth century solved the epistemological problem that soft drinks encountered 
in China, which provided soft drinks with possibilities to further explore market in China.   
Drinking modernity: soft drinks and health 
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 In traditional China, water-borne epidemics frequently took place in cities. In 
most treaty-port cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin, where migration kept population 
increasing, epidemics appeared almost every year and mortality was high. Cholera was 
one of the most serious fatal diseases that frequently broke out in the early twentieth 
century. The History of Shanghai Epidemic Prevention shows since the establishment of 
the Republic of China, cholera in Shanghai first occurred in 1912, and frequently 
appeared after 1918. In year 1903, 1907, 1912, 1914, and 1919, morality caused by 
cholera were 162, 655, 1307, 350, and 648 respectively.139 In 1932, cholera evolved into 
a nationwide epidemic, influencing 157 counties in 18 provinces.140  
Generally, epidemics were seasonal, often occurred in summer, especially in 
high-temperature years. Summer of 1934 was the hottest season in the meteorological 
history of Shanghai in the twentieth century. The average high daytime temperature of 
that summer was 35 Degrees Celsius (95 Degrees Fahrenheit), lasting from June 25th to 
August 31st, fifty-five days in total. The highest temperature in that year reached 41.2 
Degrees Celsius (106.16 Degrees Fahrenheit) in July 12. In summer 1934, the number of 
people who had cholera was huge. Da Gong Bao reported “the road surface temperature 
reached nearly 140 Degrees Fahrenheit on June 27th. Many people who caught cholera 
were found. Hundreds of rickshaw drivers were found faint on the road.” Sheng Bao 
reported on June 29th that because of the increasing number of patients attacked by 
seasonal epidemics and heat strokes, hospitals set up prevention stations earlier than 
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previous years. Everyday immunization shots were given to more than one million people 
including factory workers, students, and citizens.141 
European advancements in bacteriology, which were introduced by foreigners and 
translated by Chinese intellectuals, taught people that cholera was transmitted through 
impure drinking water and the quality of water was essential for health. Threatened by 
high mortality every season, foreigners in treaty-port cities took a series of measures 
including providing running water and managing night soil to ensure clean water. 
However, in the condition of continuously expansion of urban population in the early 
twentieth century, clean water could be hard to access in big cities. Well water was clean 
but tasted salty, whereas river water was turbid, containing bacteria that caused 
diseases.142 Cities like Tianjin whose particular geography made the water quality even 
worse. Lying close to the sea in a major salt-producing region, Tianjin’s wells produced a 
brackish, saline brew.143 Most Chinese cities were surrounded by rivers, but most of them 
served as the dumping ground for the region’s millions, which turned into a breeding 
place for bacteria. In general, entire provinces in China lacked adequate drinking water: 
in Guizhou most water was stagnant, and drinking from wells was considered as 
particularly unhealthy.144 Sources of drinking water could be contaminated in Shanghai, 
leading to a wide spread of diseases.145 According to Wang Tao (1828-87), local water 
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there tasted so bad that it spoilt the tea.146 Teahouses put a premium on pure water. It was 
not for health concerns, but because pure water enhanced the taste of the beverage they 
served. Teahouses in Suzhou particularly collected rain water or obtained water from 
selected wells and unpolluted canals outside the city, where boats were forbidden 
specifically for water quality purpose.147 
To prevent diseases, western-educated scientists suggested the public distilling or 
boiling water before drink. However, distilled and boiled water was stagnant and insipid. 
The best drinking water was mountain spring, clean, natural, but rare. It tasted fresh and 
sweet because it contained air. In numerous Chinese educational journals, Chinese 
scientists defined ideal drinking water as clean, transparent, colorless, and carbonated. It 
tasted fresh, cool, and bacteria-free. The ideal water could completely dissolve soap 
without leaving any sediment or scum, and was perfect for cooking.148 Drinking this kind 
of water not only quenched thirst, but was also good for health. There were two sorts of 
waters according to the journals were considered ideal: natural spring water and artificial 
carbonated water, also known as Dutch water. Having different juices and essences, 
Dutch water included lemonade soda, ginger water, orange soda, banana soda, etc., all of 
which were effervescent when bottles were opened.149  
According to educational journals and magazines at that time, carbon dioxide gas 
in water could inhibit bacterial growth, so the quantity of bacteria in soft drinks was 
much less than bacteria numbers in any other cold drinks and foods. Therefore, soft 
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drinks could be preserved for a long time.150 By adding carbon dioxide gas into distilled 
or treated water, soft drinks became as good as natural spring water, much more superior 
to ordinary water. Its plentiful gas, which was considered harmful to health according 
TCM, was in fact good for digestive system according modern science and medicine. 
Particularly in summer when gastrointestinal motility slowed down due to lack of 
exercises, indigestion became common. Studies showed overdrinking water or tea 
sometimes would harm stomach. One explanation was shu pi zhi (树皮质), a composition 
in tea leaves which would be fully dissolved in water after long-time soak, would cause 
diseases.151 In contrast, western-educated scientists suggested in journals that soft drinks 
containing carbonic acid could not only quench thirst but stimulate bowel movements, 
and improve appetite.152  
Soft drinks were also considered superior to watermelons by modern scientists. 
Some Chinese intellectuals and doctors who were open-minded did not take sides in the 
TCM vs. western medicine debates, but they somehow mixed the two different scientific 
theories into a hybrid system. In a children’s magazine of 1924, they suggested drinking 
soft drinks instead of eating watermelons to clear summer heat, because watermelons 
could not relieve summer heat according to western medicine; instead they easily made 
people sick. What’s interesting was they also adopted cold and hot concepts from TCM, 
stating that eating watermelons was dangerous after the beginning of autumn based on 
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the lunar calendar. They recommended soft drinks as an ideal summer drink, because 
inside heat could be taken away by belches, making the body feel cool and refreshing.153 
They believed soft drinks were superior to ice-creams, too, because soft drinks were 
neither too cold nor too cloying154 and more refreshing and cleaner. Chinese scientists 
and entrepreneurs pointed out that the modern and scientific producing process ensured 
soft drinks containing less Escherichia coli. Unlike ice-cream made of milk and eggs 
absorbing salvia to burn protein, carbonic acid in soft drinks stimulated salvia and 
facilitated sweating and digestion, and therefore made the body feel cooler.155 
Combined with various additives such as fruit juice, not only the taste of soft 
drinks improved, but soft drinks’ medical values were broadened. Natural fruit juice, 
lactic acid, and invert sugar would improve gastrointestinal function, stimulate appetite, 
and accelerate recovery from fatigue.156 Soft drinks containing potassium sulfate 
(K2SO4) and sodium bicarbonate (NaHCO3) had more medical merits. Spring water 
having calcium (calcium carbonate) and ordinary water containing magnesium ions 
(magnesium chloride) could not be directly used to produce soft drinks, because calcium 
and magnesium ions produce precipitation when they are mixed with acid. Sodium 
carbonate (Na2CO3) was the common chemical applied to remove calcium and 
magnesium ions, after which there were only a small amount of sodium (Na2SO4) and 
sodium chloride (NaCl) left in water and a part of them became potassium sulfate and 
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sodium bicarbonate after mixed with potassium bicarbonate (KHCO3), one of additives 
in soft drink production. After the processing, soft drinks have the same compositions as 
those in natural spring in Europe (加尔尔斯泉水). In real industrial production, citric 
acid and sodium bicarbonate were the two common additives in soft drinks. To improve 
flavor, soft drink companies sometimes replaced with gluconic acid and potassium 
bicarbonate. Potassium and sodium ions left in water made the drink the same as the 
natural spring. According to western science, Chinese journals pointed out that soft 
drinks could help to treat gastroparesis, constipation, jaundice, beriberi, stroke, 
hyperemia, and hemorrhoids.157  
Thanks to these educational journals, magazines, and programs, soft drinks’ 
medical values soon became a selling point for the emerging business. In a society where 
clean water was hardly guaranteed in urban areas, hygiene was the biggest consideration 
of the public. Soft drink companies advertised the sanitation of their products in various 
ways. Some declared that their products were made from distilled water. Take Aquarius 
Mineral Company for example. One of their well-known advertising slogans in Shanghai 
since the early twentieth century was “pure water, good taste, and every drop is 
distilled.”158 Words like “clean” and “distilled” frequently appeared on the Company’s 
advertising souvenirs. (Figure 3.1) Similar advertising language could also be seen in 
other companies’ advertisement across China. Shanghai Qing Lian soft drinks’ 
advertising slogan was “every drop is distilled and good for health.”159 Mei Hua Mineral 
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Water Company in Qingdao used exactly the same words in the advertisement of their 
Xian Guo Soda, saying “every drop is distilled, refreshing and tasty. It invigorates the 
spleen and increases appetite. It is popular around the world.”(Figure 3.2)   
 
Figure 3.1 
This is a souvenir produced by Shanghai Aquarius Soft Drink Company in the 1930s. It is 
a plate, on which prints the company’s trade mark and an advertising slogan—Aquarius’ 
soft drinks: distilled and pure.” 





This is a piece of advertisement on Xian Guo soda by Mei Hua Soft Drink Company from 
Qingdao. From the right to left, it says: every drop is distilled, refresh and delicious, 
invigorating the spleen and increasing the appetite, popular around the world.  
Source: “Mei hua qi shui chang ye wu guang gao,” Min yan bao, Jul 29, 1947, the 
Qingdao Archive, D000068/00057. 
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In China’s soft drink industry, not every company afforded to distill water; 
instead many of them produced soft drinks with running water. In beverage market where 
hygiene was the biggest consideration, these companies also tried every effort to 
demonstrate the quality of their drinks. One of the most effective approaches of 
demonstration was to display their scientific water treatment process. In the 1920s and 
1930s, introduction articles and investigation reports on soft drink companies were 
widely seen in scientific, industrial, and business journals and magazines. Watson’s 
Mineral Water Company, one of the leading companies in Shanghai, reported in 1926 
that they had a very complicated scientific water treatment process to guarantee every 
bottle of their product was sanitary. There was a huge water filtration room on the second 
floor of the plant, in which three large cylinders equipped with a power-driven ultraviolet 
sterilizer. It was the most advanced technology at that time, killing all bacteria in water 
that flowed through, but in the meantime, preserving all nutritional composition.160 
Watson’s advertised their products as “the most sanitary drinks produced by the most 
advanced ultraviolet sterilizer.” (Figure 3.4) This language shortly became the buzzwords 
in the whole soft drink industry.  
Small soft drink companies did not have machinery as advanced as Watson’s 
were, but they still tried their best to prove that their products were as sanitary as those 
produced by big companies. Instead of using complicated and dazzling scientific and 
technical terms, they repeatedly mentioned “sanitary” and “clean” in their advertisement. 
Shanghai Guo Hua soft drink company’s advertisement emphasized that they used clean, 
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pure, and sanitary materials, which had good smell and were good for quenching thirst 
and helping digestion. Da Mei Soft Drink Company stressed that their products were 
sanitary and noble, which effectively relieved summer heat.161 
Soft drink’s medical values were another marketing focus that the companies 
highlighted. Since western science suggested that carbon dioxide was good for 
refreshment, Chinese intellectuals saw soft drinks as a symbol in summer, which could be 
equivalent to watermelons, ice, and plum juice. (Figure 3.3) In every May or April, 
shopkeepers put soft drink bottles outside retailing stores for advertising, as if to remind 
people that summer was coming and it was the time to drink soft drinks.162 This symbolic 
connection between soft drinks and summer largely attributed to advertisement, in which 
“relieve summer heat” emerged as the other buzzword followed after “clean” and 
“sanitary.” As soft drinks were increasingly popular among the elites, some Chinese 
intellectuals began to challenge the traditional view on cold food in TCM. They argued 
that cold drinks and ice would not hurt health; rather they effectively reduced body heat 
in summer. In response to intellectuals, soft drink companies incorporated the idea of 
summer heat from TCM into their advertisement. Da Mei and Qing Lian soft drink 
companies, for example, said their products relieved summer heat and quenched thirst. 
Ma Ti soda’s advertisement on Da Gong Bao in 1911 pointed out that “Ma Ti soda made 
of special natural mineral water could relieve summer heat, remove weather evil, and is a 
necessity in everyday life.”163  
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In addition to clean and refreshing, some companies broke down soft drinks’ 
medical merits into several categories by adding various additives. Take Watson’s for 
example. Its lemonade soda quenched thirst and helped digestion; orange soda 
strengthened stomach and stimulated appetite; sarsaparilla removed dampness and 
smoothened qi; grape soda moisturized body and nourished lungs; ginger ale warmed 
stomach and strengthened qi; and cola soda refreshed body. (Figure 3.4) These medical 
values were either supported by TCM or western medicine. However, medical values of 
other soft drinks seemed too exaggerated to be true. One article appeared in women’s 
magazine in 1919 indicated that orange juice or orange soda could bring dead people 
back to life. If feeding babies with boiled milk mixed with a spoon of lemon juice, all 
diseases could be cured.164 
 
Figure 3.3: A cartoon made in the 1940s titled expression of hot weather. 
A man is lying on a summer sleeping mat with a cattail leaf fan in the hand. A 
watermelon, a bottle of soft drink, a cup of water, and a piece of ice were on his side. 
Source: Yong an monthly, vol. 1, National Library Microfilm Center, 2006. 
 
                                                 
 
 




Figure 3.4  This is a piece of advertisement made by Watson’s Mineral Water Company 
in Shanghai posted on The Young Companion in 1926. On the right, it lists all kinds of 
Watson’s products with different medical merits. In the middle of the advertisement, it 
says the company used the most advanced and modern equipment to sterilize water. 
Source: The Young Companion, No. 6, July 15, 1926. P. 2. 
 
Although innumerable advertisements made every effort to teach the public that 
soft drinks were good for health, it still took time to fully convince the majority of the 
Chinese. Yet, science and modernity was not just an abstract idea, a theory, or something 
invisible, but also were manifested in artifacts. In early twentieth-century China where 
glass manufacture was just started, soft drink bottles which withstood pressure became an 
exquisite artifact that represented and demonstrated modernity. When soft drinks were 
just introduced to China, frequent explosions were one of the reasons that the Chinese 
disliked soft drinks. However, as technology improved, soft drink bottles, especially the 
imported ones, became safer and some of them were interesting to open. One of the 
common bottles on the market was ramune soda bottles or marble soda bottles, a 
Japanese product that was introduced to China around 1902. The bottle, also known as 
the Codd-neck bottle, was named after the inventor, an English engineer, Hiram Codd. It 
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was made of glass and sealed with a marble in the codd head, which was held in place by 
the pressure of carbonation in the drink. To open the bottle, push the marble inward and it 
sank to the bottom of the bottle.165 This design allows the bottle standing upright and 
meanwhile preventing carbon dioxide from escaping upwards. Because of the interesting 
design, marble soda became children’s favorite. After enjoying the drink, children often 
smashed the bottle to get the beautiful marble for fun. The other type of soft drink bottles 
was also made of glass, but replaced the marble with a cork for sealing. To prevent 
carbon dioxide from escaping and prevent the cork from flying out, the bottle had to be 
placed upside down, which seemed strange but scientific to the Chinese.  
To withstand certain pressure, soft drink bottles required high-quality glass, but 
Chinese bottles could hardly meet the standard. Even Japanese bottles were disliked by 
mineral water producers, because the bottles were often full of bubbles which easily burst 
when pressure was put into the bottle, leaving bits of broken glass in the bottle.166 Soft 
drink companies agreed that the most economical way with bottles was to buy the best 
ones only, from the first rate manufactures in Europe and America. As the business grew, 
bottles were the biggest assets in soft drink companies. In a company sometimes the 
value of empty bottles in stock was equivalent to the value of the total machinery. 
Considering the cost, soft drink companies recycled bottles from the market and bottle 
circulation became a rule in the industry. When a thing is scare, it is precious, let alone a 
high-tech product that could not be produced in China where science and technology was 
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particularly valued and pursued. Therefore, what made soft drinks special to Chinese 
consumers was not only the magical liquid but also the bottle, an emblem of science and 
modernity. To save money, some Chinese people kept the bottle after drinking and then 
filled it with homemade drinks. Although homemade drinks tasted not as pleasant as 
brand-name soft drinks, drinking with a soft drink bottle in hand still satisfied people’s 
psychological needs.  
As western science and technology overtook Confucianism, becoming a central 
ideology in Chinese society in the modern times, soft drinks transformed from mysterious 
exotics, which used to be considered having a potential danger to health, to a modern and 
healthy beverage which was indispensable in summer. In the words of Frank Dikötter, 
with the advent of aerated water, new opportunities for refreshment presented themselves 
to a thirsty public keen to avoid contaminated water and eager to display status.167 In the 
first half of the twentieth century, Chinese people, especially the elites, were 
reconstructing their knowledge with modern science and modernity. In their eyes, soft 
drinks were sweet and refreshing, neither as bland as water nor as bitter as tea. The drink 
was no longer simply a beverage, a commodity, or a luxury, but the most suitable and 
ideal drink to quench thirst, reduce summer heat, and more importantly represent social 
status.168 Every year soft drinks were the best-selling product among all cold beverages 
and foods in summer. It was sold at retailing stores, cold drink shops, ball rooms, movie 
theaters, and cafés. Its business even overtook watermelons in big cities like Shanghai as 
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what a folk song pathetically described: “watermelons come after peaches and plums; 
business should be done in seasons. Watermelons are big, sweet, and cheap, but when 
foreign soft drinks came, they became outdated.”169 
 Since the thirties, cold drink shops mushroomed and became the most common 
places where people drank soft drinks and socialized in summer. In Shanghai cold drink 
shops were painted with snow and icicles in blue and white. Green bamboo curtains were 
hanging on the front door, on the other side of which tables covered with white 
tablecloths were neatly placed. Two to three o’clock in the afternoon was the busiest 
time, as it was cool in the morning and was too hot at noon.170 Young people from middle 
and upper classes gathered together with friends in cold drink shops, drinking, talking, 
and enjoying the coolness in summer. Ballrooms were another place where soft drinks 
were popular. Perhaps people easily got thirsty after dance and men usually dancing with 
women, especially with girlfriends, so order something to drink in ballrooms was custom. 
Soft drinks were expensive in ballrooms. The prices were several times higher than those 
on the market and often higher than a ballroom ticket. However, customers still bought 
soft drinks, because as men were usually willing to spend money on women.171  
Some rich people came to ballrooms for drinking soft drinks rather than dancing. 
If they happened to be a good drinker, their names and legends would be known by 
everyone in the ballrooms as if they were well-known heavy alcohol drinkers. Newspaper 
in 1938 used to publish a legendary story about a man who drank twelve bottles of soft 
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drinks at one time in the ballroom: “he wore a pair of glasses and had his hair permed. 
Whenever came to the ballroom, he always ordered three to five bottles of sarsaparilla. 
What was even more surprising is he opened bottles with teeth instead of using an 
opener, leaving the same teeth marks on every bottle cap. Adding some ice, he drained all 
bottles and then ordered another several bottles. His highest record is drinking forty 
bottles a day.”172 
 Because of high prices, soft drinks were luxury and only elites pursuing 
modernity could afford it. When soft drinks were rare and had not been fully accepted by 
the Chinese society, the founding father Sun Yat-sen already began to drink. After more 
and more soft drink companies opened business and extended advertising, soft drinks 
gradually became an identity for the upper class. Some celebrities even developed 
drinking soft drinks as a hobby. Song Ziwen’s sister-in-law, Zhang Yiru, who was a 
college student in the 1930s, was known for her addiction to soft drinks. As if addicted to 
drugs, Zhang drank six to seven bottles of soft drinks every day in a fixed schedule. If she 
missed the drinking time, the amount would be increased. Zhang only drank soda 
produced by big companies, even if it meant spending more money on shipping. Since 
there were no brand-name soft drinks in the canteens of her university, she asked the 
school staff to purchase for her from the market. Every Monday or Thursday, a truck of 
brand-name soft drinks were delivered to the campus, providing Zhang with a week’s 
supply.173   
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 As Chinese market was growing, soft drink industry expanded dramatically in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Soft drink companies mushroomed in big cities, where 
big companies endeavored to build up their reputation and brands. Drinks produced by 
Crystal Mineral Water Company were well known products in Tianjin. Drinks from 
Laoshan Iltis Mineral Water Co. Ltd were famous in Qingdao. J. Llewellyn and Co. Ltd, 
Aquarius Mineral Water Company, and Watson’s Mineral Water Company were the big 
three in Shanghai. Aquarius was known for its lemonade soda; Watson’s Mineral Water 
Company was good at producing sarsaparilla and soda water; and Llewellyn was famous 
for its ginger ale.174 Their business was booming rapidly, but when Coca-Cola came, all 
of the other brands were overshadowed. Although there were many difficulties in the first 
decade of operation, Coca-Cola gradually became popular and grew into the most 
favorite soft drink in the late 1940s.  
 
The advent of Coca-Cola 
Since Robert Winship Woodruff, who envisioned Coca-Cola as an international 
product, inaugurated the presidency of the Coca-Cola Company in 1923, the business of 
Coca-Cola began to expand worldwide. In 1926, Woodruff established a Foreign 
Department, which in 1930 became a subsidiary known as the Coca-Cola Export 
Corporation. It was a corporation which had acquired from the Coca-Cola Company the 
exclusive right to sell products of the Coca-Cola Company in a large part of the world 
including China. This corporation in New York received collaboration requests from all 
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parts of the world including China. Later on, a bottlers’ agreement was signed between 
the Coca-Cola Company, the owner of the trade mark “Coca-Cola,” the Coca-Cola 
Export Corporation, and bottlers who authorized to bottle, distribute and sell Coca-Cola 
in the territory defined in the agreement.175 
In the earlier time, bottled Coca-Cola were imported in a small amount by foreign 
firms such as Shanghai Mustard & Co. Ltd. Shortly, the Coca-Cola Export Corporation 
opened the first bottling plants in Shanghai in 1927 and Tianjin in 1929, two large treaty-
port cities in South and North China where a large number of foreigners resided in the 
concessions. The British-owned Crystal Mineral Water Company located in the British 
concession of Tianjin became Coca-Cola’s bottler who was responsible for producing 
and distributing Coca-Cola products in North China. Territories that the service of the 
Tianjin plant covered included all of the province of Chihli (Hebei 直隶), lying south of 
an imaginary line, beginning at the most southern point of Chahar (察哈尔) province and 
running eastward to the city of Tanggu. Ten years later, the plant got extra-territorial 
shipping privileges. The market covered Peking (Beijing) and its environs, all coast line 
territory, and northeast of Tanggu, embracing towns including Tangshan, Beidaihe, 
Qinghuangdao, and intermediate points up to the city of Shanghaiguan. These markets 
could be quickly and easily reached by rail from Tianjin and at each town the Coca-Cola 
Company had resident agents who were fully capable of handling distribution and sale of 
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Coke.176 In the South, the partner was Watson’s Mineral Water Company in Shanghai, a 
Chinese-owned company. The southern bottler was responsible for the market in South 
China and had a similar agent system as that in Tianjin. In 1932, a third bottling plant 
was built in Qingdao, where the bottler was Laoshan Iltis Mineral Water Co. Ltd owned 
by a German firm, Melchers & Co. The bottlers purchased Coca-Cola concentration, 
Coca-Cola bottles, corks, crowns, and machinery from the Coca-Cola Company in the 
United States, and aerated and bottled in the local plants.  
Having a high expectation on the Chinese market, the Coca-Cola Company registered 
the “Coca-Cola” trademark in the Bureau of Trademark of China in 1925, a newborn 
institution that was imposed by western countries after the Opium War to protect foreign 
trademarks. However, to the Company’s surprise, not only no Chinese recognized the 
brand, but few of them were interested in it. For the first couple of years, major 
consumers of Coca-Cola in China were Americans. Other foreigners were influenced by 
local social customs which had long been set by the colonial British who preferred 
Scotch, gin, and black tea. The Chinese, on the other hand, noticed by the representative 
from the Coca-Cola Company, had been accustomed to drinking their own delightful 
green tea—hot and straight for ages.177 As to Coca-Cola, some Chinese felt it tasted a 
little bit sour and unpalatable;178 others said it looked and tasted like Chinese herbal 
medicine. They said if a vulgar countryman drank Coca-Cola, he/she must believe it is a 
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kind of fever syrup!179 Full of disappointment, the Coca-Cola representative commented 
that at the beginning of their business in China, “‘Red’ had no delusions that all of these 
people would suddenly become customers for Coca-Cola.”180 
Seeing the stagnation of Coca-Cola market in China, there were no Chinese 
businessmen in the thirties were willing to run a Coca-Cola retailing business.181 
Consequently, the Coca-Cola bottling companies suffered a serious hardship and some of 
them had a huge deficit for a long time. For example, Watson’s Mineral Water Company 
was in deficit almost every year after 1927. Its business was fair at the beginning, but was 
pressured by the growing competition in soft drink industry and subsequent wars, which 
finally led to a severe business downturn over the thirties. What’s more, the history of 
Watson’s in Shanghai was younger than Aquarius’, while prices were higher than Yili’s. 
Without any advantage, Watson’s almost fell into a plight. The increasing popularity of 
orange juice produced by Meiguo and Meihua Juice companies further jeopardized soft 
drink business.182 In 1931, because of the war, the revenue of Watson’s Mineral Water 
Company was only 330,000 yuan. It increased to 380,000 yuan in the following year. In 
1933, thanks to the unusual hot weather and the stable political situation, the revenue 
climbed to 460,000 yuan. However, the annual return in these three years was still far less 
than the past. Deducting employee’s bonus and depreciation, the net balance was less 
than 20,000 yuan in 1931 and a little bit over 20,000 yuan in 1932. Even in good years 
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like 1933, the net balance, which was around 36,000 yuan, was not very impressive, 
either.183 When the weather returned to normal after 1934, Watson’s business dropped 
again. In 1935, Watson’s had a deficit of 15,628.489 yuan. To save the business, 
Watson’s mobilized employees to market products from door to door: from grocery 
stores, restaurants to stadiums and entertainment places.184 After hard work, Coca-Cola 
became one of the top-selling products of the Company and its revenue in 1936 reached 
310,000 yuan, but the overall situation was not promising. After taking debts and 
depreciation into account, the final balance of the company remained in a deficit of 
27,000 yuan. By 1936, Watson’s was heavily indebted, owing the Bank of Guangdong 
120,000 yuan. Every year, it had to pay over 30,000 yuan for the interest.185  
Coca-Cola business of Crystal Mineral Water Company in Tianjin was not very 
satisfactory, either. In the thirties, the Company launched a series of marketing 
campaigns to introduce the new beverage to the territory. In a campaign called the 
premium prize crown in March 1931, the company made big advertising canvases for 
beverage shops.186 In the following year, students from Nankai University were invited to 
visit the Coca-Cola factory. During the visit, the Company patiently explained the details 
of manufacturing process, stressed the purity and health merits, and offered free Coca-
Cola samples to the students.187 Although every endeavor was made to attract Chinese 
people, the progress was very slow. In the thirties, the major consumers of Coca-Cola 
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remained to be Americans. For example, Shengyang and Qinghuangdao were two 
important marketing sites of the Company, and the latter port was the site of the summer 
camp for American troops stationed in North China.188 In addition, Coca-Cola’s sales 
were frequently impacted by abnormal weather and political instability. In summer 1932, 
extremely adverse weather conditions seriously affected Coca-Cola’s market. Coca-Cola 
sales were further reduced when the Chinese authorities in Tianjin banned ice cold drinks 
on market because of the rapid spread of cholera.189 Even when weather was perfect for 
the business, Coca-Cola’s sales were not promising. In 1931, Martial Law enforced in 
Tianjin restricted attendance at all amusement resorts, during which the Japanese 
Concession, the most prolific sale spot of Coca-Cola, was closed entirely. All amusement 
centers reported no business, and Coca-Cola had a severe drop in sales.190  
 
From ke ke ken la to Ke kou ke le: Advertising by Translation 
 
The odd translation of the name made Coca-Cola less attractive to the Chinese. 
Because of the tongue twister-like sound, a number of Chinese shopkeepers created 
Chinese phonetic equivalents for Coca-Cola but with weird results. “Some had made 
crude signs that were absurd in the extreme, adopting any old group of characters that 
sounded remotely like Coca-Cola without giving a thought as to the meaning of the 
characters used. One of these homemade signs sounded like Coca-Cola, but the meaning 
of the characters came out something like ‘female horse fastened with wax’ and another 
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‘bite the wax tadpole.’ The character for wax, pronounced La, appeared in both signs 
because that was the sound these untutored sign makers were looking for. Any Chinese 
reading the signs would recognize them as a crude attempt to make up an arbitrary 
phonetic combination.”191 And the character wax (La pronounced in Chinese) might also 
reminds Chinese the Chinese idiom “taste like chewing wax,” which means unpleasant 
and insipid.  
Seeing the stagnant market, the Coca-Cola Company believed a good Chinese name 
might bring market for them. In 1936, they posted an announcement on a British 
newspaper, calling for a good Chinese trademark translation competition with an award 
of 350 British pounds. A Qing official and a scholar named Jiang Yi (蒋彝), who was 
visiting Europe at that time, won the competition. Inspired by the sentences from 
Zhuangzi, “tastes of pears and oranges are different, yet both of them are delicious,” (柤
梨橘柚，其味相反而皆可于口) and the verses in Liu Ji’s poem, “cymbidium smells 
sweet, but what makes people much happier is the beauty of a woman,”(兰独闻国香，姱
丽最可乐),192 Jiang Yi translated Coca-Cola into four Chinese characters Ke Kou Ke Le, 
which means to permit mouth to be able to rejoice – or something palatable from which 
one derives pleasure.193 This translation sounds nice, elegant, and more importantly was 
easy to remember. Thanks to the beautiful name, since 1936 the annual surveys on 
Watson’s conducted by the Bank of Shanghai showed that sales of Coca- Cola were very 
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good. The bank reported that Coca-Cola’s sales in 1936 was over 310,000 yuan, three 
times more than the previous years.194  
 However, the prosperity of Coca-Cola business did not last very long. Since the 
taste of sarsaparilla was very close to that of Coca-Cola but sarsaparilla’s price was much 
cheaper, many firms chose to reduce Coca-Cola imports.195 The Sino-Japanese War 
further paralyzed the budding Coca-Cola business. Since the inception of the Pacific War 
in winter of 1941, Northeast China was occupied by the Japanese Army, while Shanghai 
was virtually under the dominant influence of Japanese Authorities. Following their 
entry, American and British firms compelled by force majeure shut down all their 
businesses. Crystal Mineral Water Company in Tianjin was confiscated by the Japanese, 
who looted the company and interrupted Coca-Cola production.196 In Shanghai, Coca-
Cola business was forced to stop because of the lack of Coca-Cola concentration, raw 
materials that needed to be imported from the United States.197 Fortunately, shutdown of 
foreign firms left room for national brands to thrive. In summer 1942, national soft drink 
companies mushroomed in big cities, intending to replace foreign companies for the 
summer market. The most popular Chinese brands included Ginko, Vita Folo, Green 
Spot, Blue Spot and Red Top.198 
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Figure 3.5 Watson’s Coca-Cola advertisement 
This picture shows nationalist forces were fighting against the Japanese Army in the 
battle of Shanghai, 1937. The large poster behind the soldiers was a Coca-Cola 
advertisement, which was destroyed during the war.  
Source: http://m.tiexue.net/3g/thread_3714332_1.html, accessed by 2014-4-9 
 
 
Coca-Cola Advertisement  
 The Sino-Japanese War interrupted the Coca-Cola business in China; however, 
World War II provided a great opportunity for the Coca-Cola Company to expand 
internationally. During the war, Robert Winship Woodruff successfully attached politics 
to Coca-Cola, seeing it as important military goods that boosted troops’ morale. Just as 
the Swastika reminded people of Nazis and the rising sun (that set) represented Japan, 
Woodruff tried to make Coca-Cola into a symbol of freedom and democracy.199 In spring 
1941, Woodruff received a wire sent by an American reporter in London reading: “We, 
members of the Associated Press, cannot get Coca-Cola anymore; terrible situation for 
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Americans was covering the battle of Britain; know you can help.” Woodruff decided 
even if the Company lost money, Coca-Cola should be available to American armed 
forces. After the Pearl Harbor Incident in December 1941, Woodruff declared Coca-
Cola’s wartime policy: “We will see that every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca-Cola 
for five cents wherever he is and whatever it costs.”200 Collaborated with the Coca-Cola 
Export Corporation, Coca-Cola expanded hand in hand with U.S. army.  
 In the Second World War, American volunteer pilots known as the “flying tigers” 
came to aid the Chinese in the war against Japan. Coca-Cola, as military goods, came 
along with the U.S. army, too. To supply American soldiers in China, the Coca-Cola 
Company resumed its business in China. In addition to restarting their three bottling 
plants—Shanghai, Tianjin, and Qingdao, the Company sent its representatives, who 
rented an office next to the U.S. embassy on Fuzhou Road in Shanghai, to supervise 
production and thus to assure that American soldiers in China could drink the same Coca-
Cola as what they drank at home. In the North, since September 1946, Crystal Mineral 
Water Company was arranged for bottling Coca-Cola for the U.S. Navy in Tianjin,201 in 
which about one third of the products were consumed by American soldiers. Meanwhile, 
the factory of Laoshan-Iltis Mineral Water Co., ltd situated at No.42 Great Chanshan 
Road in Qingdao, also began to import raw materials through the U.S. armed forces and 
supply bottled Coca-Cola for American army exclusively.202 In South U.S. ships 
anchored in Shanghai’s harbor. The Xinmin Evening News, a local newspaper, observed 
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that a navy ship-based U.S. mobile hospital stored hundreds of Coca-Cola boxes on-
board. American sailors and soldiers drank Coca-Cola every day and the bottles were 
piled up like a hill on the deck.203  
 Thanks to U.S. armed forces, the name of Coca-Cola was known by the Chinese 
from Tianjin to Shanghai, from Hong Kong to Qingdao. More than a commodity or a 
military supply, Coca-Cola, in the eyes of Americans, represented a universal motif by 
saying “We are friends” to the Chinese. Having a Coke in China, as the poster 
demonstrated (Figure 3.6), indicated “good winds had blown you here.” When Coca-Cola 
was in hand, friendship between American soldiers and Chinese fighting men cemented, 
as to the Chinese “Coke” was the welcome word symbolizing friendliness and freedom. 
From Atlanta to the Seven Seas, Coca-Cola standing for peace and refresher—has 
become a symbol of good will among the friendly minds.204 Accepting friendliness and 
admiring American modern science and technologies, Chinese armed forces emulated 
American friends to drink Coca-Cola. In the late forties, Coca-Cola was almost the only 
beverage that American army and the Chinese Air Force drank.205 After the victory of the 
war, the worship and emulation to Americans grew stronger and extended to the whole 
Chinese society. Since there was a surplus, Coca-Cola bottlers tried to explore civilian 
market. 
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Figure 3.6 Chinese soldiers were having Coke with American air force.  
Source: The Spartanburg Herald, Spartanburg, SC, Thursday Morning, Nov 4, 1943. 
 
Republican period was an era when the worship of foreign goods was 
widespread.206 Luxury imports were used by elites as visual evidence of social status, 
while cheap imitations satisfied the demand for new products among ordinary people. It 
is called a two-tier society by Frank Dikötter, by which he meant that there was “a luxury 
demand from the well-to-do who required greater quality than local industries could 
offer, and a price demand from the poor for whom durability was a primary 
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consideration.”207 In most cases, foreign goods were regarded as high quality and 
reliable, whereas national goods were seen as inferior in quality and were frequently 
discarded. History of National Products Movements, which will be discussed in chapter 
5, was replete with examples of producers who went bankrupt because their products 
failed to compete with imports and were judged by consumers as inferior.208 Thus, social 
hierarchy was materially expressed not only in where people live, what people wear, and 
what people eat, but also in subtle variations in the quality of what people drink.  
Success of the Sino-Japanese War under the help of American allies made the 
worship of foreign goods grow stronger and stronger, extending to everything American, 
including Coca-Cola.209 In Shanghai, people from the upper class became fascinated with 
Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola’s secret concentration was directly imported from the United 
States in huge iron barrels. It was distinct because instead of using fruit essences, Coca-
Cola concentration contained twelve kinds of fruit juices including banana, apple, orange, 
and cola etc., all of which were known to be good for health.210 Mixing one ounce of the 
brown nugget concentration with six ounces of water and forty pounds (pounds per 
square inch) of carbon dioxide gas, a bottle of Coca-Cola came out. The drink was 
regarded as the cleanest and safest beverage in Republican China where waterborne 
epidemics were widely spread. Chinese people did not trust running water unless it was 
fully boiled. They did not trust national soft drinks either, because they believed all 
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Chinese beverages were made of unprocessed running water. However, Chinese 
consumers trusted Coca-Cola, for they believed Americans would not carelessly produce 
drinks with unhygienic running water for American soldiers and officers in China who 
consumed thousands of bottles of Coca-Cola every day.211  
In addition to the growing western worship after the war, advertising after 1945 
also largely promoted Coca-Cola business. Under the aid of U.S. Army Exchange 
Service, a large amount of Coca-Cola advertising materials were imported to China, 
though there was a restriction on imports. According to the Revised Interim Measures of 
Import and Export Trade announced in March 1946, all foreign products except the 
banned goods and products with value less than 25 U.S. dollars must acquire an import 
permit. Imports by qualified companies must be restricted within the annual rations that 
were assigned by the regional office of the Export and Import Board. To procure an 
import license for Coca-Cola advertising materials, the bottlers and Coca-Cola Export 
Corporation actively collaborated under the assistance of the U.S. Army Advisory Group 
of Army Exchange Service. The group suggested that instead of asking the bottlers to 
arrange remittance, the Coca-Cola Export Corporation should substitute with a note 
stating that “this advertising is being shipped to you free of charge, please arrange import 
license and advise” in the telegram.212 Following the instruction, the Shanghai and 
Tianjin bottlers procured import permits based on the fact that the advertising materials 
and the cost, insurance, freight (C.I.F.) valuation were stated only for customs purposes. 
The Qingdao bottler procured the permit for their order of Dealer Help material on a 
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different basis: they applied for an import permit based only on the insurance and 
freight.213 No matter what basis was followed, the Coca-Cola Export Company was 
instructed to omit descriptive data of the materials, F.O.B. (free on board) values and 
freight charges should not be shown separately but included in C.I.F. values. The later 
figures were required as the Coca-Cola Export Company endeavored to get the local 
Customs to pass the whole, or, at least, part of the material free of import duty; otherwise 
it was quite likely that a blanket duty would be imposed on the total shipment. The 
Company was also instructed that quantities and prices, without any marked deviation, 
could be less but not more than permitted amounts.214 
As sales of Coca-Cola were increasing after the war and the import permit issue 
was settled, bottlers put more efforts in advertising. Every season they ordered a large 
number of advertising materials from the United States, usually with specific requirement 
and descriptions that fit the local needs. The materials were in various forms, ranging 
from large outdoor posters, billboards, and media including films to souvenirs and 
articles for daily use marked with Coca-Cola trademarks (Figure 3.7). For example, 
Crystal Mineral Water Company, Coca-Cola’s Tianjin bottler, ordered fifty pencil tablets, 
ten score pads, two thousand blotters, and fifty thousand coasters on April 21, 1948.215 
Four months later, the Company again ordered dozens of upright Coca-Cola metal signs 
and 100 gross of pencils marked with Coca-Cola trademarks. The metal signs were 20 
inches by 28 inches, which were used to fit prewar sidewalk frames in main streets of 
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Tianjin. One of the most impressive advertisements was a poster in which a half of the 
Coca-Cola bottle was buried in snow while the other half covered with drops of dew. 
This image was so tempting in summer that every pedestrian who passed by and sweated 
under the scorching sun was irresistibly eager to drink even if it was toxic.216 The pencils, 
on the other hand, had considerable value in the Plant’s marketing approach to schools 
and companies. They were presented and distributed to student groups who visited the 
plant.217 The advertising expenditure of the bottlers was considerable. The Tianjin bottler 
used to plan to spend a minimum of 10,000 U.S. dollars on advertising in 1948 based on 
200,000 cases sales.218  
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Figure 3.7 Coca-Cola’s advertising artifacts in Republic of China.  
The first picture is an ice awl with the Coca-Cola trademark on its handle. The second is 
a bottler opener marked with Coca-Cola. The third is a thermometer used in the Coca-
Cola bottling Companies. The fourth is a pencil marked by both English and Chinese 
Coca-Cola trademarks. 
Source: http://www.ccctrip.net/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=65183&extra=page%3D1 
accessed by 12-3-2012. 
 
Although worship of things foreign predominated in Chinese society, foreign 
products that fit into Chinese culture were even more welcomed by Chinese consumers. 
Understanding the importance of localizing, shrewd Chinese Coca-Cola bottlers 
incorporated Chinese elements into advertisement. When ordering advertising materials 
from the United States, the bottlers requested specific features. For example, in an order 
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of 1939, the Tianjin bottler particularly pointed out that no steel-workers, Negroes, 
messenger boys, and other types inapplicable to this territory were required.219 Young 
and modern Chinese ladies instead became advertising spokesmen on Coca-Cola posters. 
They usually wore cheongsams and had their hair permed, constituting a classical image 
of a combination of Chinese and western, tradition and modern. On the posts, some of the 
ladies were playing tennis (Figure 3.8); some were swimming (Figure 3.9); some were 
having a picnic with friends and the loved ones (Figure 3.10); and others were playing 
mahjong (Figure 3.11), a traditional and popular Chinese game, while drinking Coca-
Cola. Coca-Cola advertising artifacts were accommodated to the local culture, too. To 
promote the business, Tianjin Crystal Mineral Water Company ordered 4,000 lunar 
calendar backs from New York in 1947. In the following year, another 2,500 Chinese 
calendar backs were ordered. The calendar backs were in Chinese and very popular 
across the country.220  
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Figure 3.8 A piece of advertisement made by the Qingdao Coca-Cola bottler, in which a 
couple is playing tennis, and Coca-Cola is their sport drink. At the bottom, it says “after 
workout, please drink Coca-Cola. It is delicious, refreshing, quenching thirst, and 
relieving fatigue.”  





Figure 3.9 produced by Qingdao Coca-Cola bottler. Three modern girls are drinking 
Coca-Cola after swimming. The advertisement says “please drink Coca-Cola after 
swimming: delicious, refreshing, and increasing the happiness of swimming.”  






Figure 3.10 Produced by Qingdao Coca-Cola bottler. A young couple brings Coca-Cola 
to picnic. They are very modern and westernized.  They are drinking Coke and eating 
sandwiches. At the bottom of the advertisement, it says “please bring Coca-Cola to 
picnic: delicious, refreshing, and endless happiness.” 





Figure 3.11 Four modern women are playing mahjong while drinking Coca-Cola. It says 
“please treat your guests with Coca-Cola.” 
Source: Xin Min Bao, Jul 14, 1947, The Qingdao Archive, D000311/00054 
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Advertising materials were widely distributed in every possible public site where 
a certain market was targeted. Schools, universities, parties, and sport events were the 
youth market that Coca-Cola bottlers endeavored to explore. In Tianjin area, there were 
200 schools and universities, of which the Crystal Mineral Water Co. planned to cover 
50% in 1948. Transportation sites such as railroad stations, bus stations, boats, and 
airports were the second place that Coca-Cola advertising materials congested. The 
bottlers diligently tried to obtain complete coverage of the transportation market on 
distribution, advertising, and retailing.221 Trains were one of the most ideal places for 
advertising. Even when all advertising spots in trains on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi railway had 
been taken, Watson’s Mineral Water Company still persuaded the railroad to save some 
place for Coca-Cola posters. The advertisement on trains was 12 inches by 12 inches, 
posting on the doors of each carriage and the walls between carriages.222 Traffic centers 
such as department stores and theatres were the third place that Coca-Cola advertisement 
concentrated. In 1948, a piece of Coca-Cola advertisement, in which a hand was holding 
a bottle of Coke with Chinese characters “having a rest” on the top and “please drink 
Coca-Cola” on the right side, was set up in almost every theater in Tianjin, including 
Mingxing, Tianhuajing, Tiangong, Guangming, Hua’an, and Meiqi.223 Crystal Mineral 
Water Company claimed that they would use “Minitoons” at theaters when they arrived 
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together with special booths, and large department stores would be the focal point of the 
Company’s efforts.224  
Although Coca-Cola advertisement in China was not as widespread as it was in 
the United States, it was rampant in big cities where none of other products could 
compare with. The red Coca-Cola trademark and the slogan “please drink Coca-Cola” 
could be seen everywhere and usually was the largest advertisement in the streets. The 
classic outdoor Coca-Cola advertisement in which a hand holding a bottle of Coca-Cola 
was six meters in length and three meters in height (Figure 3.12). Another advertisement 
was simpler in design but even larger in size: seventeen meters in length and nearly five 
meters in width (Figure 3.13). In Qingdao, Coca-Cola advertisement became a part of 
people’s life, as if nothing but Coke was the only drink available there. Filled with 
American advertisement, people who visited Qingdao could not stop wondering if they 
were in a city of the United States.225  
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Figure 3.12 This is a Coca-Cola advertisement found in corner street in Shanghai in the 
1940s. It is larger than any other advertisement surrounding it. It uses both Chinese and 
English saying “please drink Coca-Cola.” 
Source: Coca-Cola Overseas, Aug 1948. P. 21. 
 
 
Figure 3.13 This is one of the largest Coca-Cola advertisement in Shanghai. Three posts 
set up side by side. The left one is the classical English Coca-Cola trademark. The middle 
post is a foreigner introducing a bottle of Coke. The right one is the Chinese Coca-Cola 
translation.  
Source: Coca-Cola Overseas, Oct 1948. P. 22. 
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Besides fixed advertising locations, the bottlers actively sponsored various special 
events such as sports, picnics, outings, fairs, exhibitions, and carnivals, at which Coca-
Cola was sold with profits going to the sponsoring organization. One of the most 
remarkable events that Coca-Cola sponsored was the seventh national track and field 
meeting held in Shanghai in 1948, during which the most conspicuous object in the 
stadium was the huge red Coca-Cola advertising flags flying in the four corners. They 
seemed as if four guardian warriors standing in a Buddhist temple,226 higher than 
everything else in the stadium. They were even higher than the Kuomingtang 
(Guomingdang) party flag and the flag of the game.227 In the game, Coca-Cola was the 
only drink supplied to referees and administrators. At the end of each volleyball game, 
the Police Chief shouted at his assistants “deliver Coca-Cola immediately!”228 When the 
game was broadcasted, each program was followed by the advertising slogan—this 
program was sponsored by the Coca-Cola Company. One audience commented that this 
game seemed to be given by Coca-Cola.229  
Nevertheless, no matter how dense the advertising bombardment was, for a nation 
that was eager for modernization, the most tempting seduction was modern science and 
technology, the core of the modernization process. Yet, the Coca-Cola bottlers accurately 
grasped it. To demonstrate Coca-Cola’s modernity and hygiene, bottlers made their 
plants a show place and maintained all prescribed standards in building designs, 
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uniforms, sanitation, etc. Crystal Mineral Water Company, for example, had their soda 
machines exposed behind giant glass windows along the streets, through which 
pedestrians could have a good view on the equipment. Its factory buildings were modern 
and high with extremely clean condition inside.230 To ensure the sanitation of each bottle, 
each worker had to pass a physical examination before being hired and all of them must 
wear white uniforms and hats in the factory (Figure 3.14). Every year, the bottlers 
promoted plant visits by school groups, doctors, teachers, and government officials, the 
number of which increased yearly. In 1947, there were 1,000 people visited Crystal 
Mineral Water Company, while the number increased to 5,000 in the following year.231  
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Figure 3.14: How to make Coca-Cola? 
Filling and sealing-up processes in Watson’s’ Mineral Water Company. A worker 
wearing a white gown and a hat for sanitation was checking the bottles.  
Source: “zen yang zhi zao Coca-Cola?” (How to make Coca-Cola?) Yi Wen Hua Bao, 
issue 1, 1947. 
 
During the visit, Chinese visitors were astonished by the scientific production, 
management, and the modern technology that the Coca-Cola plants presented. Scientific, 
modern, sanitary, and efficient were the frequently compliments heard from visitors. The 
high visibility of the Coca-Cola production process made the three plants examples of 
modern industry in China. Industrial and business journals and newspapers diligently 
introduced the scientific process of producing Coca-Cola to the public. One article 
published in the Industrial Monthly of 1948 used two and a half pages to elaborate how 
Coca-Cola was produced in Crystal Mineral Water Company: 
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“There were three crucial processes in producing a bottle of high-quality 
Coca-Cola: water treatment, syrup preparation, and bottling. Water, which 
constituted 5/6 of a bottle of Coca-Cola, was crucial to the quality. Surface water 
and well water was either unsanitary and unhealthy or too hard to produce Coca-
Cola. The unique water treatment facility in Crystal Mineral Water Company, 
however, could automatically disinfect and demineralize water before use. This 
machine was fully automatic, requiring no operating all the time but periodically 
adding chemical reagent, and processing 550 gallons per hour. It uses chlorine to 
kill bacteria and uses Aluminum sulfate and lime to soften the water. The 
suspended solids in water were then filtered by sand and the remaining chlorine 
and organic pigments were absorbed by activated carbon. The water treatment 
part was supervised by a Chemical Engineering Graduate from Beiyang 
University named Shao Changfu, who was proficient in water treatment. Syrup 
was the second important component for a bottle of good Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola 
concentration, known as the seven mysterious X, was imported from the United 
States, and for the past sixty years no one could duplicate it. The final step—
filling and sealing-up—was important, too. Before filling, each recycled bottle 
must be carefully washed. Automatic bottler washer in the Coca-Cola plants could 
accomplish the job perfectly. After bottles were bottom-up put on the conveyor 
lines, they were automatically delivered to a metal box equipped with nozzles, in 
which surface dust was washed off by warm running water. They were then 
automatically delivered to a container filled with 3.5% sodium hydroxide solution 
in the temperature of 135 degrees Fahrenheit. After 10 minutes of washing and 
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disinfecting, the bottles were transferred to a third container and rinsed by 
processed water. Finally, the belt brought the bottles to the inspection machine 
which examined the cleanness of bottles under fluorescent light. Meanwhile, to 
fully carbonate the water, carbon dioxide and water must be mixed to a proportion 
of 3.5 to 4 percent in a very low temperature. Any excess or insufficiency of 
carbon dioxide would affect the taste and the quality of Coca-Cola. After filling 
and capping, each bottle of Coca-Cola would be examined under fluorescent light 
again. Only bottles with clear liquid were finally packed and put on the 
market.”232  
The Coca-Cola bottling plants impressed the public with a scientific, automatic, 
and mechanized image. From bottle washing to packing, hand touch was completely 
avoided. Some visitors praised that “Coca-Cola bottles in Watson’s Mineral Water 
Company looked like disciplined soldiers that neatly lined up and moved automatically. 
Watson’s bottling equipment, which was once used by U.S. military forces during the 
war and then was imported from the other side of the Pacific, was unique in China, 
producing 150 bottles of Coca-Cola every minute.”233 To ensure high-quality products, 
the plant’s inspection system was very strict. It was said that 2% of bottled Coca-Cola 
were discarded every day because of minor defects. Based on a daily output of 60,000 
bottles in 1934, the total waste of Coca-Cola was 1,200 bottles every day.234 If compared 
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the Coca-Cola plants to the museum of modern science and technology, Coca-Cola’s 
modern distribution system—Coca-Cola trucks—became a mobile exhibition that 
delivered the modern and scientific image to every street in the cities. The Coca-Cola 
bottling plants were the first companies in China that used trucks in distribution. 
Watson’s Mineral Water Company had six garages in the plant and six big Coca-Cola 
trucks driving back and forth across the town for delivery.235 The trucks with rack type 
body together containing 2000 pieces of ½ depth cases were imported from the United 
States. All trucks had a standard painting, yellow for the truck bodies with red trademarks 
on the doors. Advertising slogans, “every bottle sterilized” and “delicious and 
refreshing,” were posted on the top of selected trucks. Every morning, Coca-Cola trucks 
stopped by ballrooms, coffee shops, and restaurants. In Republican China where 
rickshaws were the major means of transportation, modern Coca-Cola trucks became 
distinguish and beautiful scenery in the cities, delivering fresh Coca-Cola door to door 
every morning.236  
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Figure 3.15 Coca-Cola trucks in Watson’s Mineral Water Company 
All of the trucks were imported from the United States and responsible for delivery Coca-
Cola in Shanghai every day.   
Source: http://www.ccctrip.net/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=65183&extra=page%3D1 
accessed by 12-3-2012. 
 
The boom of the Coca-Cola business since 1945 
With the aid of advertising campaigns, Coca-Cola’s sales skyrocketed. By the late 
forties, Coca-Cola dominated the beverage market in Shanghai. Its popularity not only 
exceeded beers and orange juices, but also beat the once popular ice-cream named 
Beauty, produced by Henningsen Produce Company, Ltd (海宁洋行). Even Aquarius’ 
soft drinks, people’s favorite beverage in the past, could not compete with Coca-Cola.237 
In 1947, the daily sale of Coca-Cola in Shanghai increased to 180,000 bottles.238 From 
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June to August, the average monthly tax paid by Shanghai Coca-Cola bottler was one 
billion yuan.239 By 1948 Shanghai became the first market outside of the United States to 
post annual sales of more than one million cases of Coca-Cola. 
Although Coca-Cola did not change its formula, within decades it transformed 
from a drink that tasted like a cough syrup in Chinese people’s minds into popular 
summer refreshment. In contrast to the negative comments on Coca-Cola’s flavor in the 
twentieth, people started to compliment the Coca-Cola’s flavor after the war. One 
Shanghainese told a journalist that he loved Coca-Cola because of its special flavor: “the 
brown drink (Coca-Cola) looks like Wu Jia Pi (五加皮), a Chinese medical wine; it also 
like a kind of beer with the brand name called the Sun. I love Coca-Cola’s special aroma, 
sweetness and astringent, which remind me the smell of herbal medicine I took when I 
was sick. Coca-Cola is neither as cold as ice-cream that makes teeth trembling, nor as 
sparkling water full of bubbles that cause burps. Coca-Cola is an excellent refreshing 
drink to reduce heat in summer, even better than a cup of Longjing tea.240 In the sultry 
dusk, a sip of Coca-Cola from the goblet instantly refreshes the body and drives away 
sultriness and loneliness.”241 The other Shanghainese described how wonderful he felt 
after drinking a bottle of Coca-Cola. “After drinking Coca-Cola, your body feels cool, 
refreshing, comfortable, and sweet. One bottle is nothing more and nothing less. The 
3,000 yuan is worth, since you are perfectly satisfied after drinking.”242 In addition to the 
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flavor, Coca-Cola bottles were also loved by Chinese people. They commented that the 
bottle’s beautiful curve with a slim waist looked like a young woman’s sexy body, 
charming and adorable.243 Coca-Cola bottles had an elegant shape and an exquisite 
design, which reflected the taste of the upper-class in society.  
Besides the issue of taste, Coca-Cola’s high prices further confined Coca-Cola 
consumption within Chinese middle and upper classes. The market price of a bottle of 
Coca-Cola in Shanghai in 1947 was 3,500 yuan, and the price doubled at cold drink 
shops and restaurants.244 Coca-Cola’s price increased dramatically when a huge inflation 
took place in 1948. In April 1948, a bottle of Coca-Cola in Shanghai Bund Park was sold 
at 86,000 yuan. Three months later it increased to over 300,000 yuan, which equaled to a 
half price of a big watermelon sufficient for a family of three. In those years, prices of 
Coca-Cola drinks in a dinner party usually exceeded the cost of the meal.245 300,000 
yuan, the cost of a bottle of Coke in summer 1948, was equivalent to a bowl of beef 
noodles, or 4 flatbreads and fried bread sticks, or two magazines.246 In other cities where 
no Coca-Cola bottling plants located, Coca-Cola was more expensive. Since 
Shanghainese were fascinated about Coca-Cola, there was almost no surplus to supply 
cities outside of Shanghai. Take Nanjing for example, Coca-Cola was so rare in the local 
market that its price increased to 5,000 yuan in 1946, which was eight times higher than 
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prices of other brands.247 In Qingdao, Coca-Cola as a luxury became one of favorite 
targets of thieves. Local newspaper reported that in the midnight of August 9, 1948, four 
thieves who were stealing Coca-Cola from the U.S. military club in Hubei Road were 
caught by the patrol police, and six cases of Coca-Cola were seized.248  
In all big cities, Coca-Cola was rich people’s favorite. Celebrities were 
particularly crazy about Coca-Cola. A movie star named Yin Xiucen (殷秀岑), who was 
probably the fattest actor in China and famous for the role he played as the second son of 
a local tyrant in the movie called “A Peasant’s Tragedy,” drank more than twelve bottles 
of Coca-Cola every day in summer. He often patted his protruding stomach, joking with 
his colleagues that “most my salary was here.”249 Yin Xiucen’s case might be rare and 
extreme, but to a great extent, it reflected Chinese people’s preference on drinks. For 
people in middle and upper classes, Coca-Cola somehow was integrated into unspeakable 
social customs. For example, Coca-Cola was a must-drink beverage when dating a girl. 
Especially when girlfriends had a temper and Coca-Cola was the best therapy to calm her 
down. Sick in bed was another situation when patients could ask for special care. A 
steamed egg was a special treatment for the sick poor, while Coca-Cola was the desirable 
food for sick people of the middle class.  
In the late forties, the Broadway of Shanghai, Da Ming Road at Hongkou district 
where bars, cafes, and ballrooms clustered, was decorated by neon lights and filled with 
aroma of Coca-Cola. In hot days of summer, Coca-Cola was especially popular. In 
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summer 1946, Watson’s produced 36,000 bottles of Coca-Cola every day, but it hardly 
met the demand in Shanghai. More than a half of bars, cafes, and western restaurants 
asked Watson’s to increase their rations.250 In 1947, Watson’s increased its productivity 
to 240,000 bottles a day, but still could not satisfactorily meet the demand. A worker in 
the Company made a joke that “Shanghai was a big Coca-Cola drinking pool, no matter 
how many drinks are produced, they will be gone immediately.”251  
 Encouraged by the rapid expanding market, Coca-Cola Export Corporation began 
to take active measures to their Chinese business. After sporadic cooperation with Shu-
Lun Pan Company, a well-known accounting firm in Shanghai, over the past decades, the 
Coca-Cola Export Corporation in the late forties formally asked for a retainer service. 
The service included “first, to obtain data and information, financial and otherwise, on 
positive applicants for Coca-Cola operations; second, to have Shu-Lun Pan’s local 
branches in Nanjing and Chongqing collect and send information and data at such time as 
Coca-Cola Company may need some; third, to make use of any correspondents which 
Shu-Lun Pan may have in other cities in China with regard to legal representation; forth, 
to discuss with China’s Government regulations on Import Licenses, Customs duties, 
etc., concerning the business of authorized bottlers in China, and the like.”252 Except item 
3, as there were no correspondents in other cities in China, Shu-Lun Pan Company began 
to be responsible for giving general advice in matters relating to taxation, registration, 
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trademark, auditing and accounting, and also in things concerning Chinese Business 
Laws and Regulations.  
 Assisted by Shu-Lun Pan Company, Coca-Cola Export Corporation registered 
their trademark “Coca-Cola” with the National Government. After the first registration in 
1925, their abbreviation trademark “Coke” was also registered in 1943 under the Aerated 
Water Group of Class 39 and the Fruit Juice Group of Class 39 from the Bureau of the 
Trademarks in Chongqing. When the trademark was expired in 1944, the Corporation 
renewed it for another ten years.253 As the business kept flourishing in China, besides 
registration the Corporation in 1948 decided to replace the previous informal individual 
inspection officer with a formal Company branch in Shanghai for maintaining qualified 
representatives and experts to supervise preparation and bottling by the authorized 
bottlers. The branch was in the charge of John Bingham Sherwood, who was given a 
power of attorney by the Coca-Cola Export Corporation as its representative to act upon 
all matters relating to the registration of the branch of the Corporation in China, and with 
ample powers to manage the operation of the branch of the Corporation after it was 
established.254 The responsibility of the Shanghai office included: 
“First, supervise bottlers. Second, undertake such work as may be 
necessary to assist in protecting the trade mark rights belonging to the Coca-Cola 
Export Corporation, and make surveys and collect information pertaining to the 
business of bottling and promoting the sale of Coca-Cola in China. Third, it is 
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also intended, when conditions permit, that this office may engage in the 
manufacture, importation and sale of Coca-Cola Concentrate and Coca-Cola 
Syrup in China, and to carry out any other business objects mentioned in the 
Certificate of Incorporation of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation.”255  
As Coca-Cola business continuously expanded, some Chinese businessmen 
wanted to become Coca-Cola bottlers. Since 1947, the Coca-Cola Shanghai office 
received a number of applications across the country. The office asked Shu-Lun Pan 
Company to investigate their financial background and resources, the types of business 
the applicants were engaged and their various connections, business standing in the 
community and political connections, etc.. One application for a Coca-Cola bottler in 
Nanjing was from a man named Benjamin K.Y. Wang, a native of Anhui province who 
came from a well-to-do merchant family. Wang’s father was the proprietor of two retail 
stores in Shanghai. Before the war, Wang worked for two foreign firms in Shanghai for a 
short while. During the wartime he remained helping run family business. By the time of 
application, he was serving as a Managing Director for the China National Development 
Corporation, a new firm working with the business of commission agents to deal with 
import and export issues. Wang had experience in soft drink business. During the 
Japanese occupation when foreign firms were forced to close down, Wang and his 
colleagues used to sell “blue spot,” a local soft drink brand. Their products were sold to 
theatres, restaurants, and retailers at a competitive price in 1943. But because of lacking 
raw materials and facilities during the wartime, their business did not survive. Wang and 
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his friends were interested in re-establishing soft drink business, hoping the Coca-Cola 
Export Corporation give them a privilege of being the exclusive representative in 
Nanjing. To convince the Corporation that Nanjing was a good location, he listed four 
reasons:  
“First, we have a vacant piece of land at factory district (outside of Water 
West Gate). The size is about 2-3 mu, feasible for building any factory building, 
cold storage, or Coca-Cola Plant with supplied equipment. Second, we have an 
office at the best residential quarter at 514 Hunan Road, which is airy and ideal 
for the Coca-Cola head office. Third, there is a large four storied building at the 
busiest corner i.e. Xin Jie Kou, which can be well furnished and used as the 
distributing center, because orders from downtown areas can be quickly 
processed. Forth, in Nanjing social connections are obtainable through high social 
personages who conduct and serve cocktail parties and other social functions.”256  
Considering Wang having limited liability to his firm and that Wang’s bank 
information was insufficient, Coca-Cola Shanghai office rejected his application.  
In the following year, another five Chinese businessmen, Sun Zhaoming, Xu 
Datong, Dong Hefu, Dai Xiaoti, and Qian Peirong applied for Coca-Cola bottling 
franchise in Taiwan. Although all of them were considerably wealthy and successful in 
their respective lines of business, none of them had any experience in cold drinks. They 
had no established business interests in Taiwan, except for China Merchants Import & 
Export Company, Ltd. run by Sun Zhaoming, who had already filed application for 
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registration of its Taiwan Branch.257 Therefore, these people’s applications were not 
approved, either.  
Comparing to the condition in the early thirties, Chinese retailers were also 
interested in Coca-Cola business. In 1948, a Shanghai shopkeeper named Y. T. Sun sent a 
letter to the Coca-Cola Company, in which he showed a big interest in Coca-Cola. He 
told the Coca-Cola Company that his store had all kinds of cold drinks except Coca-Cola. 
He was extremely interested in starting business with the Coca-Cola Company, so that his 
cold drink business could be more completed than his peers’ in Shanghai. In the letter, 
Sun also asked for some Coca-Cola signs, posters, and souvenirs to attract customers.258  
 
Conclusion 
 Science, technology, and medicine as a cultural configuration have become a new 
social order in twentieth-century China. “Included in the configuration are not only 
capitalism and colonialism, but also certain ways of thinking and relating.”259 Since the 
Opium War, science, technology, and medicine were considered as an important 
approach in China’s modernization. Its influence extended beyond intellectual levels and 
national politics, impacting the realm of everyday life including consumption. When 
science and technology became a category in commodification, western products which 
were undesirable in the past turned into something modern and indispensable. With the 
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help of advertisement and education, soft drinks not only became an alternative choice 
for hygienic drinking, safe and tasty, they also developed into a symbol of summer. Since 
bottled soft drinks were easy to carry around than tea or sour plum juice, they were 
popular in various social occasions such as dancing, workout, and picnics. As what 
Kopytoff suggests commodity has biography, soft drinks attached with multiple 
meanings and powers had its history in China, too. 260 While Winship Woodruff 
endeavored to turn Coca-Cola into a synonym of democracy and friendliness, Chinese 
elites made Coca-Cola into an insignia of taste, identity, and modernity. At the same 
time, ordinary Chinese people at the other tier of the society were equally influenced by 
modernization frenzy. When could not afford luxuries, they resorted to cheap imitations 
to satisfy their desire for modernity.  
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CHAPTER 4 
AMBITIOUS STATE, UNRULY PEOPLE: STATE REGULATIONS 
AND SOCIAL VIOLATIONS 
Science and technology as a category of consumption had an equal influence on 
the other tier of the Chinese society—the masses, though it often ended with twisted 
results. Admiring the lifestyle of the elites but being poor, ordinary Chinese people 
produced a grassroots culture of imitation. Culture of imitation existed at both upper-
class and grassroots levels. At the upper-class level, Chinese elites directly transplanted 
western products and lifestyle onto the Chinese soil in order to facilitate modernity, 
whereas ordinary Chinese people creatively and perfectly integrated foreign elements into 
their local culture. The integration was so seamless that sometimes it was hard to 
distinguish one from the other. However, the integration often led to serious and 
unexpected social problems. These problems on the one hand forced the state to 
reexamine the meaning of modernity and thus facilitated the building of a modern state; 
on the other hand the state’s ambition was frequently challenged and disturbed by the 
unruly masses. 
 After discovering the secret of soft drink manufacturing, cheap imitations 
appeared wildly on Chinese market. They were sold in unsanitary bottles or buckets, 
which were used to store plum juice or herbal tea at street drinking booths. Cheap soft 
drink imitations, though by no means was a modern business, provided ordinary Chinese 
urbanities with opportunities to meet their desire for exotics and modernity. However, 
brand infringements and sanitation problems caused by the grassroots copy culture 
mobilized the state to improve the legal system and enforce regulations. This chapter 
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focuses on the culture of imitation on soft drinks at a grassroots level in Chinese cities. It 
investigates the intricate relations and tensions among street peddlers, soft drink 
companies, and the government. Finally, it shows how technological innovations became 
an alternative solution for the sanitation problem, though they did not work perfectly due 
to the complicated state-public relations.  
 
Copy Culture and Brand Infringements 
 
 While brand-name soft drinks were used by elites as a visual evidence of social 
status, cheap imitations satisfied the demand for modern commodities among ordinary 
people who constituted the other end of the two-tier economy. This copy culture, which 
produced the two-tier economy that was at the heart of social differentiation in China, 
allowed price demand and luxury demand to exist side by side, transforming the 
extravagant into the ordinary over time, gradually turning the luxury surplus into a daily 
necessity: a market dominated by a large number of relative poor people forced producers 
to come up with cheap goods.261 Soft drinks, which had now been established as a daily 
necessity in summer, were expensive to ordinary people. Journals and magazines 
encouraged people to make the beverage at home. For families having children, cheap 
and easy-making soft drinks were particularly desirable. Every summer, children’s and 
women’s magazines published a series of articles teaching children and mothers to make 
soft drinks at home. Materials needed were simple: citric acid, soda, boiled water, sugar 
or fruit syrup, and a soft drink bottle with a preference for ramune soda bottles. Mix 
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syrup and water at a ratio of 1 to 2, and then add soda and citric acid and put the bottle 
upside down with a palm seal the mouth of the bottle. Affected by gravity, the marble 
falls down to the mouth and seals the bottle. When the bottle is standing upright, the 
marble still hold in place by the pressure of the carbonation in the drink.262 (Fig. 4.1, 
image A to E) 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Process of making soft drinks at home. 
Pictures A to E teach people how to make soft drinks at home.  
Source: Xia,Xingshou, “qishui zi zhi fa”(make soft drinks at home), shao nian (Juvenile), 
issue 7, 1924. pp. 74-76. 
 
 Since home-made soft drinks were cheap and easy to produce, they were soon 
integrated into traditional Chinese drinking business (e.g. plum juice and tea booths along 
the streets. See chapter 2) and rapidly grew into a popular business for small peddlers in 
summer. Some peddlers collected used soft drink bottles and filled them with cheap 
drinks. Others skipped the carbonation process altogether, producing and storing the 
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water and juice mixture in a large iron bucket with a tap attached to the bottom as if they 
were making plum juice or herbal tea (Figure 4.2). To keep the drink cold, some buckets 
had two layers, the space between which was filled with ice. In summer especially in the 
afternoons, drinking booths began to spread out along the roads. Vendors set up a table 
with a large board and several stools, on which there were several glasses, bottled soft 
drinks, or a bucket. To attract more customers, some booths also sold shaved ice, placing 
their ice blocks on the table, covered with a piece of white cloth. When a customer came, 
vendors opened a bottle of soft drink and poured it into the glass. If they were using a 
bucket, they poured the drink into glasses and covered them by pieces of glass to keep 
flies away. The drinks had various colors: red, green, and yellow, which were particularly 
attractive to children. Prices were cheap. In 1930, when ice-suckers were eleven cents 
and ice-creams were forty to fifty cents at cold drink stores, soft drinks at street booths 
cost only three to five cents for one glass, which was just a little bit expensive than a cup 
of tea. The hotter the weather was, the better the business would be. All customers were 
the working class in cities such as rickshaw drivers and porters. Sweating and exhausted 
from heavy physical work, they stopped by the booths and had a cup of drinks to drive 
away heat and fatigue all day.263  
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Figure 4.2:  Cartoon: the Dutch water kiosk.  
A kid is asking his mother to buy a cup of Dutch water from the kiosk.   
Source: http://www.picturechina.com.cn/bbs/thread-142229-5-1.html, accessed by 1-12-
2013. 
 
 Brand-name products always received higher recognition among consumers and 
were the favorites of the middle and upper class who were using them as a social identity. 
High prices of these products restricted the poor from consuming, but it could not 
constrain people from consuming fantasy, a fantasy that was not only about the goods but 
about improving social status attached to the commodities. Touching the goods, holding 
them for a while, or getting a fake one would easily cheer up the poor. The fantasy of the 
grassroots was a breeding ground of the Chinese copy culture, which was still vibrant in 
twentieth-fist-century China. In soft drink business, the copy culture was prevalent since 
the early twentieth century. To promote business without extra cost, some vendors, small 
businessmen, sometimes even foreigners, either imitated well-recognized trademarks or 
bottled cheap drinks in brand-name soft drink bottles. In treaty-port cities where brand-
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name soft drinks had the best sales, brand infringement was even worse, victims of which 
included both Chinese and foreign companies.  
One serious soft drink brand infringement case took place in Tianjin in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. The trademark of Hong Xing Soft Drink Company, one 
of the well-known Chinese soft drink companies in Tianjin, was frequently infringed. The 
Company’s trademark contained two dragons facing the Sun (Shuang Long Chao Ri), 
printed on every bottle owned by the Company. However, the Company later found their 
bottles were also used by other Tianjin soft drink companies De Li and Chang Li Shun, 
which bottled their drinks with Hong Xing’s trademark. The infringement was soon 
reported to the municipal government and the two companies were punished, but in the 
following years more trademark infringements were found. In 1907, 177 bottles of poor-
quality drinks marked with Shuang Long Chao Ri were found in sixty stalls, and the 
names of the suppliers were then forced to be disclosed and exposed to the public. 
Besides the illegal use of Hongxing’s trademark bottles, the Company also discovered 
two soft drink companies, Wei Sheng (Sanitation) in the North Gate Street and Chun He 
Shun in the British Concession, were using counterfeit trademarks, which was similar to 
Hong Xing’s “Two Dragons Facing the Sun.” Although the colors and the fonts in the 
counterfeit trademarks were slightly different from that of Hongxing, the Company 
claimed the image of Shuang Long Chao Ri was designed and exclusively owned by 
Hongxing Soft Drink Company and no one else had the right to use or imitate. These 
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companies using similar trademarks were, in fact and apparently, trying to confuse and 
cheat consumers.264   
To protect the interest of the Company, Hong Xing sent a letter to the Chamber of 
Commerce of Tianjin, asking for an immediate market regulation. They wrote “currently 
the Department of Commerce was emphasizing on industry and commerce promotion, 
while specialized provisions on commercial infringement and fraud became completed 
and clear. These companies which stole our bottles to bottle poor-quality drinks and 
copied our trademark not only hurt the interest of our Company, but more importantly 
broke the law of the state.”265 There were five companies listed in the letter including Wei 
Sheng in the North Gate Street, Fu Kang and Chen Jing Chun in the Japanese 
Concession, Chun He Shun and Da Ping in the British Concession, among which two of 
them were Japanese companies, while the other three were owned by Chinese merchants. 
According to Hong Xing’s investigation required by the Chamber of Commerce, two 
Japanese companies—Chen Jing Chun and Da Ping—frequently bottled their coarse 
drinks in Hong Xing’s bottles, while other three Chinese companies—Fu Kang run by 
Chunkui Wu, Wei Sheng managed by Runtian Li, and Chun He Shun operated by Fuqing 
Zhai and Chunpu Feng—either stole Hong Xing’s bottles or copied the trademark. Some 
of them did the two simultaneously.  
Despite the petition and the criticism from Hong Xing, the Chinese Government 
barely took any action, especially when foreign merchants were involved. One reason 
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was the Chinese government was so weak after the Opium War that the Chamber of 
Commerce did not have the right to summon foreigners for interrogation. The Hongxing 
trademark dispute, therefore, had to been submitted to the consulate, where a hearing 
informing the Japanese embassy to forbid the commercial delinquencies. The other 
reason for the rampant brand infringements was China’s incomplete trademark laws. 
Although trademarks were used in common practice for an unknown date for 
distinguishing industrial products, the importance of their protection by the government 
was never thought of. The conclusion of commercial treaties by China since 1904 with 
foreign nations drew the attention of Chinese government for the first time to the question 
of trademark protection. A provision was invariably made in the treaties that foreign 
trademarks should be registered and protected by the Chinese government in accordance 
with regulations promulgated by it. The demand of protection was, therefore, initiated by 
foreign merchants and pressed on the Chinese government through their respective 
ministers.266  
 The first Provisional Regulations for registration of trademarks was framed up in 
1905 and approved by the Qing Emperor to be put into effect. The articles calling for 
registration and protection of trademarks, provided that the Chinese Maritime Customs at 
Shanghai and Tianjin were to be the branch offices of the Ministry of Commerce, which 
should receive applications, assign each of them a particular number and date of its 
deposit, and transfer them to the Trademark Department for Provisional Registration. 
However, in the following eighteen years after 1905, many attempts were made in vain to 
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enact a trademark law either because of the failure in negotiating its acceptance with 
foreign countries or the internal troubles.267 Yet the changes in the eighteen years paved 
the way to the final enactment of the first Chinese trademark law.  
 Following the end of the European War of 1914, China’s diplomatic relations 
with foreign countries improved. The tremendous expansion of import trade brought with 
it an immense number of foreign trademarks, about 30,000 in round number, which were 
only filed in the Chinese Maritime Customs with registration that could give them the 
necessary legal protection, according to commercial treaties. In the meantime, the 
remarkable growth of the Chinese industries also gave rise to the demand of protection on 
the part of the Chinese manufacturers as well. Thus in the year 1923 the first Chinese 
Trademark Law was duly enacted by the national Assembly and promulgated by the 
Government on the third day of May of the same year. On the 15th, the first Chinese 
Trademark Bureau was inaugurated by the Beiping (Peiping) Government. The bureau 
was first placed under the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce but later transferred to 
the Ministry of Industry.268 
 Although the Chinese trademark system improved after 1923, trademark 
infringements never disappeared. As Coca-Cola was growing into the most popular soft 
drink in China, it became the most frequently infringed brand. In the forties, cheap drinks 
bottled in Coca-Cola bottles were often seen in the streets, which significantly harmed the 
interest of the Company. Seeing the situation deteriorating from bad to worse, the Coca-
Cola Company made a serious announcement in newspapers, claiming that the Company 
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had the exclusive right on the trademark as well as the bottles. Anyone who was illegally 
using Coca-Cola bottles must return the bottles to the Company; otherwise the Company 
would resort to laws.269  
If bottling cheap drinks in Coca-Cola bottles was an obvious violation to the 
trademark law, using similar brand names was a hidden and smart way to evade the 
fledgling trademark system. After the end of the Second World War, the market of Coca-
Cola was so flourishing that many businessmen wanted to have a share. In addition to the 
increasing applications for Coca-Cola retailers and bottlers, there was a growing number 
of various cola products appeared on the Chinese market and many of them had similar 
logo images as the logo of Coca-Cola. Just in Qingdao, there were five soft drinks 
registered under the name of cola and all of them were produced by Chinese companies. 
They used very similar brand names as Coca-Cola with only slight changes in spellings. 
For example, the Long Quan (Lung Chuan) Mineral Water Company, a small Chinese 
company operated by a fifty-year-old man from Yantai and fourteenth workers since 
1946, started to produce Long Quan Coca-Cola in 1947.270 Their English logo was 
similar to the logo of Coca-Cola, except replacing “C” with “h” in the word “cola,” but 
their Chinese trademark characters were exactly the same as Coca-Cola’s Chinese 
translation (Figure 4.3 second row right). Some companies kept the word “cola” but 
merely rephrased the first part in their brand names. For example, Mei Hua (American 
China) Mineral Water Factory named their product Vita Cola, the log of which had a 
similar design as it was in American Coca-Cola Company. Imitating the spencerian 
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cursive script of American Coca-Cola logo, in which a tail extending from the first letter 
“C” went underneath the word Coca, Vita Cola designed a long tail derived from the first 
letter “V” and flied underneath the word Vita. The cola part, however, had no changes at 
all. The other three cola products in Qingdao took a conservative approach in trademark 
designs, but Coca-Cola’s elements were still easy to tell. Wusing Cola (Five-star cola) 
was produced by China Cider Company, which was opened in April 1947, whereas Alfa 
Kola was produced by Lu Dong Miner Water Company, which was started in July 
1946.271 All of them were new, small-scale, Chinese companies that shifted to make cola 
products after the Second World War when Coca-Cola became popular in China.  
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Figure 4.3 Trademarks of cola products in Qingdao. 
The first line left is the authentic American Coca-Cola trademark in the 1940s. The rest 
of the trademarks in this group were all Chinese imitations found in Qingdao.  
Source: “Trademark registration forms,” The Qingdao Archive, B0049-001-00612:0022.  
 
Epidemics and Sanitation 
 To save costs, vendors and small businessmen produced soft drinks in poor 
conditions and took every opportunity in summer to sell cold drinks to the public without 
any regard to sanitation. They did not use the proper ingredients and no steps were taken 
by the health authorities to test the drinking qualities of these refreshments. 272 The 
manufacturers were given a free hand in their activities: either bottled shoddy drinks with 
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fake trademarks, or produced soft drinks with unboiled water, pigment, and saccharin, 
and sold them under attractive brand names at very cheap prices. What’s worse, some 
vendors themselves were carriers of diseases, but still run the business for their 
livelihood. Hot seasons were especially dangerous because of the breeding of mosquitoes 
and flies, dreaded carriers of diseases, through which unregulated cold drinks were easily 
contaminated and thus became the breeding bed of bacteria. Although many better known 
companies did take pains in giving their customers the best for their money, few 
establishments that sprung up in hot weather, offering drinking refreshments to the 
public, were strictly sterilized. 
 An inspection on the Shanghai cold drink market conducted by the Bureau of 
Shanghai Public Health in 1937 reported that 71.4% of soda drinks failed to meet the 
certain standard. This percentage was 96.5% for orange juice and 100% for plum juice. 
Although the number of bacteria in soda drinks was less than the other two because of 
different ingredients and the special producing process, many soda drinks contained 
59.5% of saccharin, 24% of blowing agent (起泡剂) and salicylic acid (水杨酸), and 
80% of pigment in colored drinks, which were not good for health.273 The test on drinks 
produced by soft drink companies was not perfectly satisfactory as well. The analysis 
revealed that thirty-seven soft drink manufacturers including Watson’s Mineral Water 
Company, Aquarius Company, the Kwan Sun Yuen, Eddie Aerated Water Company, and 
California Fruit Drinks Company, submitted one hundred and eleven samples of aerated 
water, orange squash, fresh syrups, etc. for examination, and no samples had been found 
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up to standard, which requires: 1. That the drinks shall contain no mineral acids; 2. That 
no saccharin shall be employed; 3. That no effervescent shall be employed; 4. That 
preservatives shall not exceed 0.1; 5. That there shall be no more than 100 organisms in 
every milliliter and 1 organism of the B. coil group in every deciliter of water.274 
 More than a decade later, the situation of Shanghai soft drink market did not 
improve at all. A lab test conducted by Shanghai Municipal Laboratory in 1948 showed 
that among eighteen tested ice-cream and soft drink brands, fourteen of them contained 
E. Coil, three had salmonella paratyphi A, and most of them carried dysentery bacteria.275 
Although drinking insanitary cold drinks might be fine for people who are physically 
strong, it would be fatal if the body is in a poor health condition. Human’s immune 
system is especially weak in summer, thus few people who drank insanitary cold drinks 
could escape from tragedy. One newspaper article pointed out that compared to any other 
civilized society, China had more hawkers and uneducated consumers were usually 
careless on drinking sanitation, so China’s mortality in summer was extremely high. The 
fact is it was not a natural disaster, but a man-made tragedy, which could have been 
avoided.276 In addition to suggesting not drinking cold beverages and overeating, this 
article made an urgent appeal to the authorities to take an immediate action to put an end 
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once for all to the promiscuous selling of cold drinks far from being property distilled by 
hawkers.277  
 The growing number of unsanitary drinks and rapid spreading of epidemics 
forced the government to take actions for the sake of public health. In the 1940s, local 
government in almost all cities in China had to set up the cold beverage standard for soft 
drink industry. It was mandatory before drinks were put into the market. Brand-named 
soft drink companies were very cooperative. They launched a series of campaigns 
focusing on healthy drinking and disease prevention and grounded their marketing 
concepts to cleanness and safety. One of the biggest campaigns was initiated by Shanghai 
Aquarius Mineral Water Company in 1938, whose slogan “choose your drinks 
carefully—Aquarius soft drinks” was widely appeared in a variety of newspapers, 
magazines, and posters.278 In June, the “market news” column in Wen Hui Bao highly 
praised the cleanness of Aquarius soft drinks and recommended them as the safest drink 
on the market:  
 “Big epidemics often came after the war. Widespread epidemic usually 
occurred in summer and at the beginning of fall. This year, the population in 
Shanghai was continually growing, which was a hundred million more than that 
of last year. People drank beverage carelessly only for the sake of momentary 
pleasure, resulting in disastrous epidemics. In everyday life, healthy diet was 
crucial to prevent diseases. With regard to soft drinks, products from Aquarius 
Mineral Water Company were the best choice, because every drop of Aquarius’s 
                                                 
 
 
277 “FDA urge to stop street hawing here,” U1-16-2031:862. The Shanghai Archive. 
278 One advertisement was on Wen Hui Bao, July 26, 1938. 
 136 
drinks was carefully distilled and rigorously tested by the Central Health 
Laboratory, which guaranteed no cholera, typhoid, and other bacteria. It is also 
noteworthy that people who have vaccinated, in fact, could not completely 
immune to the diseases. They should remain to pay attention to their daily diet, 
and they were recommended to only drink the distilled Aquarius’s soft drinks.”279  
 Through efforts of beverage companies and the government, the quality of soft 
drinks made a significant improvement. Products from the big, well-known companies in 
particular were growing as examples for the whole soft drink industry in China. For 
instance, a market survey in 1932 showed that among all four soda water brands selling 
in Nanjing, only three brands from Shanghai including Aquarius, Watson, and Yili met 
the sanitation standard. Their bottles were well sealed by iron caps with corks inside and 
none of them contained saccharine, pigment, and preservative, etc. Aquarius’s soda 
drinks were sealed better than other brand products. They were made up of an appropriate 
percentage of sugar and acid and the aftertaste was just right. Watson’s contained more 
sugar, so it tasted a little bit sweeter. Yili’s had more acid, which became tasteless after 
drink. Therefore, people preferred Aquarius to Yili. But in fact the high percentage of 
carbonic acid in Yili’s products was especially good for digestion.280 The only local soft 
drink brand in Nanjing in 1932 was Pu Tai He. The drink was bottled in a glass bottle 
sealed by a glass ball in the mouth and was very cheap. However, after lab tests it was 
discovered that Pu Tai He’s soda water contained E. coli, so it was forbidden to sell by 
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the Nanjing Municipal Government.281 Besides market regulations, consumers’ 
awareness of self-protection was equally important. In addition to the strict inspections 
on soft drinks companies, the local government encouraged the public to purchase 
beverages only from reliable firms, the products of which were properly labeled, sealed, 
and capped. For example, in 1927, No. 3621 Shanghai Municipal Notification officially 
suggested the public not to drink iced drinks unless contained in mechanically filled 
bottles from licensed factories, and cooled by machine-made ice.  
 No matter how seamless and strict the regulations were and how cooperative the 
brand-name soft drink companies were, cheap soft drinks continuously mushroomed on 
the market, of which unscrupulous hawkers were the major causes. To make a living in 
cities, hawkers, many of whom were migrants from poor provinces, sold food, drinks, 
and clothes along the streets. Every day they brought goods to the town, carefully looked 
around to find places that were considered safe and appropriate, and set up booths to 
solicit business from pedestrians. In summer when people are easily getting thirsty, 
drinking booths were one of the major businesses along streets. Some hawkers who sold 
meat, buns, and cakes in the rest of the seasons shifted to summer refreshments business. 
To reduce cost, they either made drinks with crude equipment by themselves or bought 
cheap drinks from small and unlicensed companies or underground workshops. As they 
required little start-up capital, these businesses flourishing in cities frequently 
overcrowded sidewalks. Sometimes the unlicensed hawkers were bold enough to venture 
forth onto the street, obstructing the progress of traffic and jamming pedestrians. 
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However, what was more dangerous was their unhygienic products seriously threatened 
the health of the public.282 Hawkers, many of whom were illiterate and had no sense 
toward sanitation, sold soft drinks produced with pigment and unboiled water, shaved ice 
made directly from running water, and fruits and salad placed in an open air with no fly-
proof covers. Some drinks were even found dead flies in the bottles, while others were 
found to be bottled in kerosene bottles.283 These unsanitary drinks became vehicles for 
the transmission of diseases, which significantly threatened the public health.  
 For the sake of the public interest, the municipal administrations announced a 
series of provisions to regulate the cold drink market and strictly prohibited hawking of 
any of insanitary article of food and drinks. According to the provisions, all soft drink 
retailers including hawkers and shoulder pole carriers must acquire the yearly-renewed 
license from the Public Health Department before opening businesses.284 Anyone who 
carried infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, leprosy, and scabies was forbidden to 
produce or sell cold drinks. Manufacturers must use boiled water and clean, well-capped 
containers/bottles, on which the trademark and production dates should be clearly 
marked. Containers used for producing soft drinks must have covers and have to be 
washed every day. If they were made of lead or copper, they must be tinned. Sealed 
bottles of soft drinks could not be opened until drinking, and selling soft drinks in open 
                                                 
 
 
282 “FDA urge to stop street hawking here,” U1-16-2031:862. The Shanghai Archive. 
283 “ningmeng yin,” (flies in soda) Xinmin Evening News, Sep 21, 1946, 4. 
284 The license fee has to be paid every year. Usually hawkers and should pole carriers paid less than a half 
of the fee.    
 139 
bottles or glasses were forbidden. Any drink that contains toxic pigment, essence, 
preservative, and sediment was also strictly forbidden.285  
To enforce the provisions, street cleansing campaigns were widely launched every 
summer across the country. Officials in the Public Health Bureau (PHB), who were 
sometimes teamed up with police, patrolled city’s streets and confiscated all unlicensed 
and unsanitary products that they found. In summer 1930, Guangzhou Public Health 
Department confiscated a large number of cheap and unhygienic bottled Dutch water, 
which was particularly beloved by children, and heavily penalized retailers if they sold 
the drinks again.286 In Shanghai the Public Health Bureau and the Police Department 
were authorized to seize all unqualified articles as well as receptacles in which they were 
concerned.287 In summer 1942, the staff of Public Health Department and Shanghai 
Municipal Council had, in a ten day period, seized and destroyed a total of 365 lbs. of 
peeled water chestnut and sugar cane, 35 lbs. of colored water, and 30 lbs. of Liang Feng 
(jellies), which were being sold by hawkers on the street.288 In summer 1943, the 
cleansing street campaign also made a great achievement: on June 16th, from a hawker 
named Shing Yo Bin, on the Kwanghsin (Guangxin) Jetty, approximately 25 lbs. of iced 
drinks were seized and destroyed;289 July 15, approximately 10 gallons of colored drinks 
were confiscated;290 and August 5th, from a hawker named A San, on kwanghsin Road 
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near jetty, 6 lbs. of iced drinks and 2 glass receptacles placed in the BHO’s store room 
were seized.291 In July 1949, officials of the Shanghai Public Health Bureau and the 
Police patrolled in the streets during day and night hours, finding unlicensed self-made 
soft drinks including brand names of O.K, Hong Xing, Guo Zi, Lu Tou, and Di Qiu, and 
confiscating hundreds of pounds of insanitary beverages. Education on health and 
sanitation usually followed after penalties, for most hawkers moved from countryside and 
were illiterate.292  
In railroad stations where hawkers congested, the cleansing campaign was in full 
swing, too. In response to the move of the Public Health Bureau, the Railroad Bureau 
played an important role in eliminating illegal hawkers in stations and trains. Regardless 
of the PHB’s regulations, the Shanghai Railroad Bureau announced all hawkers and small 
shop keepers who were running businesses in Beijing, Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, 
Changzhou, and Zhenjiang Stations must be licensed by the Railroad Bureau, otherwise 
penalties would apply. In Shanghai North Station, for example, punishment for an 
unlicensed cold drink hawker was forcing him to either drink or empty all his beverages. 
Since spring 1949, the Bureau decided to force illegal hawkers doing business in 
Shanghai North Station to buy tickets and send those who were selling drinks in trains 
without tickets to the police office.293   
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In the meantime, vaccination campaigns and disinfection campaigns went neck-
and-neck with the cleansing campaigns. Clinics and hospitals offered cholera vaccines to 
the public. Mobile clinic stations set up by the Public Health Bureau were travelling in 
the city to give shots. In summer 1946, fifty-eight medical teams composed by 
participants from Ren Ji Hospital, Fu Ru Hospital, Nan Yang Hospital, and Shanghai 
Hospital were sent to factories, schools, and residential areas to give free shots. By June 
20, over 62,000 people had been vaccinated.294 Only on one day, July 12 of 1949, there 
were 96,479 people got vaccinated in Shanghai, among which 23,109 were vaccinated by 
the mobile clinic station at Ti Lan Qiao. By July 13, the total amount of vaccinated 
population over the summer of 1949 in Shanghai reached 2,517,785. The disinfection 
campaigns made significant achievements as well. To prevent cholera spread by 
mosquitoes and flies, hygiene teams made up by medical people and policemen sprayed 
DDT at every slum in summer. From July 5 to 12 of 1949, 1,004,000 square feet of slum 
was disinfected.295  
After intense campaigns, sanitation of the cold food and drinking business was 
improved, but complete eradication of hawkers could never been fulfilled. When 
sanitation movements subsided, hawkers who made a living on the small business 
returned to the streets right away and they were sprouting out faster than the campaigns 
could eradicate. When they were peddling, their eyes kept looking around and staring 
nervously into the distance. As soon as seeing policemen in yellow uniforms came from 
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afar, the hawkers hastily packed their goods and fled away. Hawkers who were too late to 
escape prudentially bowed and apologized to the police. If lucky, they could survive; 
otherwise, not only they were put in jail but their goods were confiscated.296  
To eliminate illegal hawkers and protect the public health, frequent and strict 
inspections must be maintained. However, in addition to the rapid growing number of 
hawkers, neither the Public Health Bureau nor the Police Department in cities like 
Shanghai claimed to take a full responsibility to the issue. For years, the Health 
Department usually took the lead in coping with the situation and gained some 
achievements, but because of staff shortage, the Food Division in the Health Department 
became helpless to take an active part in the yearly campaigns as the number of illegal 
hawkers kept increasing. The sporadic actions merely relying on the Department hardly 
led to any long-standing success. The Shanghai Times on July 12th, 1944 commented that 
the whole matter on the cold drink market reflected unfavorableness to the 
Administration and especially on the Health Department as far as the display of food 
stuffs was concerned. On May 21st, 1944, the Public Health Bureau issued notification 
No. 262 titled “Hawking of Foodstuffs, Prohibited Foods and Drinks,” in which sales of 
seasonable dangerous and unsound foodstuffs were prohibited. In reality, however, not 
only the number of illegal hawkers kept increasing rapidly, the hawkers even set up their 
flimsy stalls and sheds along the main streets, which became a menace to pedestrians and 
shop-owners, not to talk about the obstruction they caused from the air-raid-precaution 
point of view.  
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The Shanghai Times suggested the difficulty could have been fixed by a 
collaborative endeavor, because there was a lack of cooperation between the Public 
Health Bureau and the Police Department, the lower level of the administrative hierarchy. 
The duty police work was not only protecting life and property through the enforcement 
of laws and ordinances but included maintaining social orders as well. Facing the 
deplorable situation, especially when the outbreak of a cholera epidemic was expected, 
the Shanghai Times felt that the Health Bureau with all their sub-branches was not in a 
position to deal with it. It suggested the Administrator in the Health Bureau to search help 
and assistance from other bodies of the administration, especially from the Police 
Department, which was contemplating a formation of the “sanitary police” who were 
specialized to manage hawkers to offer a good assistance to the Public Health Bureau. In 
this way, the Health Bureau, the only authority that should be in charge of this body of 
men, could make them a useful instrument of giving the city a better aspect than an 
occasional street cleansing campaign could do, and last but not the least, be of valuable 
help to enforce health restrictions to the benefit for the inhabitants in the city.297 
Indeed, participating of the Police resolved the staff shortage problem, but the 
action of the Police still could not eliminate unlicensed hawkers once for all. After the 
failure of the PHB, high expectations were placed to the Police. The municipal police 
outdoor members who have been ignoring the influx of a large number of itinerants and 
food hawkers and who have not restricted the activities of many unlicensed stall owners, 
was urge to be replaced by firmer disciplining police authorities. Chow Fu-Hai, the 
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director of the Police, who had improved local police work in one aspect in which he 
launched several successful campaigns and had mitigated the street obstruction, became 
the person on whom the high expectation laid by the public and the municipal 
administration. Under Chow’s rigid and frequent inspections, the number of hawkers 
reduced and traffic congestions caused by hawkers were significantly relieved. 
Nevertheless, Police’s actions in a long run did not solve soft drink’s sanitation problem, 
either, which was largely due to police’s dereliction of duty. A lack of official reprimand 
in the police system encouraged certain corrupt members in recommencing bribery when 
performing official duties. When checking unlicensed stall owners and other itinerant 
dealers, some policemen were bribed for granting privilege to the undesirable.298 For 
example, a piece of news in 1944 reported that there was an unlicensed hawker selling 
unhygienic plum juice in front of the Shanghai Hong Kou Park. The business was quite 
good especially in the weekends. The drink was made from smashed plums, saccharine, 
and water, most consumers of which were ignorant children who were playing in the park 
with friends. Although a police notification had been there for years, policemen never 
drove him because of bribery.299  
Referring to the unceasing sanitation problems, neither the Public Health Bureau 
nor the Police Department claimed to shoulder the full responsibility; instead they 
rebutted that the accusation of their irresponsibility was a deliberate slander. The tension 
between the public and the two institutions was particularly apparent in the “orange 
squash” crisis took place in summer 1934, in which certain beverages labeled “orange 
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squash” were found to be unhygienic and dangerous. Without knowing the producers, the 
editor of Spectator harshly criticized the dereliction of duty of the PHB in the issue dated 
August 3, suspecting that there was a hidden secret behind the event and the 
Administration deliberately concealed the name of the condemned manufacturers at the 
expense of the public health. In response, the Commissioner of the Public Health Bureau 
commented that the criticism “passed the bounds of fair-play, which means such a 
statement could only emanate either from a person lacking of knowledge or from a policy 
of deliberate misrepresentation.”300 The Commissioner explained that “the reason the 
names were not given is very simple: the manufacturers of such contaminated beverages 
were usually small nomadic hawkers who manufacture their material in obscure 
alleyways not infrequently in areas outside our jurisdiction, and as seen as we condemn 
their stock they disappear into the air.” 301 The Commissioner felt that they have gave the 
public as clear a warning as they could and that their statement was perfectly logical 
inasmuch as the notification states: “the public are hereby warned that certain beverages 
labeled Orange Squash etc., which have been found on the bacteriological examination to 
be unfit for human consumption, are being offered for sale throughout certain parts of the 
Settlement. In order to prevent intestinal infections, the Public are advised to purchase 
beverage only from reliable firms, the product of which are properly capped, sealed, and 
labeled.”302  
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In this way, the PHB shirked its responsibility to the masses. The Commissioner 
claimed that the names of reliable manufacturers, which were licensed by the council, 
might be changed from day to day, it was therefore impossible for the PHB to be more 
explicit without being accused of advertising the product of certain establishments. Thus, 
it was necessary for the public in Shanghai to take some interest and responsibilities in 
health matters themselves. The logic behind the PHB’s argument was the reputable and 
brand-name soft drink companies were well-known to the public. Although occasionally 
a few companies were found to produce unsatisfactory articles, in most cases they were 
reliable and the appearance of their products was sufficient for consumers to distinguish 
the good from the shoddy. In the meantime, prosecutions both taken and pending would 
be published in the usual way when the matter was no longer sub-judice. The action of 
the PHB, claimed by the Commissioner, was, in the main, directed against the worst and 
more dangerous samples produced surreptitiously and sold in unlabeled bottles, and 
which at the time of warning were flooding the Settlement.303 
As to the fact that under rigid inspections from the PHB, there were still a great 
amount of samples of ice cream and drinks were discovered below the standard, another 
denouncement raised by Spectator, the Commissioner explained:  
“The samples are mostly taken for the purpose of licensing various 
establishments, and it naturally follows that when samples are below standard 
these establishments are not licensed. Again in other areas where establishments 
have been licensed, there are occasional bad samples, in which event the 
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necessary steps are taken to immediately improve the product, and confiscation of 
such stocks are considered unfit for the public consumption that takes place under 
the due and the correct legal procedure. Hence, the accusation that the department 
is afraid to bring forward the names of those that fail to rise to standard is quite 
unwarranted, and could only originate in the mind of a person ignorant both of 
procedure, and with a tendency towards believing in crooked procedures.”304  
 As unsanitary drinks were carriers of infectious diseases, the sanitation issue of 
soft drinks drew wide attention from the public. Forbidding such drinks expressly 
stipulated in state laws and ordinances. Administrations such as the PHB and the Police 
Department endeavored, at least seemed, to strive for implementing the laws for the 
public good. However, the market was still flooded with a large number of unsanitary 
soft drinks, which caused various versions of rumors on corruption that were circulated in 
the society. Intolerant to the repetitive health issues, a newspaper article published in 
1947 sharply criticized the bureaucratic corruption in the government which refused to 
disclose the names of the illegal manufacturers. It said “there were various rumors going 
on in the society, but whether there was a hidden secret was still unknown. Nevertheless, 
government’s dereliction of duty was undeniable. Someone said China’s bureaucracy was 
made by paper, which was absolutely true. Recently, several soft drink companies that 
violated the laws were punished, but the punishment was lenient under the name of 
showing solicitude for Chinese businessmen and protecting Chinese economic rights, 
propagandas vigorously advocated by the government and intellectuals in the National 





Products Movements. By doing so, the government hoped the Chinese companies to 
improve rather than simply eliminating them, which was very considerate. However, we 
hoped the policies were not made of paper, because this kind of social networks in 
bureaucracy would be built at the expense of millions of people’s lives.”305 
 
Soda Fountains 
In the Republican era, anyone wishing to start a summer drink refreshment stall 
could put on sale whatever solution he himself had prepared without any knowledge or 
regard for public health, and the government was incapable of fully enforcing the 
sanitation laws. With this insecure cold drink market, rich people could always protect 
their rights by consuming brand-name and high-quality products, whereas the poor, the 
major consumers of the cheap imitations, were the victims of the market disorder. Yet, 
technological innovations brought a hope to the masses. When big soft drink companies 
strived for maintaining the quality of bottled drinks, they tried to expand their business to 
the masses as well. As for the dilemma that the machine-capped bottled drinks were too 
expensive to the poor (because bottles per se were expensive and the collection and 
cleaning process of bottles were time consuming and costly) while the home-made drinks 
were unhealthy, since 1930s some companies introduced mechanical soda fountains in 
soda business, which were not only cheaper than bottled drinks but also more hygienic 
than drinks sold by peddlers. The whole idea of soda fountains in the minds of those soft 
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drinks companies, as claimed by the Sanitas Mineral Water Co. Ltd,306 one of the most 
important soda fountain producers in Shanghai, was to produce and sell cleaner and safer 
drink for the poorer classes, which was obtainable from the old fashioned native drink 
counters.307 The companies believed that if provided syrups come from reliable sources, 
Soda Fountains would considerably diminish the trade of street hawkers dealing in 
various kinds of cold drinks during the season, which were unhygienically prepared and 
directly threated to the health of the public.308  
To convince the public and market the soda fountains, soft drink companies 
actively searched for cooperation from the Public Heath Bureau. The Sanitas Mineral 
Water Company, for example, collaborated closely with the Sanitation Division of the 
PHB since the very beginning. Their products and manufacturing process were under the 
jurisdiction of the PHB and samples were taken at regular intervals for analytical and 
bacteriological purposes. Soda containers of the soda fountains were fool proof and could 
only be refilled at the Sanitas Factory, whereas the fountains were mechanical in 
operation, hence possible contamination from soiled towels, dirty hands, flies etc. was 
reduced to minimum. In this way, the Company assumed that Soda Fountains would 
appeal to the public. If the price was good, to some extent, it would replace the sales of 
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plum juice (Suan Mei Tang) and shaved ice etc., which were sold in many instances 
under conditions insanitary and unsafe.309   
Fountains were installed free of charge against guarantee and on conditions that 
all sodas and syrups were procured through the owners of the fountains, and that daily 
sales reached a given standard, which was calculated according to locality of fountain. 
Owners would check up frequently on sales and fountains, upon any breach of contract 
the fountain would be withdrawn.310 Usually, Soda Fountain companies supplied kiosks 
including Soda Fountains, glass washing apparatus, ice boxes, and so forth on loan to 
dealers nominated and guaranteed by a distributor who would not be entitled to make any 
charge to the dealers such as rental etc. Each dealer must be guaranteed to the Soda 
Fountain Company by the name of the distributor on the safety, insurance, breakage and 
due return in good condition of the kiosk and/or equipment. In the event of loss or 
breakage from any cause whatsoever, the distributor should reimburse the Company at 







                                                 
 
 




Table 4.1:311 rates of reimbursement provided by the Sanitas Mineral Water Co. Ltd. in 
1934 
 
Each Complete Kiosk $1200 (Chinese dollars) 
Table with 6 glass panels 170 
Two chromium Supports 25 
Water tank with signboard  50 
Chromium fountain 180 
Four glass syrup containers with chromium taps and lids 35 
One glass washing apparatus 65 
One ice box 35 
One block of the refrigerating coil 60 
One copper / tin tank 350 
… … 
 
When the kiosk and all the equipment were ready, the Soda Fountain Company 
supplied soda water and syrup to dealers, and paid the distributor for the liability. For 
example, the 1934 contract between the Sanitas Mineral Water Co. Ltd, the Soda 
Fountain owner, and Mr. Z.K. Woo, the distributor, states that the Company would 
supply one tank of soda water and seven bottles of syrup to dealers guaranteed by the 
distributor at a cost of seven dollars to be paid for in cash by the dealer at time of delivery 
which price included delivery and collection. The Company would also pay the 
distributor in the morning following the previous day’s collections a sum of one Shanghai 
dollar per tank, which constituted the only liability from the Company to the 
distributor.312 For the distributor, in addition to delivery and collection, he had to submit 
a list of the names and addresses of his dealers to the Company which had the right to 
reject any dealer who might not be acceptable to the Public Health Bureau or police 
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Authorities of the Settlement or Concession. The distributor must keep constant 
supervision over the dealers. Their premises and any uncleanliness etc. should be 
reported in order to assist the Public Health Bureau or the Councils, and such dealer when 
so instructed should deliver up his kiosk and equipment without any claim legal or 
otherwise on the Fountain Company. In addition, the distributor also had the 
responsibility to instruct dealers in the most economical and hygienic method of 
handling. For example, the glasses should be kept under covers and lids kept on syrup 
containers to prevent access of flies and dirt etc.313  
Since the 1930s, with close collaboration between Soda Fountain companies and 
the Public Health Bureau, Soda Fountains were supplied to dealers in Chinese territory as 
well as the Settlement in Shanghai. Some were also placed on wheels for hawkers. In 
June 24, 1933, there were eleven Soda Fountains functioning in the Western District.314 
The Sanitas Company and its distributors planned to install at least 150 fountains in the 
international settlement and French Concession of Shanghai.315  
The increasing application of mechanical operated Soda Fountains significantly 
improved the sanitation condition of cold drink stalls, but possible contamination still 
remained by using of dirty lead pipes leading from soda container through ice box and on 
to service tap. In particular, insufficiently washed drinking glasses were the most serious 
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defect of the innovation. A chief health inspector found two unsanitary portable kiosks 
from which served fruit cordials on Muirhead Road in 1933.316 He reported:  
“One is located in a fruit shop and on my visit I found many large flies 
walking over the glass tumblers on the stand. The other is in a converted C. 
Eating Houses which had no license or facilities for the proper washing of glasses.  
The stand looks well. This is about all one can say about it from a sanitary 
point of view. I observed the water tank on top being filled with cold water out of 
dirty bucket. This is a gravity flow with no pressure to speak of to the glass 
rinsing spray. I tested some and consider it would be far better to rinse the glasses 
in the dirty bucket. In such a method the whole glass would be immersed in water. 
With the rinsers at present this is far from being the case. In fact the syrup 
remains on the glasses to provide food for the flies.  
The rinsing method in use on the kiosks cannot be said to be a 
‘satisfactory method and proper washing up facilities.’ For a fruit shop to sell 
aerated waters sucked with a straw there’s no objection. There’s nothing to 
contaminate, nothing requires washing, so the Department never objected. 
Overall, the soda kiosks are unsatisfactory. I suggest to restrict the 
manufacture, preparation, and storing of cold drinks and ice cream to places with 
special fly-proofed pantries and premises. Those without such were refused 
licenses. Besides, the soda kiosks might be improved by the dissembling of the 
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tank rinsing outfit and fitting nearby of a proper washing up sink and provision of 
a cover on glass container.”317 
Receiving such report, the Public Health Bureau felt hesitate to license these 
places, especially kiosks with inadequate facilities for washing glasses, though many of 
them had installed Soda Fountains. As an improvement, Soda Fountain Companies 
adopted an idea of pressure soda, which included a plunger to clean the glasses. But 
public health inspectors still doubted the efficacy, because it only meant another handling 
for the syrup and it was doubtful if the glass holders could be cleaned satisfactory in 
average Chinese off-license cold drink stores or fruit shops. From the view of an 
inspector, the old idea of leaving the syrup in the original bottles was better but the old 
idea comparing to the new one did not have advertising values (because the new idea 
seemed more hygienic).318 What’s worse is the soda fountain kiosks “allowed” vendors to 
install kiosks in any and every kind of premises, which would only give shop owners 
another chance to sell unhygienic green bean soup (lv dou tang), cold jellies (liang feng), 
plum juice (suan mei tang), and even ice cream, which were originally a big part of their 
business.319 The insecure situation was also agreed by the Public Health Bureau. They 
pointed out that “the tank above the fountain might be filled with water which is not 
clean, and further, unless the glasses are pressed down very firmly on the plunger, the 
spray of water is inadequate to cleanse them properly and this defect will be worse during 
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a rush of business. The facilities for washing glasses will be even less easily remedied on 
the hawkers’ barrows which you (the Sanitas Mineral Water Co. Ltd.) also propose to 
utilize.”320 The Bureau thus asked for further improvements to reduce danger and 
suggested that “with regard to the fixed fountains, if arrangements could be made to 
connect the water tank of the fountain with the channel water supply we would then be 
prepared to agree to the issue of a license provided that the premises otherwise conform 
as regards construction and sanitary requirements of the Department.”321  
To convince the government, Soda Fountain Companies actively cooperated with 
the Public Health Bureau in improving the innovation and did whatever they could to 
assist the sanitary maintenance. Sanitas Mineral Water Company, for example, put in 
force a series of system which they thought would eliminate the objections raised by the 
Public Health Bureau: first, the inspector who delivers a full tank of soda water would at 
the same time inspect the upper tank containing washing water; second, he would deliver 
each soda water tank a full supply of boiled water and would personally waited to see the 
washing tank filled; third, he would instruct the lessee of the kiosk in the proper 
manipulation of the glass cleaning plunger; four, he would collect any unclean cloths 
used by the lessee; five, he would warn lessee against the use of native ice in the 
refrigerator box; and finally the Company would themselves report any untoward action 
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on the part of the lessee in their own protection and the Bureau’s report of any 
delinquency after due warning would result in the Kiosk being removed.322  
However, no matter how many efforts the soda fountain companies made, 
oppositions were still strong. One chief inspector in Shanghai doubted the real 
effectiveness of the measures taken by the companies. His report to the Acting 
Commissioner of Public Health in July 8, 1933 stated that “inspection of tanks by the 
Company’s inspectors will not ensure the usage of boiled and uncontaminated water in 
their absence. I doubt very much the competency of the Company’s Inspectors to judge 
of this sanitary standards required in all the arrangements in connection with the 
production and distribution of the beverage. Instruction of lessees of the kiosks in the 
proper manipulation of the glass cleaning plunger will not greatly improve the matter and 
remove the danger of glasses being contaminated. All the suggested improvements, with 
the exception of the fifth, are unsatisfactory and cannot be relied upon, hence, cannot be 
regarded as ensuring the required standard of cleanliness and safety.”323  
 Even though oppositions never vanished and potential sanitary dangers in soda 
fountains were never eliminated, given the disorder on the cold drink market in the early 
twenties, soda fountains indeed made a breakthrough in soft drink hygiene. The Public 
Health Bureau acknowledged the merit of the innovation and admitted that the apparatus 
was sound, marking a big step forward. They claimed that the advantages were real, and 
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the disadvantages were only possibilities, which could be reduced to a minimum with 
efforts. One inspector concluded that Soda Fountains, whether stationery or portable, had 
much to recommend and from a health point of view may be encouraged.  
 Fountain companies made some achievements in 1933. When the business season 
was coming in April 1934, fountain companies such as Sanitas Mineral Water Co., Ltd. 
contacted the Public Health Bureau for another round of cooperation, expressing their 
willingness to improve their device and make every effort to follow any requirement and 
suggestion proposed by the Bureau. The Company stated: 
 “Last year the Sanitas Mineral Water Co. Ltd., for whom we are General 
Managers, operated a large number of aerated soda water fountains, which were 
lent under guarantee to certain reputable Chinese. By far, the fountain was 
produced and it met with a certain amount of success. As the season is near at 
hand and before contracting with the dealers, we should be glad to again 
demonstrate these fountains to a representative of your Department, when any 
advice you can give us will be gone into carefully. We might mention that during 
the past season your Department did assist us materially and we shall be grateful 
for any further comment you may deem desirable.”324 
 Considering the improvement and efforts made by the company to ensure 
sanitation last year, the Public Health Bureau had no objection to Soda Fountain and was 
very glad to collaborate with the company again. However, they pointed out that it was 
very advisable that some methods hopefully could be evolved for improving the water 
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sprays for cleansing the glasses. Considering the method—necessitated pressing the 
glasses on a plunger—in use last year was not satisfactory, the Bureau suggested that: 
First, intensive efforts be made to improve the method of cleansing these glasses. Second, 
if possible it would be an excellent thing if arrangements could be made to have 
waterworks’ water supplied to the cleansing of water tank above the fountain. Third, it 
was essential that all the lessees of such fountains took out the requisite license (including 
ice cream and ice drinks).325 The Bureau also asked for a list of the proposed sites for 
those fountains from the Police Department in order to facilitate management and 
regulation on problems of sanitation and traffic congestion, especially those at certain 
extremely busy corners. Regarding to congestion, the Bureau decided no portable 
apparatus of this kind would be permitted in the Settlement or on outlying Municipal 
Roads.326  
 In respond to the suggestions, Sanitas Company claimed that they improved the 
plunger system, in which a greater force of water was used and a strong spray was 
directed to the outside and lip of the glass as well as the inside. As to the source of 
cleansing water, the Company guaranteed that the only water used for washing the 
glasses must be water produced by the Shanghai Waterworks and/or French Municipal 
Council.327 Although the chief public health inspector thought the improved plunger 
system’s water pressure did not differ from that in the old system, he admitted that the 
improved system had more holes in the nozzle, the water from which was able to spray 
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the outside top of the glass. The inspector commented that the fountains were built with 
qualified materials and raw materials used in fountains were sanitary, so it only required 




 When bottled soft drinks, a symbol of luxury, modernity, and social identity, 
became the favorite of the elites, imitations and self-made soft drinks helped to quench 
the thirst of the Chinese masses. Cheap soft drinks, at all once, appeared in traditional 
Chinese drinking booths, sometimes at teahouses, along streets where tea and plum juice 
were sold. Soft drinks in the cries of street peddlers were not so different from other 
traditional Chinese drinks, as if they were always a part of the Chinese drinking culture. 
Buckets stored with cheap soft drinks sit side by side with buckets stored with plum juice 
and tea. Only the colorful waters in glasses that sit on the table told customers that soft 
drinks were a sort of special. This hybridity of the Chinese business with western 
elements created a grassroots consumer culture which was hard to distinguish the origin 
at the first glance. Imitations not only provided new business opportunities for street 
peddlers who were struggling for a living, but also satisfied the desires of the masses who 
admired the lifestyle of the upper class who created an aura of social prestige for 
themselves mainly by producing and transmitting modern concepts and practices such as 
drinking soft drinks to China. In the early twentieth century, as Qin Shao argued in her 
paper “Tempest over Teapots: the Vilification of Teahouse Culture in Early Republican 
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China,”329 the upper class, especially the new cultural elites, which refer to a segment of 
the May Fourth intellectuals, considered Chinese traditional leisure space such as 
teahouses inherently backward as opposed to the western-style leisure space including 
ballrooms, theaters, cafés, western restaurants, and cold drink bars. However, the 
traditional leisure space had few changes regardless the fierce criticism and attacks from 
the new cultural elites in the twentieth-century China. Yet, the Chinese grassroots copy 
culture acted as a bridge connecting the upper class and the masses, the western-style 
leisure space and the traditional Chinese consumer space. Although the lowbrow 
consumer culture in general, at least in terms of the business forms and consuming 
patterns, barely changed in Republican China, it sometimes nicely blinded western ideas 
with Chinese elements rather than staying static. 
 If the changes in grassroots consumer culture sort of reflected the grassroots’ 
desire for modernity, which resonated with the upper class and thus represented the 
overall social mentality of the Chinese in the twentieth century, the crises caused by the 
grassroots copy culture revealed an irony during the process of pursuing development. 
Except meeting the psychological desires of the masses, soft drink imitations did not 
bring any social good but caused serious legal disputes and sanitation problems that 
forced the society to reconsider the process of development. Yet, these crises, on the 
other hand, facilitated the modern state-building and development, during which modern 
systems such as trademark laws and sanitation ordinances were gradually established 
despite the continuous violations from the unruly masses. Although these social problems 
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caused by cheap soft drink imitations could never be completely settled, the modern 
systems with the help of the technological innovation—soda fountains—opened a new 
era for market regulations. 
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CHAPTER 5  
NATIONALISM REVISITED: THE NATIONAL PRODUCTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY 
Introduction  
 When imperial and colonial powers expanded in China in the twentieth century, 
Chinese people, from intellectuals, entrepreneurs, government officers to grassroots, 
called for building a nationalistic consumer culture. The nationalistic sentiment 
particularly reflected in National Products Movements, in which nationalism molded a 
burgeoning consumer culture by applying the categories “national” and “foreign” to all 
commodities. Soft drinks initially were foreign products, so the nationalistic battle was 
particularly intense in this fledgling industry. In the Movements, the state and Chinese 
soft drink businessmen actively participated in cultivating a nationalistic drinking culture. 
They endowed a nationalistic category to soft drink consumption, which Karl Gerth has 
been eloquently demonstrated in his book, China Made: Consumer Culture and the 
Creation of the Nation. By analyzing Chinese National Products Movements in the first 
half of the twentieth century, Gerth claimed that goods possess nationality and the 
pervasive tensions between consumerism and nationalism were central to the creation of 
China as a modern nation.330 Largely stimulated by modern business interests, the 
Movements enlisted student activists, local and national government, and many sectors of 
modern Chinese society to its cause while imbuing the general rhetoric of aggrieved 
Chinese nationalism. On the surface, the Movements were in a consensus and were 
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pervasive in modern China, but Gerth left some room for discussing the conflicts behind 
the homogenous nationalistic veil.  
 In National Products Movements of the soft drink industry, the state actively 
involved in promoting national industries by organizing national goods exhibitions and 
rewarding outstanding Chinese soft drink companies. The state also imposed stamp taxes 
on soft drinks, which provoked fierce resistance from Chinese soft drink businessmen, 
who argued that imposing taxes actually meant a betrayal to the essence of the National 
Products Movement. In this state-businesses relation, Chinese businessmen formed as a 
dynamic civil society that resisted the state policies. Meanwhile, they also constantly 
shaped and revised the meanings of nationalism. If we further magnify our analytical 
subjects, the civil society became too broad to explain every conflict within the 
Movements. The Coca-Cola protest of 1947 was one of them. While many products had a 
clear-cut regarding to their nationality, Coca-Cola produced under the modern 
franchising system blurred the boundary between national and foreign products. 
Watson’s Mineral Water Company, the bottling plant of Coca-Cola in Shanghai, was 
owned and run by Chinese people. The Company imported syrup, bottles, and machines, 
and sold finished products to both the Chinese and foreigners. During National Products 
Movements in the late forties, when American products were the major target of 
boycotts, Coca-Cola drew furious protest from Chinese soft drink businessmen, who 
claimed Coke not only was a luxury and a waste, but also severely inhibited the survival 
of the national soft drink industry. This event led to an intensive debate over what were 
national products and in what category Coke belonged to.  
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 This chapter starts with a brief survey about National Products Movements in 
general since the beginning of the twentieth century, while putting particular emphasis on 
the boycotts against American products including Coca-Cola after 1945. Promoting 
production and consumption of Chinese soft drinks was one of the important 
compositions in National Products Movements, in which Chinese soft drink companies as 
well as the state collaborated with each other to cultivate a nationalistic drinking culture. 
Using soft drink industry as a lens, the rest of the chapter tries to challenge the consensus 
of National Products Movements. By analyzing two case studies: the stamp tax dispute 
and the Coca-Cola protest of 1947, this chapter shows how in real society, nationalism 
sometimes pathetically gave way to pragmatic rationality, and nationalism in 
consumption became harder and harder to practice as the pace of globalization 
accelerated.  
 
National Products Movements        
 Since the Opium War in 1840, China’s economy has changed dramatically. 
Western imperialists imposed a series of unequal treaties and exported a large amount of 
industrial products to the Chinese market. Influenced by the expanding foreign industry 
as well as the state policy of “business enterprises rescue the nation” (实业救国), 
Chinese national industries grew rapidly. In addition to the increasing mechanization of 
traditional industries, many new industries such as match, flour, and soft drinks also 
appeared on the Chinese market. However, imperial powers, by means of a large amount 
of direct investment and unequal treaties gradually controlled China’s major economic 
fields such as finance, mining, and transportation. In everyday life, the influx of imports 
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and the desires that those modern products created threatened many people in China. 
Politicians worried about trade deficits and the new consumer lifestyles exemplified by 
opium dens and addicts. Intellectuals, who had begun to read works on western political 
economy, feared the loss of sovereignty in the growing foreign-dominance commercial 
economy. Manufactures, faced with cheap but superior imports, wondered how they 
would preserve and increase their market shares.331 The threats were magnified by the 
rise of Chinese nationalism inflamed by Sino-Western political and military conflicts, 
which led to surges of nationalistic consumer culture, also known as National Products 
Movements in modern China.  
 The Movements popularized the meaning of material culture around the duality of 
“national products” and “foreign products,” and made consumption of national products a 
fundamental part of Chinese citizenship. Leading entrepreneurs, who were the major 
force of the Movements and whose economic interests were at stake, became living 
examples of two common expressions of the day: “Business enterprises rescue the 
nation” and “Establish factories for national self-preservation” (设厂自救).332 Ordinary 
people also cried out for consuming national products to demonstrate patriotism, as 
nationalism intended to mold a burgeoning consumer culture by applying the categories 
“national” and “foreign” to all commodities had created the notion of “treasonous” and 
“patriotic” products.333 
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 Generally speaking, each National Product Movement was derived from political 
reasons, triggered by certain Sino-western political, diplomatic, and military conflicts. 
The movements usually had certain foreign countries as the target protest, which had 
infringed China’s interest in the conflicts.334 Although the origin of the Movements could 
be traced back as far as the nineteenth century, the first truly National Products 
Movement started with the anti-American boycott of 1905. To protest discriminatory of 
U.S. immigration policies, Chinese merchants throughout China and overseas led a 
boycott of American products in summer of 1905.335 In the following decades, 
intensifying Sino-Japanese frictions and conflicts led to a prolonged boycott of Japanese 
goods. The humiliating Twenty-One Demands and Japanese invasion fueled anti-
imperialist sentiment and brought National Products Movements into a climax. Chinese 
business communities as well as the Guomingdang government actively participated in a 
collaboration to make effort to develop national industries and encourage Chinese people 
to consume Chinese products.  
One large-scale “Buy Chinese” movement took place at the end of 1933. It was 
officially launched by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and evolved in full swing in 
the Chinese quarters of Shanghai on October 13th. Exhibitions, slogans, and posters were 
frequently and widely seen in every corner of the region. Exhibitions in connection with 
the Chinese movement which was under way at the Wen Miao garden displayed a large 
amount of nationally produced goods. Meanwhile, some 350 Chinese business and public 
leaders attended the inauguration of the movement, which took place in the Chamber of 
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Commerce Hall in North Sichuan Road. There were flags and poster decorations all about 
the hall, and banners bearing such phase as “the more foreign goods imported, the poorer 
China will be!” “It is disgraceful for Chinese to patronize foreign goods.” During the 
conclave, a number of speeches were delivered by government officials such as the Chief 
of the Second Division in the Bureau of Social Affairs, who enthusiastically encouraged 
citizens to consume national products. Following the speeches, there were music and 
singing, and a broadsheet propagandizing the movement was distributed among those 
present.336  
 Japan’s defeat in 1945, however, did not end Chinese nationalistic sentiment on 
consumption; rather the United Stated replaced Japan as the target in the new round of 
National Products Movements. American troops as the allied fought shoulder by shoulder 
with the Guomingdang army in the Pacific War, but what came along with the Sino-U.S. 
friendship was the deluge of American products. In the name of friendship with its ally 
the Nationalist Party, the United States signed a “Surplus Property Bulk Sale Agreement” 
with China in August, 1946. The agreement stated that its primary purpose was to “bring 
about the speedy turnover to China of war surplus for use by China in rehabilitating its 
economy, combating inflation, and acquiring foreign exchange through sales for 
export.”337 With the agreement in place, hundreds of American products which were high 
in quality but low in prices, such as canned food, nylon socks, and milk powder, poured 
into the Chinese market. In a large populous city like Shanghai, there was not a single 
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person who never consumed U.S. products, especially America-made food. Xinmin 
Evening News of 1947 sarcastically commented that “thanks to our great friend, from 
now on a noble child—if he has the luck—is completely fed and raised by American 
products. From the moment when he is born with the assistance of a midwife who wears 
America-made gloves to his death, he doesn’t need to eat a grain of rice grown by 
Chinese farmers, nor wear a piece of cloth woven by Chinese peasants. What he eats are 
imported milk powder, fish oil, vitamin ABCD, and all kinds of canned food. What he 
wears are foreign wool sweaters, suits, and jackets.”338 
 After 1945 American products were sold in every store and department. Even 
street stalls, most of which were run by refugees, were filled with American 
commodities. In the Civil War, many people who fled and took refuge in Shanghai made 
a living by peddling American products in streets, which greatly obstructed traffic. The 
Shanghai Municipal Government banned street vendors by laws in 1946, but soon over 
two hundred street peddlers gathered together and opened a United World Store, 
specializing in selling foreign products in the Nanshi district (Huangpu district today). 
The so-called United World Store, which was very crowded every day, in fact, was a 
huge U.S. products stall where no national commodities could be seen. Xinming Evening 
News commented that American Products Store might be a more appropriate name for 
this place, since the only thing that was Chinese in the store were peddlers and 
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customers.339 In other districts of Shanghai where enforcement of the regulation was 
weak, street peddlers selling American products were rampant. American canned food 
was neatly piled along the streets. Sugar, coffee, and cookies were sold by weigh instead 
of cans to maximize the profit.340  
 Impacted by the deluge of American products, many national industries went 
bankrupt. When U.S. military canned food and milk powder entered Shanghai, Chinese 
Meilin Canned Food Company immediately lost the market. When repacked American 
Weishi monosodium glutamate appeared, Tianchu MSG Company felt the disaster right 
away. When American medicine came to China, Xinyi Pharmaceutical Factory spent ten 
thousand million yuan on advertisement, but still in vain. After Camel and Luck Strike 
cigarettes were sold in Shanghai, Chinese brands such as Lanjizi and Meili were driven 
away to Sichuan province—an inland province of China. Only nine months after victory 
of WWII, national industries either were bankrupt or stopped production. Chongqing, an 
industrial city during the war, turned into a barren land after victory. Shanghai, the 
industrial center after the war, was in a precarious situation under the impact of American 
goods. Factory owners were selling production machines and real estate, while a large 
number of workers were unemployed.341 By 1946, Shanghai Socks Factory only operated 
three to four hours a day. Among eighty cigarette factories in Shanghai, only half of them 
were in operation. In Shanghai canned food industry, there were only 50 out of 180 
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factories survived.342 Many Chinese said that the devastation of our national industry 
after the war was much more severe and fatal than the damage made by Japanese 
dumping a few years before.343 
 Moreover, the hyperinflation in the forties gave the struggling national industries 
a fatal blow. During the Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalist Government resorted to the 
printing press to finance the majority of its spending, covering 65 to 80 percent of its 
annual expenditures through money creation. During the civil war years of 1946-1949, 
monetary expansion covered 50-65 percent of the government’s spending.344 The money 
printing and the civil war brought the worst inflation in the Chinese history. By the end of 
1946, money supply increased to 9,181.6 billion yuan, and a more than six-fold increase 
to 60,965.5 billion by December 1947. Seven months later in July 1948, the money 
supply expanded to 399,091.6 billion yuan.345 Foreign exchange markets reflected the 
huge devaluation of the yuan. In June 1937, 3.41 yuan traded for one US Dollar. By 
December 1941, on the black market 18.93 yuan exchanged for a US Dollar. At the end 
of 1945, yuan had fallen to 1,222. By May 1949, one US Dollar fetched 23,280,000 yuan 
for anyone who cared to have some.346 
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Figure 5.1: Money Inflation of China, 1937-1948 




 Inflation caused a significant rise of living cost. Commodity prices rose almost 
four thousand times higher than those before the Sino-Japanese War.347 Within one year 
after the victory, prices in Nanjing increased seventeen fold, while goods prices in 
Shanghai increased thirteen fold. However, growth of people’s salaries was much lower 
than the price increase.348 High prices dramatically increased the cost of national 
industries, which led to high prices of the national products on the market. Facing the 
deluge of American products, expensive national products which were expensive but in 
low quality could not compete with foreign goods at all. While the cost in American 
products only accounted for twenty-five percent of the final price, the cost of most 
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national products was seventy-seven percent of the price.349 For example, a box of China-
made shoe-polish was 1,200 yuan, but imported American shoe-polish was only 700 
yuan. A Chinese lipstick cost 1,500 yuan, whereas American lipstick was less than a half 
of the price, 600 yuan. National Angel milk powder was 4,000 yuan per pound, but 
American Klim was 2,000 yuan.350 
 For most Chinese people who worshiped things foreign, American products were 
regarded not only cheap but also better in quality than national goods. Even when prices 
of some national products were cheaper than those of American products, Chinese 
consumers still preferred the latter one. For example, a pair of China-made shoes cost 
109,000 yuan, while the same style of American shoes was 145,000 yuan, but most the 
Chinese bought American shoes. With regard to other products such as crackers, which 
had a higher difference in prices, American products became much more popular. Sales 
of American crackers in Shanghai could reach 25 tins every day, but sadly sales of 
Mabaoshan crackers, a national brand, in 1946 were only one tin every two days.351   
 Shocked by the pervasiveness of American goods and the waning national 
industries, the nationalistic Chinese started another surge of National Products Movement 
in the late forties, calling for consumption of Chinese products. In 1946, the Shanghai 
branch of China Association for Promoting Production opened a National Products 
Exhibition Mall to attract people to buy national products. The mall contained two 
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hundred and twenty-one exhibitions and one hundred and nineteen national companies 
participated. It gathered almost all national brands under the same roof in order to 
provide consumers convenience to compare and purchase, trying to change consumers’ 
preference for foreign goods.352 However, some patriotic Chinese felt the exhibition was 
not enough. They wrote to the editor of Xinming Evening News, suggesting the 
newspaper initiating a propaganda team to persuade people door by door to buy Chinese 
products which were either donated or loaned by Chinese companies. Participants could 
be anyone regardless of gender, as long as they were patriotic and eloquent. The 
proposers believed campaigning in this way could not only partially solve the 
unemployment issue, but also stressed the importance of consumption of national goods 
and made a contribution to save bankrupting Chinese industries and economy.353  
 The deluge of American products was considered not only a heavy blow to 
national industries, but also a political threat to social peace and stability. After the war, 
the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party returned to ongoing hostilities in the 
Chinese Civil War, even though negotiations were still in progress in 1945.354 When a 
full-scale civil war finally resumed after the Chongqing negotiations, the Communist 
Party started to support the National Products Movement. Communist Party mobilized 
patriotic intellectuals and young people to protest the bulk sale of American surplus 
property. The movement was vigorously supported by nationalist intellectuals such as 
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Guo Moruo (1892-1978) and Deng Chumin, (1889-1981) as well as hundreds of 
“patriotic entrepreneurs” and students.355 The activists argued that most American goods 
were not necessities in spite of the cheap prices and good qualities, but what made people 
buy them was people’s curiosity and conceit. In the boycott of 1946, a group of students 
criticized that many Chinese discarded their belts to buy a pair of nylon pants; discarded 
their beautiful leather handbags to buy American plastic bags; and discarded their modern 
silk cheongsam to buy nylon cheongsam. They were smoking American cigarettes and 
using American ball pens and fountain pens, but what did they smoke and write with 
before American goods came? The students warned consumers that together with the 
advent of these American products, the United States also sold a large amount of 
weapons to China, helping and prolonging the Chinese Civil War, killing hundreds and 
thousands of Chinese people. Anyone who bought American goods owed an apology to 
the brothers and sisters who died under American weapons.356 It was agreed that the 
long-standing Civil War gave no space for national economy to rehabilitate and 
American products further inhibited the tottering national industries. To save the country, 
there was no better way than forcing American army to withdraw from China and 
stopping the Civil War immediately. In this light, the boycott of American products was 
the most effective way to force American army to withdraw. Activists shouted slogans 
that “the Civil War should stop and peace and democracy should be achieved. American 
army must withdraw from China immediately. Chinese people would not buy American 
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products unless American troops get out of China.”357 Although the nationalistic emotion 
up-surged, activists pointed out that the boycott, which merely served for saving the 
dying national industries, did not mean unfriendliness to American allies. As long as 
American army withdrew from China and the Civil War ended, no one would oppose 
legal international trade when a democratic government was formed and fair international 
trade agreements were set.358 
 
The National Products Movement in Soft Drink Industry  
 Soft drink business in China was an emerging but fast-growing industry in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Cities like Shanghai saw a fast expansion of both 
foreign and Chinese soft drink companies, but in most regions of China, particularly in 
treaty-port cities, soft drink market was generally dominated by foreign companies in the 
early 1900s. Take Tianjin for example, by 1915 the market was dominated by three big 
Japanese soft drink companies—Da Ping, Chen Jing Chun, and Qiu Yuan—with an 
annual sale over 10,000 dozens.359 In the eyes of most Chinese people, the domination of 
foreign business in soft drink industry significantly undermined the economic interest of 
the country. Competitions from foreign companies further suppressed the development of 
the newly formed industries. To save Chinese soft drink business and save the nation, 
Chinese soft drink companies made efforts to seek possible solutions. Through diligent 
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investigation and research, Chinese merchants such as Yang Yijian and his colleagues, 
who were founders of Tianjin Hong Xing Soft Drink Company, finally found recipes that 
were comparable to foreign products. Their Company soon became the most well-known 
Chinese soft drink company in Tianjin.  
 Tianjin Hong Xing Soft Drink Company was opened with a raised fund of 8000 
silver dollars in April 1902 by Yang Yijian, who was born in Hebei province. After 
several years of hard work, the Company produced various kinds of soft drinks with 
domestic materials. Its products were sold in many provinces across the country 
including Zhili (Tianjin and Beijing), Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Shanxi, Jilin, Fengtian 
(Liaoning province), Hankou, Xiamen, etc. Over the decade, frequent political turmoil 
and different tax systems on national and foreign products, to some extent, impeded the 
Chinese beverage business, but Hong Xing Soft Drink Company continuously made a 
profit every year and its products gained a considerable share of the domestic market. 
Thanks to the Company’s constant dedication to improve their products, its sales 
expanded rapidly and caused a big drop in sales of foreign soft drinks. By 1915, sales of 
Japanese soft drinks in Tianjin dropped more than a half, which was believed as a partial 
success in resisting foreign imperialist power and Chinese soft drink companies 
successfully saved some interests of the country.360  
 In addition to making every effort at improving qualities of national products, one 
of the most visible way in encouraging consumption of national products was 
advertisement, which in Karl Gerth’s words, was the most portable institution in the 
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exhibitionary complex. Despite the foreign origin of soft drinks, many Chinese soft drink 
companies integrated nationalistic elements in their trademarks and advertisement, which 
was known as nationalistic commodity spectacles.361 It represented a more subtle way of 
nationalizing consumer culture than the violent anti-imperialist boycotts and ranged from 
fashion shows to parables about product-nationality that appeared in popular newspapers 
and magazines. The Chinese soft drink advertisement took nationalistic commodity 
spectacles outside controlled spaces to individual consumers, producing what could be 
called a micro-exhibition.362   
 To help consumers distinguish Chinese drinks from foreign and cultivate a 
nationalistic consuming culture, the most important thing was to identify the nationality 
of products. In the twentieth century, phrases like “national products,” “China-made,” 
and “Chinese” frequently appeared in all kinds of soft drink advertisement. In the 
advertisement of aeronautical soft drinks produced by the North China Soft Drink 
Company in Qingdao, the slogan “please drink Chinese-brand aeronautical soft drinks” 
was particularly highlighted in boldface at the top of the advertisement, striking and 
solemn compared with the joyful pictures at the bottom (Figure 5.2). The slogan implied 
that consuming Chinese-brand soft drinks was not only for leisure and health, but was a 
serious patriotic activity dedicated to save the tottering national economy. The 
nationalistic sentiment was more apparent and stronger in the advertisement of Yixing 
Soft Drink Company, in which patriotism was fully filled between the lines. It said 
“every patriotic personage agrees that Chinese-brand Yixing soft drinks are hygienic; 
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please identify the registered trademark in order to distinguish it from shoddy products. 
Chinese consumers, please don’t be tricked and cheated (by foreign products), but 
(should participate in) protecting and maintaining the interest and the right of China, so 
that our country will not fall into the hands of foreign imperialists. All patriotic people 
must make an agreement, advocating that business enterprises promote the nation.”363 
(Figure 5.3) 
Besides the vigorous patriotic claim in the advertisement, the company’s 
trademark name Yixing also revealed a strong nationalistic sentiment and Chinese cultural 
characteristics, which helped sharpen the distinction between Chinese and foreign. As 
Gerth argued the category of national products was always linked to nationalism, 
authenticity, and modernity, as well as to traditional concepts such as propriety 理, 
righteousness 义, integrity 廉, and shame 耻,364 national soft drinks also associated their 
brand names to traditional Confucian virtues. The character Yi in the brand name of 
Yixing means righteousness, indicating that the company and the brand were justice, 
which was in a contrast to foreign products which were commonly associated with 
imperialism, treason, inauthenticity, weakness, and immorality. The character xing means 
prosper, denoting that the Company was dedicated to the revival of the Chinese nation.  
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Figure 5.2: Advertisement of aeronautical soft drinks produced by North China Soft 
Drink Company.  
The big characters in the middle of the advertisement say “cool like frost, pure like a 
jade, good smell, and deep love.” The four lines between the two images describe the 
function and the features of the product: remove filth, sober up, clear heart fire and 
regulate qi, facilitate digestion and eliminate phlegm, good quality and cheap price.  





Figure 5.3: advertisement of Yixing Soft Drink Company 
Source: Qingdao Times, May 9, 1931. The Qingdao Archive, D000253/00033. 
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The patriotic sentiment was widely seen in many Chinese-brand soft drinks, in 
which the word “China” (Zhong Hua or Zhong Guo in Chinese) as a large geographical 
identification that represents a sense of unity, solidarity, and identity became the brand 
that subsumed local and provincial items under the category of national product.365 Soft 
drinks’ trademark names such as Rong Hua (荣华 make China prosper), Tian Hua 
(Heaven China), Guo Hua (国华 China), and Da Hua (Great China) were frequently seen 
on the market. They were usually accompanied by distinctive trademark images that 
contain rich Chinese cultural elements. For example, the China Soft Drink Company 
identified its trademark with the Great Wall image which was not only a symbol of China 
but also a token of the big achievement and the greatness of the Chinese nation. Its 
advertising slogan “Chinese people should drink China Soft Drink” manifested the 
nationalistic sentiment even conspicuous. The Company demonstrated its patriotism by 
advertisement. More important was it captured the nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese 
masses and thus tried to encourage them to buy Chinese soft drinks.  
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Figure 5.4: China Soft Drink advertisement in 1947.   
On the top right, it says Chinese people drink Chinese soft drinks. 
Source: Shang Bao, Jul 21, 1947  
 
 Soft drink companies were not the only participants in National Products 
Movements. The Government also played an important role in cultivating nationalistic 
consumption and promoting the fledgling national soft drink industry. In the surges of the 
Movements, any achievement accomplished by Chinese companies was well recognized 
and rewarded by the state. In National Products Promotion campaigns launched by the 
Qing Empire and later by the Government of Republic of China, Hongxing Soft Drink 
Company was nominated and honored numerous times as the outstanding example of 
national industries in the Beijing and Tianjin area. The company became a hero who 
made a big contribution to defend China’s interests and national prestige. Over the 
decades, the company was granted numerous rewards and honors by the state. In the first 
exhibition of national goods in Tianjin held by the Qing Government in October 1906, 
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the Technology Department (工艺总局) awarded the first place to Hong Xing, praising 
with words like “good quality, fair price, and proper service.”366 In November of the 
same year, the Ministry of Commerce awarded a silver medal to the Company in the 
welcome exhibition during his inspection. In the second assessment organized by the 
Technology Department in November 1906, Hong Xing was awarded a gold medal with 
comments that “high-quality materials, clean distilled water, and refreshing and cool 
tastes. Hong Xing soft drinks are good summer beverages that benefit health and 
sanitation.”367 In the following year, Hong Xing Soft Drink Company once again 
received a gold medal due to its good performances in the successive three assessments. 
It was honored that “the taste is extremely cool and pure. If air is completely evacuated 
from the bottle, the product could be preserved for a longer time and its market will be 
expanded.”368 Among the four assessments in the year of 1908, Hong Xing Soft Drink 
Company won a silver medal from the Technology Department with a comment that 
“excellent in preparation, mellow and clear in taste, cheap in price, and beautiful in 
design, which is good enough to resist foreign products.”369 The Company continuously 
received two gold medals in 1910, one in the first national products exhibition held in 
Southeast Asia while the other was during the assessment conducted by the Ministry of 
Zhili Commerce. In 1911, it once again received a first place in the exhibition of local 
specialties.   
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After the establishment of Republic of China, Hong Xing Soft Drink Company 
was continuously praised as the hero of the national industry, especially when the voice 
of promoting national industry in China grew louder and louder after the humiliated 
“Twenty-one Demands” was signed with Japan in 1915. In a series of state-organized 
national products promotion campaigns, Hong Xing Soft Drink Company, whose 
business tremendously undermined Japanese soft drinks in Tianjin, was particularly 
nominated and honored by the Government as one of the pioneer fighters in the boycott 
against the Japanese products which have flooded the Chinese market since the beginning 
of the twentieth century.  
 
The Soft Drink Tax Crisis: Resistance from the Civil Society  
On the surface, National Products Movements were nationwide patriotic activities 
involved consumers, business communities, and the state, which actively cooperated with 
each other. As a matter of the fact, the movements were so large in scale and so broad in 
concept that it concealed many conflicts. One of them was the dispute over the soft drink 
tax in the late 1920s. The voice of tax-cutting appeared very early among the Chinese soft 
drink businessmen. In 1915 when Tianjin Hongxing Soft Drink Company was honored 
by the state because of its achievement in boycotting of Japanese soft drinks, the 
Company had requested the state to cut the internal transit tolls (or lijin 厘金) and tariff, 
which were believed as two big obstacles inhibited the growth of Chinese soft drink 
business. The company suggested that if the Government cut the taxes, not only burdens 
of Chinese businessmen would be reduced but also the market of Chinese soft drinks 
would expand. In the views of soft drink companies, tax-cutting was the most effective 
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and practical measure in state-supported campaigns aimed for preservation and 
promotion of the national industry.370     
However, before the lijin system371 was completely abolished, the Ministry of 
Finance of the Republic of China enacted stamp tax in August 4, 1927, starting to impose 
taxes on soft drinks in the Chinese territory outside of concessions. According to the 
ordinance, every 1 lbs. bottle of imported soft drinks should pay two cents of stamp tax, 
every 0.5 lbs. bottle of imported soft drinks should pay one cent of stamp tax, and China-
made soft drinks should pay a half of the tax of the imported.372 Following the regulation, 
every province and city set up organizations such as stamp tax departments and stamp tax 
offices, and made specific and detailed rules for the local to carry out. The Tianjin branch 
of the Hebei Stamp Tax Department announced their provisional rules on April 1929, 
which then were distributed among all local offices, chamber of commerce in Tianjin, 
shops, and companies. The rules stipulated that each bottle of drink must pay the tax, 
marked by a stamp sticking on the cap of the bottle, before it was put on sale. Each soft 
drink company must purchase stamps from the local stamp tax office and stick them on 
bottles before packing. The tax office must check the stamps and issue a tax certificate 
attached on each package. If necessary, the local tax office could send inspectors 
permanently staying in the factory for inspection, during which the factory must not hide 
any tax-related information or reject investigation. Although drinks that shipped out of or 
through Hebei province did not require the stamp tax in Hebei, they had to be reported to 
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the stamp tax office as soon as they arrived and got a shipping license as a certificate 
which would be checked by tax offices along the way. Those drinks could not be sold 
during the trip, otherwise not only the stamp tax should be paid, but a heavy penalty 
would be imposed. Drinks shipped from other provinces, which hadn’t got stamps, must 
purchase the stamps in Hebei before put on sale. It was illegal to sell any unstamped 
drink, otherwise punishment would be enforced.373 The regulation was soon delivered to 
and then distributed by the Chamber of Commerce in Tianjin, an organization which was 
responsible for communication between the government and local merchants. It decided 
to collect tax collectively for convenience of both companies and the organization, and 
called for several meetings with soft drink companies for persuasion and explanation.    
 In spite of patient persuasion, the act remained fiercely resisted by Tianjin soft 
drink companies as soon as the tax was announced. In the same month of the 
promulgation, a tax-cutting petition drafted and jointly signed by nine soft drink 
companies represented by Hongxing Soft Drink Company374 was sent to Hebei Stamp 
Tax Department. In the petition, the nine soft drink companies indignantly accused that 
the tax severely impeded the development of Chinese soft drink industry, which in fact 
led the state-organized National Products Promotion Movements to backfire. They 
claimed:  
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 “We are so scared by the recently released stamp tax provision. Soft 
drinks produced in our companies were imitations of foreign goods. Since 1900, 
most soft drinks sold in Tianjin were either produced by Japanese companies or 
imported from overseas.375 Since 1902, to promote national goods, we Chinese 
merchants have started to build soft drink companies and marketed our products 
in Tianjin and across the country, leading to a tremendous decline of the Japanese 
business in Tianjin. At the beginning of the political tutelage, Government of 
Republic of China took the opportunity to help people to develop national 
industry in order to resist imperial powers and improve ‘people’s livelihood.’ Will 
imported soft drinks be double taxed? If the tax aims for resisting foreign 
products, then why local products should be taxed? Considering the 
impoverishing situation in our country where livelihood became increasing 
difficult and the price of raw materials and labor force was increased 
dramatically, the profit of our products was too small to support our business. In 
addition, as our situation was further deteriorated by oppression and exploitation 
from warlords these years, how could we afford the stamp tax? Finally, soft 
drinks are popular beverage in summer, which are far different from luxury 
products. The government said the tax was ultimately paid by consumers but not 
merchants, but the fact is increased prices after the tax will result in difficulties in 
sales. Stagnation of our business is not important, but unemployment of our 
workers due to the depression is crucial, which contradicts to the teachings of Sun 
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Yat-sen—benevolent and respecting to labor. In short, our business not only 
relates to the livelihood of hundreds of workers, but also contains the meaning of 
promoting national industry. As to the stamp tax on soft drinks, we could hardly 
accept.”376 
 Although the petition appeared rational and sincere, the Hebei Stamp Tax 
Department denied the fact that the tax caused backlash against National Products 
Movements. Stamp Tax Department stated that according to the tax law, national soft 
drinks only paid a half of the tax compared with the imported, therefore the Government 
had already taken particular care of national soft drink companies and protected national 
goods.377 Since there was no formed custom on taxation since the opening of the Tianjin 
port, Stamp Tax Department believed there was inevitable misunderstanding between 
Tianjin businessmen and the government. Therefore, the Hebei Stamp Tax Department 
asked the Tianjin branch to patiently persuade and educate each company until they 
thoroughly understood the principle and follow the rule. On April 25th and 26th, 
cooperating with the Chamber of Commerce, the Tianjin branch called a meeting with 
representatives from soft drink and cosmetics industry, during which the officers 
explained to the representatives that stamp tax provisions, in fact, had well reflected the 
state’s intention on national products protection, and the provisions had been successfully 
implemented in every other province without any resistance and disadvantage. After the 
meeting, believing that the companies had understood the law and accepted, the branch 
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informed Hebei Stamp Tax Department that full implementation of the stamp tax would 
be started since the first day of May.  
However, the later story showed that the Tianjin branch was over-confident on the 
tax issue. After two soft drink companies Guang Ming and Dao Sheng went bankrupt in 
May, Chinese soft drink companies became hostile to the stamp tax act. Their indignation 
grew stronger when the commissioner of the Tianjin Branch claimed in the meeting of 
May 14th that neither the Department nor the branch took the responsibility to the 
bankruptcy of the two companies, and the rest of the companies should continue to pay 
the tax. Full of anger, these companies jointly submitted another petition to Hebei Stamp 
Tax Department on May 18th. The petition indignantly accused the commissioner who 
did not have any compassion to people’s livelihood, threatened and forced the companies 
to pay taxes by May 20th. The companies pointed out that other provinces, as far as they 
known, did not implement the stamp tax, and they could not afford it either. They 
complained their business was in an extremely difficult situation, which was first hit by 
the flux of foreign drinks and then exacerbated by the taxation: 
“Concessions in Tianjin were rife with foreign soft drink companies that 
were currently producing and selling drinks in a great amount and at an extremely 
low price, while our Chinese soft drink business was in stagnation due to the 
taxation. If the government insisted to impose the stamp tax, China-made soft 
drinks with increased prices would not compete with the foreign ones, while the 
untaxed foreign drinks would continuously dominate the market in Concessions. 
We were trying our best in boycotting foreign goods, but in vain. Even worse is 
recently retailers and vendors were afraid of selling our products due to 
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intimidation from the stamp tax imposed by the Tianjin branch of the stamp tax 
department. As a result, our goods become unmarketable. Several Chinese soft 
drink companies have been closed for more than ten days. Guang Ming and Dao 
Sheng were two victims in this tragedy. They were forced to shut down because 
their small capital could not afford the large amount of debts, which was a loss of 
our community. However, considering Guang Ming and Dao Sheng did not 
completely blame the Branch for their bankruptcy, how could the branch compel 
us again?”378   
Since the establishment of the National Government, the state actively 
participated in National Products Movements. It abolished the lijin system, achieved 
tariff autonomy, and organized numerous national products exhibitions across the 
country. The Government also included “advocate and protect national industries” into 
their policy agendas.379 However, with regard to the stamp tax on soft drinks, Tianjin 
Chinese soft drink companies argued that the policy contradicted to the essences of 
National Products Movements. In the petition letter, they wrote: 
“According to the state policies, national industries will be largely 
encouraged and rewarded by the state, then how could the branch devastate rather 
than encourage it? To boycott of foreign goods and promote national industries, 
we have to keep our business running under pains. If the Tianjin branch is still 
care about promoting national products, they should understand our difficulties 
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and report to the government. Affected by the move of the capital city, the 
domestic market stagnated and our business is almost dying.380 If the Tianjin 
branch understands our difficulties and stops taxing, we may survive, but if the 
branch insists to impose the stamp tax on us, we will all bankrupt very soon. We 
have made up our minds to reject the taxation, and thus further communication is 
unnecessary even if the branch calls for meetings in the future. It is apparent that 
the date of imposing the stamp tax will be the date of our bankruptcy, which is 
also the date of unemployment of workers. Even if foreign products are 
dominating the market in the future, we will never make efforts again.”381  
In the view of the Tianjin stamp tax branch, the accusations were so ridiculous 
that the Chinese businessmen made cases out of nothing. The branch denied that Tianjin 
was the only province implementing the stamp tax, as the stamp tax provisions were 
clearly included in the Acts of all other provinces such as Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, and 
Fujian. The statement that Tianjin was the only city implemented the stamp tax was 
merely a pretext of the businessmen who deliberately hided and concocted the fact to 
avoid taxation. The other statement that all retailers and vendors were refusing to sell 
Chinese soft drinks because of the tax was not true, either. After several rounds of 
persuasion and education that all ended in vain, the Tianjin Stamp Tax Branch had no 
patience any more. It complained that Chinese businessmen did not appreciate its efforts, 
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but attributed the business stagnation and bankruptcy of Guang Ming and Dao Guang to 
the branch.382 Without any hope, the Branch had to send a letter to the Chamber of 
Commerce of Tianjin, asking help for distributing the taxation message among the 
Chinese companies in order to urge them to pay the tax as soon as possible. In this way, 
the branch demonstrated its seriousness toward the state law and meanwhile would not 
overly infuriate the soft drink businessmen. The letter wrote: 
“Since the opening of our branch, we have made every effort to educate 
and persuade all soft drink businessmen. We never sent our people to check or 
punish any company, as all notifications were conveyed and distributed to 
businessmen by the Chamber of Commerce. While the fact is very clear, how 
could those businessmen mislead the masses by making slanders and spreading 
rumors? The statement that the market of Chinese soft drinks was largely affected 
by the foreign ones was untenable, too. According to the Stamp Tax Act, when 
the foreign soft drinks enter into the Chinese territory, they have to pay the tax 
without exception, and their tax will be doubled, which explicitly reflects the 
Government’s encouragement and reward toward national products. While the 
Chinese businessmen clearly knew the command by the Republic of China, how 
dare they resist against the Government?”383 
 However, the explanations were not accepted by the businessmen who firmly 
believed their interest was considerably hurt by the taxation. They were not convinced 
that the different rates of taxation between Chinese soft drinks and foreign drinks 
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reflected consideration from the state, because foreign drinks were sold within the 
concessions, the largest soft drink market in Tianjin where the stamp tax did not apply. 
Therefore, despite the Chamber of Commerce once again organized a meeting on May 
31st, trying to clear the misunderstanding between the businessmen and the Government 
and thus enforce the new tax act, Chinese soft drink businessmen in Tianjin still kept 
resisting. Without any satisfactory progress at the end, the Tianjin Stamp Tax Branch and 
the Chamber of Commerce had to take an alternative measure: force vendors and retailers 
to pay the tax. They announced that “while we are continuously commanding soft drink 
companies to pay the tax, vendors and shops that were selling soft drinks had to pay the 
tax in the first place. All restaurants, hotels, fruit shops, and stalls are not allowed to sell 
any untaxed soft drink. Regular inspections would take place for enforcement.”384 As to 
Chinese soft drink companies, the branch denounced that “for several months’ persuasion 
and postponement in checking, we have been kind enough and patient enough, but the 
soft drink businessmen are still obdurate and resisting. By far, we have made enough 
compromise and have no patience any more. In order to carry out the state’s act, we could 
not allow them to delay any further.”385 The Branch urged the Chamber of Commerce to 
keep persuading and claimed that “if the businessmen persist in error and resist, they 
were far away from being good citizens.”386 
 This event caught a wide attention from the public who saw it as a political satire. 
One article titled “views about the soft drink stamp tax” published in The Beiyang 
                                                 
 
 
384 Ibid., 2036. 
385 Ibid.  
386 Ibid. 
 193 
Pictorial News in May 1932 sarcastically compared the taxation as a way that the 
government encouraged people to lead a simple and hardworking life in the difficult 
period. It says: 
 “People easily get thirsty in hot seasons and they are eager to drink 
something to refresh the body. Water is too insipid whereas tea is too bitter, so it’s 
better to drink something cool and sweet, which quenches the thirst right after the 
body is drained. It is soft drinks, superior to ice-cream, as it is not too cold and 
fatty. 
Sales of soft drink are best in summer, especially in cities, where people 
sometimes drink several bottles a day. It has been a long time since the tax office 
proposed to impose soft drink stamp tax to increase revenue. Although it has not 
been completely fulfilled, it is unavoidable in the light of the situation that the tax 
office once and again stressed the tax regulation regardless of petitions raised by 
soft drink businessmen. 
As the state is dedicated to advocate national products consumption, it is 
improper to drink untaxed foreign soft drinks, though they are cheaper. However, 
in the hot weather, it is uncomfortable if there are no cool drinks available. A 
Chinese proverb says wool comes from sheep. Soft drinks are expensive, but the 
prices will increase again after the taxation. Consumers have to pay more to 
relieve the summer heat. They could not afford the high prices, but what could 
they do? 
Therefore, I suggest Chinese people take this opportunity to, first of all, 
become abstentious. As cold water is good enough to refresh the body, why must 
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drink soft drinks? Second, our Chinese people have to actively avoid 
Europeanization, because soft drink, whose original name in China is Dutch 
water, is not an indigenous product. For the past four thousand years, people lived 
well without drinking soft drinks. Third, Chinese people should support national 
products. Since the ancient time, watermelon, plum juice, and jelly (Liangfen, 
Bolifeng) have been ordinary cooling foods in summer, which are untaxed and 
cheaper but tasted as good as soft drinks. Considering the current political and 
economic situation that requires every Chinese to endure hardships, how could we 
still consume expensive drinks? Instead, we should have the passion and the 
enthusiasm in construction of our nation, how could we addict to relaxation, self-
indulgence, and cool drinks? Maybe it is the hidden meanings of the stamp tax 
considered by our government!”387 
 
The Coca-Cola Protest: Conflicts within the business community 
 While the resentment on the stamp tax of soft drinks had not been fully appeased, 
the mixed identity of Coca-Cola once again challenged the meanings of National 
Products Movements. As the modern business franchising system adopted by the Coca-
Cola Company came to China, questions such as who were the nationalists and what was 
nationalistic consumption became complicated. Especially when the flourishing new-
form business impeded the development of traditional Chinese companies, disputes over 
the category of national products grew intense.  
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Since 1945, under the bombardment of advertisement, Coca-Cola had become the 
top-selling soft drink on the Chinese market, especially in big cities like Shanghai. Yet 
Coca-Cola, known as a foreign brand, also became the top target for attacks in the surge 
of National Products Movements. Frustrated by the fierce competition from Coca-Cola, 
Chinese soft drink companies, whose business was significantly hurt, lamented that the 
huge gap on financial capabilities between American and Chinese companies determined 
the fiasco of the national industry in the commercial war. Chinese businessmen denied 
the taste of Coca-Cola was superior, believing that Coca-Cola’s success was totally due 
to its excellent marketing strategy supported by the abundant foreign capital. They 
claimed in a newspaper in 1947 that Americans spared no expense in advertising, not 
only spending a huge amount of money in advertisement, but also giving away free 
beautiful coolers and servant training program videos to restaurants and Cafes to 
encourage them to sell Coca-Cola. In addition, modern and high-technological machinery 
which could produce a maximum of 120,000 bottles per day was also imported to China, 
and none of Chinese soft drink companies could compete with it. Chinese soft drink 
businessmen concluded that only foreigners had this capacity and boldness to do a 
business in this way, whereas the Chinese were short-sighted and incompetent, so the 
defeat was inevitable and the Chinese could only helplessly see foreigners invade China 
economically.388  
 Facing the criticism, American Coca-Cola Export Corporation denied it was 
doing any business in China. Although the Corporation admitted that their representatives 
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were occasionally sent to Shanghai, they were not official attorneys to Coca-Cola and the 
representatives’ office did not belong to any department of the Coca-Cola Export 
Corporation. The representatives were merely functioning in a supervisory capacity and 
to survey the Chinese market with a view to future prospects. Charles T. Carroll, the 
representative who operated a small office at 101 Hamilton House, 170 Kiangse Road 
(Jiangxi Road) in Shanghai under the name of Coca-Cola Export Corporation in 1947, 
claimed that they did not carry on any business in China in the true sense of the word, nor 
did they have what they call a business establishment in China as a Corporation. They 
kept no books and handed no payments for merchandise, nor did they import goods for 
sale in the Chinese market. The bottlers bought direct from the United States, and 
effected payment for the merchandise direct to Coca-Cola’s New York office. The 
Shanghai office did not intervene, in any way, in such transactions.389  
 With regards to the Shanghai office, Charles T. Carroll explained the office 
merely served as a place to write letters, keep files, and interview parties with whom they 
contacted in business. The office was rented in the name of “Charles T. Carroll, Jr., 
Representative of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation,” which was marked on the door of 
the office. Except Carroll, the only office employee was a stenographer and an office 
boy, both of whom were hired by Carroll personally. The Shanghai office did not operate 
a bank account in the Coca-Cola Export Corporation’s name. Instead, the bank account 
which was used in connection with the office was in the name of “Charles T. Carroll, 
Jr.—Special Account.” In addition, the letters generally were signed “Charles T. Carroll, 
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Jr.” without any reference to the position. Occasionally, “Representative, the Coca-Cola 
Export Corporation” was singed in a letter.390  
 When referring to the duty of the representative, Carroll said he did not hold 
power of attorney for his Company, rather his job was to supervise the activities of their 
Authorized Bottlers in China, and to ascertain that they follow certain prescribed 
standards in connection with their own business and in pursuance of the ‘Bottlers’ 
Agreement,’ and covenanted of the bottlers there under. The representative did not import 
directly any products of the Coca-Cola Company and did not sell any products to the 
bottlers. On the other hand, the representative rendered to the bottlers general assistance 
in the promotion of their business and advised in a technical capacity in reference to 
production matters. Officially, the representative did not enter into the bottlers’ 
procedures for procuring import licenses and foreign exchange. As to the compelling 
advertising campaigns which were believed as the key of Coca-Cola’s success, Carroll 
explained all of the advertising was done by their bottlers with the exception of an 
occasional advertisement which he placed with trade magazines.391 
 To protect the company’s brand, the Coca-Cola Export Corporation decided to 
register its Shanghai office and then the branch at once and had their English name and 
Chinese name properly recorded. The Company worried that under the Chinese Company 
Law in the late forties, it was possible and there were instances where infringement on 
trademark names had already taken place. For example, the Parker Pen Company who 
was late in registering its Company name and found that a Chinese company had already 
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registered “The Parker Pen Co.” and was doing business under that name. There was 
nothing that Parker Pen could do about it under the interpretation of the Company 
Law.392 Learning the Parker Pen Company’s experience as a lesson, in 1948 the Coca-
Cola Export Corporation filed an application with the Bureau of Social Affairs for 
registration. When explaining the purpose of the Shanghai branch, the Company insisted 
that their main object in filing the application for permission to establish a branch was 
merely to protect their Company name against the registration of it by someone else. In 
the application, they asserted that even after the branch had been established; they would 
continue to operate as heretofore for some time to come, which meant that no income 
producing activities would be carried on in China by the branch. In other words, all sales 
would be consummated at points outside of China.393 
 Since 1948 sales of Coca-Cola had been skyrocketing, in the meantime, however, 
the worst inflation from 1948 to 1949 in the Chinese history as well as the bulk sale of 
American products after the War stirred up the Chinese businessmen’s hostility toward 
Coca-Cola. Increasing prices of raw materials during the inflation made the precarious 
national soft drink business even worse. Seeing the continuous expansion of Coca-Cola, 
the City Council, a public body established since 1938 and participated by representatives 
from all fields of society particularly from industries, proposed to restrict luxury imports 
in order to save foreign exchange and protect the foundation of the nation—the national 
industry. The proposal points out that the bulk sale of foreign luxury drinks significantly 
destroyed the national industry, which was far away from the purpose of austerity raised 
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by the Government. Coca-Cola, the top-selling soft drinks in Shanghai, was an American 
brand, and thus was suggested to be categorized as a luxury, the import of which 
especially its raw materials had to be firmly restricted. The proposal was strongly 
welcomed by the Shanghai Chinese Soft Drink Association, which actively responded 
with a resolution: 
“We opened soft drink companies to produce the best beverage in Shanghai. 
However, recently the American Coca-Cola Company is dominating the market 
by virtue of massive investments. They export tons of Coca-Cola concentrated 
syrup, asking Watson’s Mineral Water Company to bottle and sell. Coca-Cola’s 
business has given the Chinese soft drink industry a heavy blow, resulting in the 
shutdown of hundreds of national companies. Our Chinese companies have been 
seriously threatened by the unfair competition. Since the City Council represents 
the interest of the Chinese public, it is urgent to forbid luxury imports and reduce 
foreign currency exchange to protect the economic foundation of the nation. 
Therefore, we strongly support the proposal.” 394    
Soon after, the resolution was sent to the Shanghai Municipal Government for 
review. But before a decision was made, Watson’s Mineral Water Company wrote an 
open letter to the public explaining that Coca-Cola was not a wasteful luxury, but a 
widely known brand that was popular across the world except in the Soviet Union and its 
allies. The Company pointed out that Coca-Cola has been commonly recognized as an 
ordinary, daily drink in the world, which was increasingly how it was consumed in 
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Shanghai, so it could not be defined as a luxury. More importantly Watson’s said, “raw 
materials” used in other soft drink brands were also imported from overseas. In this 
sense, any discrimination involving Coca-Cola was unfair and unjustified. In the letter, 
Watson’s particularly emphasized that they had made large contributions to state revenue. 
Because of the prosperity of their Coca-Cola business, the Company paid the largest 
amount of commodity tax in the industry, which was up to 140 billion yuan in June 1948. 
Their partners, including distributors and retailers, also paid a considerable amount of 
business taxes and banquet taxes, which was estimated to be a total of 250 billion yuan in 
June 1948. As to foreign currency exchange, Watson’s argued that only eight percent of 
annual income was invested in importing raw materials, such as concentrated syrup, 
which meant they spent a very small amount towards “foreign exchange” especially if it 
was compared with the amount of taxes they paid to the government every year.395    
 The Chinese Soft Drink Business Association could not deny that Watson’s was 
the biggest tax payer in the industry, but they started to play another political card, 
accusing Watson’s of causing the collapse of the national soft drink industry and the 
national economy. They said that Watson’s Coca-Cola business significantly undermined 
nationalistic sentiment and weakened the National Products Movement across the 
country. However, in Watson’s opinion, this accusation was completely unjustified. The 
Company pointed out that although Coca-Cola was an American brand, all assets 
including factory buildings, machinery, transportation facilities, coolers, bottles, and 
crates were investments made by Chinese shareholders. If the government forbade Coca-
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Cola imports, the Company argued not only that the interest of its Chinese shareholders 
would be hurt but industries in their supply chain including glass, caps, sugar, coolers, 
and crates would be affected and thousands of Chinese workers would be unemployed. 
Last but not the least, the Company argued Coca-Cola was actually beneficial to the 
public’s health, because the quality of drinking water in China was always a problem and 
the market was glutted with shoddy products.396 
 Behind these issues of foreign currency exchange and Coca-Cola being classified 
as a luxury were deeper concerns. The focus of the debate, in fact, was whether or not 
Watson’s should be treated as a Chinese company, and where the boundary between 
national and foreign industry should be drawn. The National Products Movement as well 
as the concept of national products was nothing new in China. As early as in the 1930s, in 
order to show support for the national economy, the Republican Government 
promulgated detailed, official standards to identify products’ nationality. These standards 
considered four basic components of any product: capital, management, raw materials, 
and labor. Based on those criteria, “national products” were categorized into seven 
official grades—from grade one, the purest—to grade seven, the least pure: 
Grade 1: Chinese capital, management, materials, and labor. 
Grade 2: Chinese capital, management, and labor, but the use of small amounts of 
non-Chinese raw materials or a few foreign technicians. 
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Grade 3: Chinese investment using capital borrowed from abroad, but Chinese 
management, materials, and workers; or the analogous situation with foreign 
technicians. 
Grade 4: Chinese capital, management, labor, and primarily foreign materials; or 
the analogous situation with foreign technicians. 
Grade 5: Chinese capital borrowed from abroad, Chinese management and labor, 
primarily foreign materials; or the analogous situation with foreign technicians.  
Grade 6: Chinese capital borrowed from abroad, Chinese management and labor, 
and mainly foreign raw materials; or the analogous situation with foreign 
technicians. 
Grade 7 (added within a few years): Chinese labor, management, and workers, but 
all foreign materials; or the analogous situation with foreign technicians.397  
 According to the seven official grades, Watson’s Mineral Water Company, which 
was supported by Chinese capital and completely run by Chinese people, was neither the 
purest Chinese company nor the least pure. The Company was formerly British-owned 
and under the management of Watson & Co, A.S., a British firm in Hong Kong initially 
organized by chemists and druggists, wine and cigar merchants, and photo suppliers. In 
1919 the company was separated from its Hong Kong connections, and four Chinese 
businessmen, all of whom were Cantonese, put it up by registering with the Chinese 
Government with a capital investment of $140,000. 398 By 1933 Watson’s board of 
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trustees expanded to six members. The president of the board was a fifty-year-old 
Cantonese named Guo Weiyi who used to participate in the opium trade and later made a 
fortune with his inventories when opium prices soared after the trade was prohibited. 
With this money, Guo bought Shanghai Watson’s Mineral Water Company from the 
hands of the British in 1919. He also invested in Chinese banks (钱庄) in Shanghai and 
became a shareholder of De Chang 德昶, Hong Xiang 鸿翔, and Hong Sheng 鸿胜.399    
 The second biggest shareholder of Watson’s was a speculator named Shi Dezhi
施德之, who once ran a photo studio, and later earned a great fortune by inventing a 
medicine for heatstroke called “Shi Dezhi miracle syrup.” 施德之神功济众水 Even 
though the efficacy of the syrup was questionable and Shi Dezhi was one of the widely-
known “slippery fellows” in Shanghai, his invention somehow became very popular and 
his wealth increased to 1.5 million yuan. After investing in Watson’s, Shi ran into legal 
difficulties. In 1933 Shi was summoned by the court because of his role in the morphine 
and heroin trade. His share of the Company stock was said to be transferred to Guo 
Weiyi. The rest of Watson’s stockholders were Lu Weichang 卢炜昌, the president of 
the Shanghai Jiangwu Sports Society; Cui Pinxi 崔聘西, shareholder and manager of the 
Bank of Taihexing 泰和兴银号, manager of Heshen Cotton Mill 和生纱号, and 
Counselor of Wu Hua Bank of Industry and Trust 五华实业信托银行. Although Cui was 
not very wealthy, he was very competent and had a good reputation. Other stockholders 
included Zheng Zhuochen 郑灼臣, a famous dentist in Shanghai; Guo Jianxiao 郭健宵; 
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and Shao Wenbing 邵文炳. 400 Managers in the Company were all Chinese, too. For 
example, in 1933 the manager was a thirty-five-year-old Cantonese man named Weng 
Yaoheng 翁耀衡, a graduate from Shanghai Saint John’s University. Weng was very 
talented and competent and ran a cotton business in his early years.401 
 Since the establishment of the Company in Shanghai, no foreigners joined the 
board of trustees or managers. In 1924 Guo Weiyi was the president of the board while 
Lu Weichang and Hu De 胡德 were managers. In 1930 Wen Yaoheng became the 
manager. In 1933 Xuan Dezhi 旋德之 was elected as the president. Three years later 
Shao Wenbing replaced Xuan and in 1937 Guo Jinkun 郭锦坤 replaced Shao, during 
which Wen Yaoheng and Tang Dingxiang 唐鼎祥 were managers. In 1939, Liang 
Zhenqing 梁振卿 was appointed as the manager, who was replaced by Shi Dubi 施杜毕
one year later. Throughout the 1940s, before the Communists came to power, key 
positions in Watson’s Mineral Water Company were all taken by Chinese people, 
without exception. In 1942, the president was Huang Zhaoshen 黄昭深 and the manager 
was Sun Yunzhong 孙允中. In 1946, they were Guo Jinkun, Sun Yunzhong, Zhang 
Jiayan 张家彦, and Xi Dequan 席德权. In 1949 the president was Zhang Rongpu 张荣溥
.402 
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 Like most Chinese soft drink businesses, Watson’s Mineral Water Company went 
through some very hard years at the beginning. Struggling to survive, Guo Weiyi and his 
friends moved the company a couple of times. After they bought the Company from the 
British, they moved it from its original site, Hen Bang Qian 横浜桥 to Huishan Road 汇
山路 in 1924. At the new site, they purchased real estate of five mu (3333 square meters) 
and spent 100,000 yuan on factory buildings. In addition they rented two office rooms in 
Jiangxi Road, one of which was used as the delivery center where over ten workers were 
hired. After the Japanese army occupied Shanghai, the Company was moved twice and 
their Coca-Cola business encountered hardship because of difficulties in importing 
concentrated syrup. It was finally settled in Jiaozhou Road in 1940. 403 During the First 
and the Second World Wars Watson’s business was very unstable. Like other Chinese 
soft drink companies, Watson’s had to face fierce competition from foreign businesses. 
Their biggest competitor was the British-owned Aquarius Mineral Water Company, 
whose facilities and financial strength was much better than Chinese counterparts. 
However, since its purchase through hard work, Watson’s business was getting better and 
better. A golden time for the company came in 1929 when they contracted with the 
American Coca-Cola Company. Except for the period of Japanese occupation, the 
Company as a Coca-Cola bottler rapidly flourished and became one of the most 
competitive soft drink companies in Shanghai. Referring to this success, the Company’s 
owners and managers proclaimed it was largely due to the indigenous makeup of the 
Company. They said the company’s Chinese identity not only stimulated the enthusiasm 
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of factory workers but also encouraged patriotic consumers to choose national brands 
over foreign ones.404     
 As a member of the Chinese Soft Drink Business Association, Watson’s actively 
participated in the National Products Movement by improving their products and building 
their brand. They invested a large amount of money in new machinery, bottles, and 
facilities. To solve the persistent ice shortage problem in Shanghai in the 1930s, the 
Company decided to open an ice manufacturing facility in the name of “promoting the 
national industry and protecting the interests of the Chinese people,” a slogan that was 
vigorously used by nationalists in exhibitions, demonstrations, newspapers, and 
government documents. Watson’s board of trustees believed that opening an ice-making 
company was necessary and urgent, because there was only one mechanized ice-making 
company in Shanghai—which hardly met the local summer demand. The other small ice-
making companies, Watson’s argued, were low in output and unsanitary, as their ice was 
made from natural ice saved from lakes in winter. Based on the established reputation of 
Watson’s soft drink industry in the city, the board of trustees was optimistic about the 
future of their ice business. Shortly after, Watson’s Ice Manufacturing Company was 
registered as a branch of Watson’s in the Department of Commerce in Republic of China. 
It was categorized as a national company, which could only be invested in by Chinese 
citizens in Republic of China, as stated in the company brochure.405 All personnel 
including shareholders, managers, staffs, and laborers were Chinese. 
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So far, according to the official standards, Watson’s Mineral Water Company as 
well as its subsidiary—Watson’s Ice Manufacturing Company—was pure Chinese 
company in terms of capital, management, and labor. The only controversial part of the 
identity was perhaps the imported machinery and raw materials, which became the main 
target of the petition. The Chinese soft drink Association pointed out that Watson’s had 
three sets of aerated water processing machines, one capping machine, a pump, and one 
set of both syrup and filters—all of which were imported from the United States.406 Their 
Coca-Cola concentrated syrup was purchased from the American Coca-Cola Company 
through foreign firms in Shanghai like A. F. Deer.407 However, this was just one side of 
the story. The accounting books of Chinese soft drink companies reveal that depending 
on foreign materials for production was very common in the forties when the industry 
was still young in China. These companies were heavily reliant on foreign imports for 
machinery and many raw materials such as saccharin, sodium bicarbonate, citric acid, 
corks, and even bottles. For example, the aerated water processing machines at Shanghai 
Weisheng Soft Drink Company卫生汽水厂 and Tianhe Soft Drink Company 天河汽水
厂 were imported from Great Britain, filters at Siwei Orange Juice Company 四维鲜橘水
厂 came from Japan, and machinery at the Meihua Mineral Water Company 美华汽水厂 
was entirely imported from Japan.408 
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As Watson’s vigorously fought back, the debate became more intense when the 
Chinese Soft Drink Association accused Watson’s of attempting to confuse and fool the 
public by overstating their Chinese national identity and contribution to the nation. The 
Association responded:  
“Although the American brand Coca-Cola was one of the popular 
beverages of the world, it was not a necessity in China. Since Chinese companies 
could produce similar tasting drinks to Coca-Cola, it was unnecessary to waste a 
large amount currency in foreign exchange to import luxury products. As to the 
imported materials used by other Chinese soft drink companies, we have to point 
out that these were ordinary raw materials that were not typical for soft drink 
producing, but they were also needed in other industrial fields, so they were not a 
luxury and should not be criticized and prohibited. With regard to the national 
economy, we were confident that if Coca-Cola were to be forbidden, sales of 
Chinese drinks would definitely increase and thus tax payments, as well as 
government revenue, would not shrink. In contrast, if our government was merely 
interested in tax income without consideration on the drain of foreign currency 
exchange, it was tantamount to seeking temporary relief regardless of the severe 
consequences, which was, by quoting a Chinese proverb, “drinking poison to 
quench thirst.” Finally, we would like to point out that after Coca-Cola was 
forbidden, Watson’s Mineral Water Company, as a Chinese company as they 
claimed, could continue to produce other kinds of beverages. Since the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs had decided to forbid luxury imports including cookies and 
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candies during the economic crisis, how could Coca-Cola, a foreign soft drink, 
make an exception?”409 
China was one of the biggest oversea markets for Coca-Cola in the late 1940s and 
the Shanghai Coca-Cola crisis soon caught the attention of Americans. An American 
journalist criticized the petition in Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury that “it was a 
hasty and ill-considered action which played directly into the hands of those who wanted 
to eliminate the competition of Coca-Cola through political, instead of legitimate 
business, means.”410 He argued all the concentrated flavor essences used in bottled drinks 
in China—including sarsaparilla, lemonade, cherry soda, and Coca-Cola—were 
imported, so if Coca-Cola were to be banned as an imported luxury, all aerated waters 
using foreign manufactured essences must be prohibited from sale. He also pointed out 
that Watson’s Mineral Water Company was a Chinese company and perhaps it was the 
Company’s success in business competition that caused its opponents to adopt political 
means to hamstring its sales. The journalist warned the Chinese government that there 
would be serious impacts on native Chinese industries if the proposal was approved, 
because aside from Coca-Cola concentrated syrup, Watson’s used all kinds of Chinese-
made products for its entire process of manufacturing, sales, and distribution. In other 
words, a small amount of imported ingredients was helping create jobs and promote 
Chinese industries.411 
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Moreover, the journalist believed prohibiting Coca-Cola might even affect Sino-
foreign business in general, for Coca-Cola was not the only commodity in China that had 
a foreign origin. Modern industrial products such as automobiles and electric light bulbs 
contained certain essential parts imported from overseas. If Coca-Cola was banned, “all 
local manufacture of finished goods with imported raw materials could be banned on the 
ground that it was hurting some kind of native industry. In the end, China would have to 
slam its doors to any kind of foreign trade and go back to the wheelbarrow age.”412 
Regarding the Shanghai Coca-Cola crisis, he argued “the City Council would establish a 
dangerous precedent by the adoption of the proposal, because all Shanghai businessmen 
would forsake the ordinary methods of business operation and direct their most ardent 
appeals of salesmanship to the City Council. To eliminate competition, they would not 
have to think in terms of lowering costs and increasing efficiency, but they would 
maneuver for political favors from the City Council.”413  
Perhaps because the United States was allied with the Nationalist government, or 
perhaps because Watson’s defense was particularly convincing, the mayor of Shanghai 
was not very interested in the proposal raised by the Chinese Soft Drink Association. 
However, as calls for a boycott of Coca-Cola became overwhelming, the Shanghai 
Municipal Government finally decided that materials used in the production of Coca-
Cola could be imported to China without interruption. The Government explained that 
the raw materials of Coca-Cola are “lipoid” 油脂腊类, which belongs to one sort of 
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mixed essences 内混合香料, and Republican China had already imposed and 
subsequently reduced import quotas on this material. In May and June, the import quota 
for lipoid in the greater Shanghai area was $489,907.22, which was $244,953.61 for each 
month. This amount had been already reduced to less than one-third of the import quota 
in April, which had been $690,180.00. In this sense, the import of Coca-Cola’s 
concentrated syrup had already been restricted under the law and could not be separately 
categorized as a restricted item by itself nor could import restrictions be compounded on 
one particular item. Furthermore, according to an investigation by the Shanghai 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, this kind of “mixed essence could not 
successfully be produced by Chinese factories at the time, so Coca-Cola’s concentrated 
syrup was temporarily allowed to be imported.”414 
 
Conclusion  
In the first half of the twentieth century, the state dedicated to start political 
reforms to save China from internal and external troubles, the influence also extended to 
business and consumption, domains that were directly related to people’s everyday life. 
Collaborating with the businesses, the state endeavored to integrate politics—nationalism 
that aroused by assault of colonial powers—into consumption. National Products 
Movements channeling consumption in a language of nationalism were the most visible 
campaigns that prevailed in every field of industry and involved people in all social 
classes. The national goods exhibitions were splendid, the nationalistic slogans were 
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encouraging, and the advertisements filled with patriotic enthusiasm were impressive. 
When people were stunned by the incredible consensus in the Movements derived from 
patriotism, if there was something discordant, it was easily neglected. In most cases, 
words like nationalism were too big to characterize a society as dynamic and diverse as 
that in China, especially when characterization and categorization on commodities 
became complicated as the process of globalization accelerated in the modern times.  
In a globalizing economy, not only who were the real nationalists became hard to 
tell, but the boundary of nationality of products became difficult to draw. While the 
Chinese soft drink companies were regarded as national heroes in National Products 
Movements in the early twentieth century, they suddenly were categorized as bad citizens 
when they were resisting the stamp tax. Perhaps the definition of Chinese nationalism 
was straightforward for most people especially for the outsiders, but it actually meant 
differently to different interest groups in China. The state saw National Products 
Movements as political campaigns that effectively raised national morale in the hard 
times, which could be used as a way to consolidate the political power. The stamp tax, a 
new tax policy replacing the traditional lijin system, was not only a part of the 
construction of a modern state, but also an important source for the state revenue to 
which every good Chinese citizen was obligated to contribute. However, for Chinese 
companies, National Products Movements were, more importantly, business campaigns 
that used special advertisement to promote business. When the political and business 
ideas coincided, the state and businessmen collaborated together, producing a magical 
and splendid outcome that disguised China as a homogenous entity. When conflicts 
inevitably came due to the originally different intentions, the homogeneity soon turned 
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into irreconcilable disputes. The stamp tax crisis forced us to ponder who were 
nationalists? Were there pure nationalists and faithful disciples on nationalistic 
consumption? What did National Products Movements really mean to Chinese people?  
The riddle of nationalism became even complicated as globalization accelerated 
and new management model became involved, during which the nationality of products, 
an identity which was easy to tell in the past, became intricate. Was Coca-Cola, an 
American brand but bottled in Chinese plants using Chinese materials, Chinese capital, 
and Chinese workers, purely foreign? Were Chinese soft drinks used imported raw 
materials, bottles, and machines purely Chinese? After all, what was important for 
national products? What did nationalistic consumption mean to the Chinese? With these 
unsolved questions, disputes over nationalism went beyond the state and businesses 
relations, and haunted within the business community. Based on business interest, 
companies interpreted and shaped nationalism and nationalistic consumption variously. 
In the Coca-Cola protest of 1947, for example, the National Products Movement and 
nationalism was mobilized for new objectives, becoming a pretext for business 
competition. Therefore, the seemingly singular nationalism generated from the nation and 




COCA-COLA VERSUS SALTY SODA, HOW SUMMER BECAME 
COOLER UNDER SOCIALISM, 1949-1978 
Coca-Cola business in China entered a golden age after WWII. In the meantime, 
the golden age was ended abruptly by increasingly fierce political confrontations between 
Communism and Capitalism in the following Cold War. To prevent spread of 
communism, western countries led by the United States imposed economic sanctions 
against communist countries, which were then developed as China embargo policies after 
the establishment of the People’s Republican of China in 1949. Restricted by embargo, 
Coca-Cola business was forced to retreat and disappeared from mainland China for 
almost thirty years. Meanwhile, driven by the ideological conflict in the Cold War, the 
communist state transformed Coca-Cola, the once modern and popular drink, into a 
symbol of capitalism. Known as “imperialism in a bottle,” Coca-Cola became a 
politically sensitive word in Maoist China. To avoid political persecutions, especially in 
the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese public treated Coca-Cola as a plague and drew a 
clear boundary between Coca-Cola and themselves.   
Absence of Coca-Cola made the rest of soft drinks, regardless of brands, luxuries 
in Maoist China where food situation was challenging. To ensure the majority of the 
population had food to eat, the state advocated a simple life-style, particularly opposing 
to conspicuous consumption. The state imposed cold food taxes on ice, ice-creams, and 
soft drinks, but meanwhile, it also encouraged a mass production and consumption of a 
“China-invented” soft drink named salty soda or yanqishui. In summer, salty soda 
regarded as a socialist welfare was widely distributed among factory workers across the 
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country in order to prevent heat stroke. Salty soda was highly advocated by the 
communist state as an example of superiority of socialism. For ordinary Chinese people, 
the drink was not tasted as good as brand-name drinks, but it recalled nostalgia for the 
happy moments at their young ages.  
 
The China Embargo and withdrawal of Coca-Cola 
 To keep arms and strategic materials out of the hands of the cold war enemy, the 
United States began a campaign of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in 1948. 
Juxtaposing with the Marshall Plan after the Second World War, the Export Control Act 
of 1949, under the name of restricting military supplies, announced a series of restrictions 
on exports to the Soviet Union and its European allies. In November 1949, the U.S. and 
other Western allies formed the Coordinating Committee (Cocom) to coordinate strategic 
control of trade with the Soviet bloc and make an agreement on the embargo list. The 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 made the Cold War more rigid and all the measures extended to China and North 
Korea as well.  
When realized they lost China in the Cold War, the United States not only refused 
to recognize the PRC, preventing its representation in the U.N., it also sponsored and 
executed international economic sanctions against the Communist regime of China, 
which started with partial trade controls and ended up with a total economic embargo.415 
Initially, the China export control list categorized all strategic goods into I-A items 
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(goods of direct military utility) and the I-B items (multipurpose capital goods), both of 
which required licenses to be exported. Non-strategic goods could still be exported to 
China without government authorization. Licenses for I-A items were always denied and 
for I-B items were granted only after confirming that such goods would be used for 
civilian purpose. However, with the escalation of the Korean War, the Department of 
Commerce of the United States announced revocation of the general license for export to 
China, which meant that all persons and firms wishing to export any commodities to 
mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao must submit applications for export license, and 
such licenses proved, practically, unavailable. On December 16, the U.S. government 
froze Chinese assets in the United States and prohibited all imports from trade dealing 
with China.416 
 Although there were some China trade supporters, the American business 
community, in general, acquiesced a domestic atmosphere hostile to Communist China 
and willingly subscribed to and promptly complied with the government’s embargo 
policy. They criticized the China trade supporters that not only themselves enmeshed 
with “naivete” and “obvious illusions,” but America “had a good deal to lose when they 
ostensively brandished their optimism about the possibilities of doing business with the 
Communists.”417 The China embargo, which mainly stemmed from Washington’s 
frustration with the loss of China, became intensified in the 1950s and the 1960s because 
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of China’s military threat and aggression in East Asia, particularly its intervention in the 
Korean War, its military operations in Taiwan Strait area, and its continued aid to the 
North Vietnamese as well as its border conflicts with India. When public emotion was 
inflamed by increasing American casualties in Korea, the belief that trading with China 
was immoral and dangerous to American security was reinforced. Communist China 
expressed its desire to continue the economic exchange in order to benefit from American 
resources and technology. The majority of American business also hoped to keep the 
China market open as long as possible. However, it was hard for private interests to argue 
when what was at stake was magnified as not just a matter of a few dollars, but the 
nation’s security. The American business community as a whole, therefore, did not show 
much interest in influencing the government’s China policy; and the minorities who did 
were carried away by the tidal waves of the time.418 In the following two decades, the 
United States implemented a complete embargo that forbade all financial transactions 
with communist China.  
 The U.S.-led embargo aroused great hostility in Beijing against the United States. 
China not only seized all American assets in the country as retaliation, but also published 
a large amount of critical articles in major newspapers, criticizing American imperialism. 
The articles pointed out that the United Nations had been dominated by the United States, 
which were hostile to PRC China as well as the world peace. However, the articles 
believed that “the China embargo did not impede the success of the Chinese justice 
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revolution. The China embargo enraged Chinese people who were fighting for peace and 
invigorated them to fight and defeat American invaders as fast as possible.”419 
Nevertheless, China still believed that it was possible to resume and expand the 
Sino-U.S. trade in the future and the current trade interruption was unilaterally due to the 
hegemonism of the U.S. government. In response to the journalists in the international 
economic conference held in Moscow in 1952, the China deputy, Nan Hanchen (南汉宸), 
said there was a long history in the Sino-U.S. commercial relations. On the day of the 
establishment of the PRC, Chairman Mao announced to the world that China was willing 
to build foreign relationship with any country that respected China’s sovereignty, and the 
PRC always supported international peace and friendly international cooperation. At the 
earlier time of the PRC, Sino-U.S. trade used to develop quite well, during which the 
number of economic transactions exceeded the amount in the past. This trend showed that 
the commercial relations between the PRC and the United States could be resumed and 
might develop even better in the future.420  China was very confident on potential Sino-
U.S. trade and believed that the international trade in the PRC must surpass that in the 
past. After the revolution, farmers got land and their enthusiasm on production increased. 
With the increasing purchasing power of China’s peasants, the Chinese market was 
expanding dramatically. To meet the demand of the growing market, China had to import 
a large amount of industrial facilities, raw materials, and industrial products. Meanwhile, 
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China could also export agricultural products, manufacturing products, and livestock.421 
When mentioned the interruption of the Sino-U.S. trade in the 1950s, Nan Hanchen 
argued it was the result of the China embargo policy implemented by the U.S. 
government, which intervened in the Korean War and seized Taiwan in disregard of the 
needs of American people. As a result, American industrialists, businessmen, and 
agriculturalists lost the big and reliable Chinese market that consisted of 500 million 
people. If the U.S. government canceled the embargo policy, Sino-U.S. trade could be 
resumed and developed immediately.422  
The U.S. embargo policy broke the multi-relations in the world trade, forcing 
western countries to become more dependent on the United States on foreign trade and 
thus deepened the trade crises in those countries. Foreseeing the potential market in 
socialist countries and saving the economy, some western countries such as Great Britain 
began to expand trade with socialist countries and tried to get rid of the embargo policy. 
In fall 1952, Great Britain raised a slogan “trade not aid,” leading western countries to 
resist American embargo policy. Since 1952, western countries represented by the British 
Administration frequently requested the Washington to relax the policy, but it was either 
rejected or delayed by the United States, which claimed that the direct threat to the 
national security was not the World Wars but the competition on the export market.423 
America’s opposition could not obstruct actions of western countries. In 1957, the British 
Ministry of Trade announced that 207 items were removed from the China embargo list 





423 Weijuan, “meiguo jing yun tie mu de wa jie” (The collapse of American embargo policy), Wen Hui Bao, 
June 10, 1957, 4. 
 220 
and Great Britain decided to follow their own way from then on.424 Thereafter, other 
western countries such as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France also 
followed the example of the United Kingdom, independently developing trade with 
China.  
Despite China’s protest and the international pressure, the United States still 
insisted the China embargo policy, which led to a complete disappearance of American 
business on the Chinese market for more than two decades. Since the beginning of the 
China embargo in 1949, Coca-Cola, listed as one of the strategic materials of the United 
States, was prohibited to be exported to the PRC. Having hope in minds, the Coca-Cola 
bottlers in China strived for survival in Communist China, but their business was 
hopelessly shrinking due to the lack of raw materials. In 1950, Thomas Liang, the 
director of Crystal Mineral Water Company in Tianjin, once tried to contact the Coca-
Cola Export Corporation for purchasing Coca-Cola concentrate, but could not get any. He 
got a very disappointing message from the division manager of the Coca-Cola Export 
Corporation, Carl F. Faires Jr. saying that “it is with deep regret that I must inform you 
that under present condition our Company will not be able to provide you with 
Concentrate at this time. I am very sorry that it is necessary for us to make this decision, 
but I am sure that you will understand the circumstances which leave us no choice in the 
matter.”425 As a result, the already pricy drink had to raise the price again, making the 
commodity even unaffordable for ordinary Chinese people. The situation became even 
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worse when Chinese street peddlers frequently infringing Coca-Cola’s trademark, which 
was not registered with the People’s Government. As imitation drinks bottled in Coca-
Cola bottles had been sold openly with a lower price and there was no way of stopping 
such sales in the fact that the name of Coca-Cola and the bottle were not registered, 
Tianjin Crystal Mineral Water Company had sustained heavy losses.426 Forced by the 
shortage of raw materials and the shrinking market, in 1953 Tianjin Crystal Mineral 
Water Company decided to stop producing Coca-Cola and only produce soft drinks using 
local materials.427 
 
Toxicity of Coca-Cola   
In addition to the economic reasons, the Chinese Coca-Cola crisis was 
exacerbated by the ideology competition in the Cold War. Ever since the Communist 
came to power, everything foreign was put under a careful political scrutiny for its class 
category. Particularly, in the circumstance of the China embargo which widely incited the 
Chinese nationalist sentiment. American products became the national targets for 
imperialism, and Coca-Cola as the representative of Americanization was the biggest 
target of attack. The once popular beverage in China was suddenly criticized as a toxic 
that not only physically harmed people’s health but also ideologically poisoned people’s 
minds. State-controlled newspapers and magazines in the late 1940s and the 1950s 
educated Chinese masses in the term of science and medicine that Coca-Cola contained 
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nothing good for health, but was a cauterant that damaged teeth and the digestive system. 
Although the Chinese translation of Coca-Cola means something palatable from which 
one derives pleasure, the journals pointed out that in fact Coca-Cola neither tasted good 
nor made people happy.428 An article published in Xinmin Evening News elaborated the 
argument from a scientific perspective:  
“Among all useful tropical plants, there is a tree called cola tree (or kola 
tree), which is originally from Africa. Its fruit, known as cola nuts or kola nuts, 
contains chemical compositions such as theobromine and caffeine that could 
excite nerves and refresh minds. Cola nuts’ characteristics were known by blacks 
very early, and so far the plant is widely grown in many tropical countries such as 
Brazil. Many countries use cola nuts as the raw materials in producing chocolate 
and medicine. For example, the USSR’s pharmacies are selling one sort of 
chocolate called cola chocolate, which indeed could refresh people’s minds. 
Americans also use cola nuts to produce food and drinks, one of which is Coca-
Cola, which becomes popular due to its large-scale advertisement campaigns. 
However, because of insufficiency of the raw materials, the company replaced 
cola nuts with all kinds of artificial substitutes which are all toxic to human beings 
according to scientific chemical analysis.”429  
For communist China, Coca-Cola’s toxicity was much more dangerous and 
intimidating on the social scale. It had become an economic power that was juxtaposed to 
Ford and Rockefeller in the United States, and more important, it had grown up as a 
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strong political power that not only influenced American politics but also penetrated into 
the international arena.430 Coca-Cola’s originality as well as its business success which 
were honored in the capitalist world was translated in communist China as class 
exploitation and oppression. Communists advocated that prosperity of the Coca-Cola 
Kingdom was built upon sweat and blood of the working class, and its success was 
merely based on gimmicks such as advertisement. State-controlled media commented 
that in the twentieth century, Coca-Cola, whose big shareholders were Wooddruff’s 
family and friends, represented the toughest reactionary force of the capitalist world, 
manipulating politics in American South where the working class was struggling for a 
living while Wooddruff’s family was leading a luxury life.431  
After the Second World War, Coca-Cola as an American life style expanded side 
by side with American imperialism. In streets of Paris, trucks painted with red and yellow 
Coca-Cola trademarks could be seen everywhere, providing the French at the amount of 
840,000 bottles every day. Egypt with six bottling plants, was the biggest supply base in 
the world, producing 3,500,000 bottles each year. In the Philippines, the annual sale of 
Coca-Cola was 5,000,000 bottles before the war, but later it increased to 193 million, 
which meant on average each Philippine, including adults and children, consumed 12 
bottles of Coke every year. In West Germany Coca-Cola reappeared on the market after 
large-scale advertising campaigns, and in Belgium Coca-Cola drinks were sold in every 
Cafe… Generally, the Coca-Cola Company sold 50,000,000 bottles every day across the 
                                                 
 
 




world, which made a huge amount of profit that interested Capitalists in the Wall 
Street.432  
The worldwide ubiquity of Coca-Cola suggested to the Chinese communist state 
that Coca-Cola had become the most important tool of the American imperialist to 
exploit the working class and anesthetize people’s minds. Although young people in 
Shanghai loved Coca-Cola, it was portrayed by government media as far inferior to the 
Chinese traditional drink—plum juice. Either as a revenge against America’s China 
embargo or as a result of ideological competition, words like toxics, Coca-Cola invasion, 
Coca-Colonization, and Coca-Cola dumping were widely seen in all kinds of Chinese 
newspapers, journals, and magazines in the 1950s. They compared Coca-Cola to 
quicksilver spilled on the ground, penetrating to every corner of the capitalist world, 
incurring numerous resistances across the world. For example, one piece of news in 1953 
reported Americans were dumping Coca-Cola to Japan, which caused furious resistance 
from Japanese beverage merchants. The News says when American businessmen asked 
the Japanese Government to import Coca-Cola drinks of 200,000 US dollars, Japanese 
beverage merchants furiously resisted, as their business was severely hit by the imported 
American beverages a year ago. Considering the resistance and financial difficulties, the 
Japanese Government hesitated to accept, but American Coca-Cola businessmen still 
attempted to dump Coca-Cola to Japan.433 Another newspaper article lamented Coca-
Colonization of Europe by pointing out that many well-known breweries and champagne 
houses in Belgium and France were sadly changed to Coca-Cola bottling plants because 
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of American dumping.434 But it was delightful that most of the Euro-Asia continent, 
extending from the Baltic Sea to the Hainan island,435 began to say no to the wholesalers 
on the other side of the Pacific.436 
Sometimes in colonial countries Coca-Cola even became a powerful weapon to 
attack colonizers. In the 1950s when independence movements were in full swing in 
developing countries, Chinese Medias, the voice of the communist party which claimed 
itself brothers and sisters of the impoverished masses across the world, were interested in 
reporting the indomitable struggles for independence in the Third World. One piece of 
Chinese news, for example, highly praised a brave Lebanese child who gave an American 
sentinel a basket of Coca-Cola, one of which contained a bomb and later exploded. The 
newspaper commented at the end that “this news showed the power of Coca-Cola was 
much stronger than the power of Atomic and hydrogen bombs, since in the anti-
imperialist struggles, everybody including children was strong soldiers and every object 
including Coca-Cola bottles was a weapon.”437 The communist China was amused by the 
sarcasm and they thought the news was very encouraging, for the fact that using Coca-
Cola, the symbol of American imperialism and aggression, to attack American aggressors 
slapped hard in the face of U.S. imperialism.  
Coca-Cola in China was once criticized as a waste of foreign exchange and a 
contrary to nationalism. Tthe critique became much shaper in the 1950s when the 
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ideological conflict played a role. Shanghai Xinmin Evening News in 1948 once 
commented that considering the huge allocation of foreign exchange limits on Coca-Cola 
concentrate in Shanghai, which was 5,599,215 US dollars,438 Coca-Cola was a luxury 
wasting much more foreign exchange than any other luxuries did.439 Two years later the 
same newspaper compared Coca-Cola—the brown liquid—to the blood of imperialism 
and colonialism, which penetrated into the capillaries of American economic system. The 
deeper the colonization was in a certain place, the more Coca-Cola advertisement could 
be seen. “Coca-Cola—imperialism in a bottle,” a term indicating the inherent and 
incurable corruption and exploitation characteristics of capitalism and imperialism,440 
was widely spread in all kinds of Chinese newspapers and was even continuously seen in 
the 1980s after China’s opening up. When class conflicts became a dominating theme in 
the Mao era, Chinese media made every effort to construct Coca-Cola into a symbol of 
corrupted life style of capitalists who oppressed the working class in semi-colonialist 
China:  
“The brown liquid, which was once honored as a noble beverage, flowed 
everywhere in semi-colonial Shanghai. It flowed onto officials’ and 
businessmen’s banquets in skyscrapers, into the securities buildings where stock 
markets wax and wane, onto the tables of bankers who were busy in calculating 
and counting money, and into the Café shops where bargains were going on in the 
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dim light and decadent songs. Every day more than 20 Coca-Cola trucks shuttled 
back and forth across every road in Shanghai, which was a familiar scene to 
Shanghainese.”441   
After 1949, Coca-Cola’s sales and its advertisement fell dramatically. Compared 
to a daily sale of over 120,000 bottles in 1948, it declined to 24,000 bottles by the end of 
July in 1949 and the sale further decreased when a large amount of watermelons appeared 
on the market in August.442 In 1950, Coca-Cola’s sales decreased to 9,600 bottles every 
day. Seeing these numbers, Xinmin Evening News confidently made a conclusion that 
before the PRC American capitalists earned a large amount of money through the brown 
liquid at the expense of the blood of massive Chinese people, whereas after the PRC, the 
brown liquid was dying, because the new Chinese society did not need the ‘westernized’ 
drink.443 While be proud of China’s independence from Coca-Cola imperialism, Chinese 
media entertained the public and promoted socialism by making sarcasms to the ongoing 
intensive cola war between Coca and Pepsi in the western world. In August 1961 
People’s Daily published a long article deriding the cola war as a mirror reflecting greed 
and corruption of capitalism: “The Coca-Cola Company was not only a representative of 
the whole monopolistic enterprises in the United States, but also a symbol of American 
imperialist expansion in the free world. During the ‘golden era of Coca-Cola’ in 1949, 
one fourth of its profit came from overseas… The Coca-Cola Company exploited its 
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bottling plants and gained enormous profit simply by controlling the syrup patent. So did 
the Pepsi Company…Wasn’t the ruthless war between Coca-Cola and Pepsi an epitome 
of the corruption of dying American imperialism?”444 
 
The Socialist Transformation 
 
 Decades of wars and the U.S.-led embargo inflicted considerable damage on 
China’s economy, but they were unsuccessful in undermining the Chinese Communist 
regime. The hostility from the western world inspired the enthusiasm of the socialist 
revolution. Before nation-wide victory of the Communist revolution, Mao Zedong 
announced and started implementing the new democratic economic program, an 
intermediate stage toward socialism, which aimed to overthrow feudalism and achieve 
China’s national independence from colonialism. Mao’s new democratic revolution 
sought to enter directly into socialism through a coalition of classes fighting the old 
ruling order, bypassing the rule of the capitalist class that Marx and Lenin predicted 
would usually follow such a struggle. During the new democratic period, a certain degree 
of capitalist elements would be allowed, but it would be finally replaced by the 
development of socialism. Generally, the revolution included three major economic 
policies: first, confiscation of the land of the feudal class and land distribution among the 
peasantry; second, confiscation of the capital of the comprador bourgeoisie; and third, 
protection to the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie.  
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 The revolution did not succeed until the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China, which brought China into the second transitional stage—the socialist construction. 
After three years implement of economic recovery policies, which aimed to restore the 
economy to normal working order, the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the 
end of 1952 adopted what came to be known as the general line or general task for the 
socialist construction in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The basic 
aim set for the period was to accomplish industrialization and socialist transformation of 
agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a fairly long period of 
time.445 The socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, which started 
between 1954 and 1956, consisted of two steps: the first was to transform capitalism into 
state capitalism, and the second was to transform the state capitalism into socialism.446  
State capitalism was the transitional stage of the socialist transformation, during 
which the state allowed the national bourgeoisie a necessary period of time to gradually 
accept transformation. Under the leadership of the state and the working class, it was not 
an ordinary but a particular kind of capitalist economy, namely, a state-capitalist 
economy of a new type which took on a socialist character to a very great extent and 
benefited the workers and the state. It was new because it existed not chiefly to make 
profits for the capitalists but to meet the needs of people and the state. Although a share 
of the profits produced by workers, about one quarter of the total, went to the capitalists, 
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the remaining three quarters were produced for the workers (in the form of the welfare 
fund), the state (in the form of income tax), and expanding productive capacity (a small 
part of which produces profits for the capitalists).447 In private-owned industry, there 
were three forms of state capitalism to be adopted in the PRC: joint state-private 
management; orders placed by the state with private enterprises to process materials or 
manufacture goods, with the state providing all the raw materials and taking all the 
finished products; and similarly placed orders, with the state taking not all but most of the 
finished products.448 Among the three forms, the latter two were the first and second 
stages of the state capitalism, whereas joint state-private management was the highest 
level that was pursued by the Communist party and the form that most big companies 
adopted.  
During the transition, bourgeoisie sacrificed a part of their interest, but it was 
claimed that the change was voluntary. Since the very beginning of the campaign, Mao 
Zedong stressed that “not only must the implementation of state capitalism be based on 
what is necessary and feasible, but it must also be voluntary on the part of the capitalists, 
because it is a cooperative undertaking and cooperation admits of no coercion. This is 
different from the way we dealt with the landlords.”449 The most effective way in 
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realizing the peaceful transition was educating the capitalists in patriotism. Mao 
suggested that the Communist Party “should systematically cultivate a number of 
capitalists who had a broader vision and were ready to lean towards the Communist Party 
and the People’s Government, so that most of the other capitalists may be convinced 
through them.”450 To further pacify the capitalists, the state adopted a policy of 
redemption by steps in nationalizing means of production privately owned by the 
bourgeoisie. Before bringing private enterprises into joint state-private management by 
whole trades, redemption took the form of distribution of profits, viz., portioning out to 
the capitalists part of the profit (say, one-fourth) according to the net earnings of the 
enterprises. After the conversion of private enterprises into joint state-private 
management by whole trades, redemption took the form of payment of a fixed rate of 
interest, i.e., for a certain period the state paid, through the special companies for whole 
trades, a fixed rate of interest on their investments to the capitalists. Furthermore, with 
regard to the capitalists and their representatives, work had been found by the 
government departments concerned for those who were able to work, and proper 
arrangements had been made or relief provided for those who could not, so as to ensure 
their livelihood.”451 By 1956, the PRC completed the socialist transformation of capitalist 
industry and commerce and joint state-private management dominated all industry fields 
in the society. After redemption was completed, joint state-private management 
companies became complete socialist state-owned enterprises and socialist economy was 
finally established.  
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Great Leap Forward of Coca-Cola 
The success of the new democratic revolution and the following socialist 
transformation campaigns highly mobilized the nationalistic sentiment and enthusiasm on 
reconstruction. To develop China’s economy, the Communist Party formulated a series of 
five-year economic plans, the second of which last from 1958 to 1961, known as the 
Great Leap Forward, making a bold claim that China would catch up with and surpass the 
United Kingdom within 15 years. On the basis of an exaggerated belief in the power of 
ideology on human consciousness, the radicals were convinced that by putting politics in 
command, the objective difficulties created by lagging industrialization and 
mechanization could be overcome in a relatively short time. The cause of the Great Leap 
Forward movement, as what Zhang Shuguang argued, was partly inspired by the China 
embargo. The sanctions fostered Chinese leaders’ determination to “exceed” the British 
and “overtake” the Americans within a decade and to smash “blind faith” in foreign 
powers by drastically increasing the output of heavy industry.452 Although officially the 
Great Leap Forward did not start until 1958, as a radical response to the embargo, Mao 
concluded very early that the Chinese people were capable of anything.   
Inspired by the radical thoughts, bold and impractical attempts and claims 
appeared in the early fifties before the Great Leap Forward, especially in the fields that 
used to be dominated by foreign companies. In the soft drink industry, Coca-Cola, the 
foreign-brand drink, was regarded as unsurpassable in the past. However, when Coca-
Cola’s market was shrinking in China because of the embargo, the nationalistic Chinese 
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believed it was not a big deal. As retaliation, they confiscated all Coca-Cola machines 
and equipment, trying to produce soy sauce instead. In Shanghai, Watson’s Mineral 
Water Company did not strive for saving its business but voluntarily changed its 
business, even though its daily sale was not terribly bad just after the establishment of the 
PRC. Watson’s felt its business was obsolete and the factory workers were unwilling to 
be the agent of consumer products of American imperialists. In 1949, over 100 workers 
in Watson’s Mineral Water Company collectively proposed to stop producing the 
luxurious drink and instead to make high-quality soy sauce. They thought this shift could 
not only solve the market problems on agricultural products, but also improve the quality 
of household food with the existing advanced technologies and skills as well as solve the 
employment issue. The manager of Watson’s Mineral Water Company agreed that 
shifting to produce soy sauce was a good idea. He borrowed a book titled Manufacturing 
Methods on vinegar and Condiments and tried to figure out the solutions.453 However, 
after a series of attempts, reality disproved their hypothesis. The results showed that 
Coca-Cola equipment could not be used to produce soy sauce but was only suitable for 
making cola. Despite the failure, the idea was set up as an excellent example of 
transforming the world by farewell to the past, which was highly eulogized and 
advocated in all kinds of newspapers. By showcasing the “creative” attempts of 
Watson’s, Chinese media encouraged other industries to shift from a consumption 
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oriented business—producing luxury for bourgeois— to a production-centered 
business—making products for people’s livelihood.454  
After the failure of the tests, Watson’s workers still bravely gave up the cola 
business, devoting themselves to other industries. The total number of workers in 
Watson’s before the PRC was over 240, but now it was only 70 in 1950. Even the 
remaining 70 employees refused to produce Coca-Cola from January to April in 1950. 
They only returned to the factory in May due to a large amount of the leftover raw 
materials. These workers only produced ordinary soft drinks in large bottles with an 
average daily sale at 9,600 bottles, which was sufficient to support their living for a 
while. They were not interested in making profit at all. Instead they were planning to 
exhaust soft drink raw materials as soon as possible in summer, so that the company 
could shift to produce useful products which were beneficial to people’s livelihood.455  
An even bolder claim than using Coca-Cola equipment to produce soy sauce was 
probably the assertion that Chinese people had succeeded to produce drinks tasted exactly 
the same as Coca-Cola. Before the PRC when Coca-Cola was popular, it was widely 
reported in Chinese newspapers that the recipe of Coca-Cola was a big secret in 
American business. Coca-Cola contained seven raw materials including water, sugar, and 
coca leafs, which were known as “the seven X” (the seven unknowns). The recipe was 
patented and only two people knew it in the 1940s, Dr. W. Heath and B. Wells, who 
never took the same flight and never wrote the recipe on any piece of paper. When at 
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work, they only used numbers instead of names, so even their assistants did not know the 
meanings. The original recipe document was safely kept in the Trust Company, now Sun 
Trust, for emergency.456 People in Shanghai, one of the largest international markets for 
Coca-Cola, once tried to replicate Coca-Cola, but all of them were intimidated by “the 
seven X.” However, in the first few months of the Big Leap Forward Movement, Chinese 
people claimed that they found “the seven X.”  
Shanghai Aquarius Mineral Water Company announced in July of 1958 that they 
successfully produced Coca-Cola. While the secret document was still safely placed in 
the bank safe of the United States, Chinese technicians claimed that they solved “the 
seven X” merely based on a bottle of Coca-Cola sample and successful teamwork. By 
smelling, tasting, and chemical analysis, they quickly figured out the unknown “X” and 
developed a formula including twenty-five ingredients. It was reported that according to 
experts’ evaluations, the Chinese Coca-Cola was comparable to American Coca-Cola in 
color, flavor, and taste. Thus, Aquarius Mineral Water Company decided to mass produce 
this drink in July and tentatively named it Dongfeng Cola (East Wind Cola) or Shanghai 
Cola. The Company also published the news on newspapers, hoping readers to provide a 
better trademark name. Chinese newspapers vigorously celebrated the success, 
commenting that “the seven X” could not scare brave Chinese people and the east wind 
defeated American Yankees. The article concluded “Are the X really intimidating? No! 
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As long as liberating people’s minds, the X could do nothing either.”457 Not only “the 
seven X” in Coca-Cola was a small piece of cake, but “the sixteen X” in Rendan, a 
medicine used to treat heat stroke, was nothing to fear. Like Coca-Cola, Japanese Rendan 
monopolized the Chinese market and there were only four Japanese doctors knew the 
sixteen ingredients in the formula. When Aquarius Mineral Water Company announced 
their discovery of “the seven X” in Coca-Cola, Chinese pharmacists in Ji Zhong Tang 
Pharmacy also claimed that they successfully developed the Chinese Rendan. They said 
that the appearance and quality of the Chinese Rendan were superior to the Japanese 
product, and the flavor was much suitable for Chinese tastes. Using the two encouraging 
examples—Dongfeng Cola and Chinese Rendan, the Xinmin Evening News concluded 
that the disclosure of the secrets of Coca-Cola and Rendan demonstrated the truth that 
when the mystery was unveiled, western products were nothing but small tricks.458  
 
Socialist transformation in the soft drink industry 
In the 1950s, soft drink industry underwent a socialist transformation. After Coca-
Cola was withdraw from China, former foreign-invested and Chinese-owned soft drink 
companies were shifted to the form of joint state-private management, in which all 
production facilities, equipment, and materials were either confiscated or redeemed by 
the state. Under China embargo, previously imported materials such as sodium benzoin, 
essence, citric acid, and corks were all replaced by local materials in order to maintain 
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production. The enthusiasm on production grew higher and higher as the increasing 
nationalistic sentiment and the socialist passion stimulated by independence, China 
embargo, and the Great Leap Forward movemnet. Unlike the former economic system in 
which profit was the ultimate goal in any given business, in socialist economy of the Mao 
period, what mattered to the joint state-private management companies was merely 
production, the level of output. Soft drinks in China were highly seasonal commodities 
that were mainly consumed in summer. For the rest months of the year, production in soft 
drink factories was almost stopped, leading to extremely low equipment utilization and a 
huge waste which was incompatible with China’s underdeveloped economy as well as the 
communist ideology. In summer, however, as the production facility was unequally 
distributed among regions, poorly mechanized soft drink factories in majority cities 
hardly met the local demand, whereas several well-established factories in big cities such 
as Shanghai intensively competed for a market share.  
Since the opening of treaty ports in the nineteenth century, Shanghai, the biggest 
economic centers of China, concentrated a majority of resources. With regard to soft 
drink industry, there were several well-established companies such as Watson’s Mineral 
Water Company, Aquarius Mineral Water Company, and Yili Mineral Water Company, 
which were all well mechanized and able to produce high-quality drinks. Yet, most 
equipment in these companies was under a low rate of utilization over the whole year. 
For example, Watson’s Mineral Water Company had the most advanced equipment, 
completely automatic and could produce 2,340 bottles per hour and 46,051,200 bottles 
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per year, but the actual annual equipment utilization was only 7.6%.459 Its highest 
monthly productivity could reach 4,056,000 bottles, but the monthly sale was only 
860,532 bottles, 21.12% of its productivity.460 In contrast, other regions in China were 
not as lucky as Shanghai. They either did not have soft drink companies at all, or only 
had one or two small-sized soft drink factories, producing poor-quality drinks with crude 
facilities in a low efficiency. The state-owned soft drink company in Beijing, known as 
the Three Stars Mineral Water Company, was one of them. Although it was located in the 
capital city, it failed to import equipment from the Soviet Union, and its poor-quality 
drinks were far from meeting the demand in Beijing.461 To balance supply and demand, 
the state first suggested shipping Shanghai soft drinks to Beijing, but glass-bottled soft 
drinks were too heavy and fragile to deliver and it was uneconomical to distribute such a 
low-value commodity across such a long distance. 
A better solution was to reallocate resources, which could not only increase the 
equipment utilization but also solved the imbalanced regional development that 
contradicted the socialist proclamation. In 1955, the central Government decided to move 
Shanghai Watson’s Mineral Water Company which had ten years of soft drink production 
experience to Beijing and joint-ventured with Beijing Three Star Mineral Water 
Company. The new factory was state-owned and renamed as Arctic Ocean Soft Drink 
Company (Bei bing yang). Its products later became the best memory for most 
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Beijingeses in the Mao period. This decision was made based on several considerations. 
First, Watson’s advanced equipment could still be used for at least ten to fifteen years, 
which saved capital investment about 478,702 yuan. Second, Beijing had a large 
consumer market, nearly 3 million residents. Third, on the technological level, the 
advanced mode of production in the South could help and guide the backward industry in 
the North. Finally, Watson’s cap-making machines could supply high-quality caps to 
other companies in the North who always purchased caps from Shanghai.462 After the 
move-out of Watson’s Mineral Water Company, Aquarius Mineral Water Company, a 
former British-invested company, became the only joint state-private managed soft drink 
company, also known as Shanghai Soft Drink Company, in Shanghai. The Government 
argued one soft drink company as big as Aquarius Mineral Water Company was 
sufficient enough to meet the local demand in Shanghai. As the ultimate goal of socialism 
was to achieve common prosperity, redistribution of resources could not only balanced 
the unequally development of the industrial structure across regions, but also could 
highly increase the equipment utilization.463  
 
Salty Soda: a Socialist Welfare for the working class 
 
Compared to other industrial products, bottled soft drinks usually acquired little 
attention from the state due to their relatively low value to people’s livelihood and 
difficulties and cost in transportation. For a long time, soft drink production and 
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consumption was highly restricted in the local area. When the Communists came to 
power, they merely controlled raw materials such as sugar and citric acid, but were barely 
interested in production, distribution, and consumption of soft drinks. In the first several 
years of the PRC, the percentage of the state acquisition in soft drink industry was very 
low: in 1953, the state acquisition from Watson’s Mineral Water Company was 13.4% of 
its total annual sale; in 1954, before mid-August, it was 19.7%.464 However, when the 
national socialist revolution evolved in full swing in the mid of the 1950s, in addition to 
redistributing the sources of soft drinks, the state also attached political meanings to it. 
Under the propaganda of the state, soft drinks were not simply palatable refreshing 
drinks, more importantly it became a social welfare—a heat stroke prevention measure—
for the working class in hot summers. 
Before the revolution, the Communist Party claimed that the working class 
suffered from endless exploitation and oppression from capitalism, imperialism, and 
feudalism. Workers in private-owned factories worked in very harsh conditions: the 
working places were shabby, dirty, and narrow, extremely hot in summer while terribly 
cold in winter. Workers’ rights, even their lives, could not be protected. Every day, textile 
workers in Shanghai, for example, had to work twelve hours in the noisy, humid, and 
polluted workshop, and seventy to eighty percent of them got pulmonary diseases. 
According to the medical report in 1929 from Shanghai, since 1919 Yang Shu Pu 
industrial hospital had treated 880 textile workers, a significant number of whom were 
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permanent disabled.465 Working conditions in hot summers were even worse. In the 
tobacco factory, for example, the temperature in summer could be over 100 °C (212 °F). 
Before the PRC, only a few factories in Shanghai provided cooling equipment, while 
most industries including metallurgy, enamel, and glass industries where the working 
temperatures were extremely high, had no cooling measures at all. In summer, workers 
were constantly attacked by heat strokes, some of whom even died.  
Compared to feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism, communism represented the 
interests of the working class. It was a social, political, and economic ideology that aimed 
at the establishment of a classless and revolutionary socialist society structured upon a 
state ownership of the means of production. When the Communist Party came to power, 
the state adopted various measures to improve the working condition in factories. With 
regard to the frequent summer stroke problem in factories in summer, the central ministry 
of the textile industry proposed summer-temperature-control standards in April 1951: the 
highest temperature for cloth factories in summer was 92°F, and yarn factories could not 
exceed 98°F.466 In 1952, state-owned textile factories in Shanghai added sixteen air 
coolers. Private-owned factories also adopted fans, blowers, and arbors to lower the 
temperature.467 In addition to setting up temperature control facilities, soft drinks that 
could cool bodies down also became an important measure in preventing summer strokes. 
By 1956, the state council, for the first time, included the summer cooling measures into 
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the “Code of Safety and Health in Factories:” Clause 21, if the temperature in working 
places is higher than 35°C (95°F)468, factories should take cooling measures...; clause 27, 
factories should provide soft drinks such as salty sodas to workers who were working in 
high-temperature conditions.469 
   Heat stroke was understood by modern medicine as a symptom caused by 
dehydration and lack of salt. Ordinary sweet soft drinks were not only expensive in the 
food shortage period, but also could not supplement salt, though they could hydrate the 
body. When the demand of soft drinks in summer was enormously increasing after the 
promulgation of the summer factory regulation, mass producing ordinary soft drinks were 
even unrealistic and meaningless, because sugar, one of the most important ingredients in 
soft drinks, was a luxury commodity that was in short supply. Even brown sugar, also 
known as Cuban sugar because of the place of origin, sold at 49 cents per jin (500g) and 
was rationed. Ordinary people could get brown sugar only in certain circumstances such 
as after childbirth. In Chinese medicine, brown sugar was believed to enrich the blood for 
puerperae and help them recover quickly, so women could get doctor’s prescription on 
brown sugar after childbirth, though the ration was very small. For most families, eating 
white sugar and brown sugar was a fantasy. Instead they used a cheap sweet substitute, 
saccharin, which was 10 cents a bag (about 20g). Yet, in the fifties and the early sixties, 
saccharin, later known to be hazardous to health, was also rare. If a child could drink a 
cup of saccharin water, he/she immediately became the public person among the kids 
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who were full of jealousy. Wang Hexi, a man in his mid-fifties, still vividly remembered 
his jealousy in his second grade to one of his classmates who got saccharin water from 
his father who was working in Luoyang Bulb Factory. He said every kid in class 
competed to exchange a cup of saccharin water with pieces of paper in their notebooks. 
Later, saccharin became more common in the society, but its sweetness was still a good 
attraction to most people. In the Cultural Revolution, as an educated youth, Wang Hexi 
was sent to the countryside, where saccharin could be bought in production teams. 
Whenever his team leader rang the bell for work, as encouragement, he always cried that 
first one going to work would be awarded with a cup of saccharin water. In the seventies 
and thereafter, saccharin became a common commodity in local stores. Many families 
tried their best to save 10 cents to buy a bag of saccharin and hid it somewhere that 
children could not see. Occasionally, parents made a cup of saccharin water to satisfy 
children’s watering mouths.470  
 Considering the medical theory as well as the challenging food situation, 
Aquarius Mineral Water Company, the only joint state-private owned soft drink company 
left in Shanghai at that time, creatively and independently developed a new product—
salty soda, known as yanqishui—to meet the demand. In June 1956, Aquarius Mineral 
Water Company claimed that “in order to meet the demand of workers who worked in 
high-temperature conditions, we have successfully developed yanqishui, which cost only 
1.0569 yuan per dozen (12 bottles), and would put into mass production soon. Yanqishui 
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was only designed for labor protection but not for the populaces’ everyday consumption, 
so we would only produce from June to September.”471 Instead of using a lot of sugar, 
yanqishui was made from salt, saccharin, pigment, citric acid, essence, and saleratus, 
some of which are very unhealthy from the modern perspective. Compared to sweet 
sodas at that time, the only difference of yanqishui was it reduced the proportion of sugar 
or saccharin while added salt. The producing process was simple: mix all the materials 
according to a proportion, pour into clean water which has been disinfected by 
ultraviolent rays in advance, and finally bottle it. 
 Since the mid-fifties, there were two kinds of soft drinks in Communist China: 
sweet soda and salty soda, which were both refreshing drinks in summer. The bottle size 
of sweet sodas was 240 ml, while the size of salty sodas was 650 ml, but the producing 
processes were almost the same: sweet sodas contained a little bit more syrup than salty 
soda. However, their prices varied widely. Considering one bottle of sweet soda cost 13 
cents at least and 20 cents at most while one bottle of salty soda only cost 8 cents, the 
profit of sweet soda was much higher than that of salty soda. Aquarius Mineral Water 
Company, also known as the Shanghai Soft Drink Company in Maoist China, decided to 
produce more salty soda than sweet soda, because they saw salty soda as a product 
serving for the working class. They claimed since the production goal in the socialist 
society was to meet the demand of the working class, they should produce products for 
proletariats, even though the profit was small. In contrast, for those secondary 
commodities like sweet soda, they should restrict the production scale, though its profit 
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was large. This was the essential difference between socialist production and capitalist 
production.472 The Company recalled when they were in the hands of foreigners before 
the PRC, they only produced sweet soda, because capitalists aimed to extract surplus 
value from the labor to turn into profit. However, the socialist public ownership in the 
PRC determined their production direction: producing low-profit salty soda. In summer, 
especially in high-temperature, open-air working conditions, workers particularly needed 
salty soda to replenish their consumed water and salt during the work. Supplying salty 
soda to workers stood in sharp contrast to workers eating salt in summer in capitalist 
countries, which reflected the superiority of the socialist system.473 Focusing on the 
interest of the working class, Aquarius Mineral Water Company decided two-thirds of 
their output should be salty soda and the rest was sweet soda.  
 While sweet soda and salty soda were both refreshing drinks in summer, in 
socialist China the former was labeled as the labor protection product and the latter was 
regarded as a secondary commodity that was not necessary. Salty soda symbolized the 
state’s special care to workers, whereas sweet soda was just ordinary commodity which 
was even related to luxury. To increase revenue and channel consumption, the state 
issued the “special consumption tax” in 1950, which imposed cold food taxes on cold 
food shops, cafes, and restaurants where cold food was sold. Following the old tax 
system in the Republican era, the new released “special consumption taxes” generalized  
the seven existing regional consumption taxes such as taxes on ballrooms, banquets, 
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hotels, cold food, and entertainment activities into a single standard state regulation. The 
tax rates varied from 3% to 50%, and the collection target was consumers who consumed 
these products. With regard to cold food taxes, anyone who bought cold food in cold food 
shops and cafes had to pay the tax. However, cold food was diverse and each given cold 
food was assigned a certain class category in the early communist China. For example, 
soda drinks, ice lolly, cold noodles, and ice cream were all cold food, but the Xinmin 
Evening Newspaper commented the producing methods, meanings of consumption, and 
the identities of customers differed, and thus the boundary and the rate of taxation should 
be clarified.474 In addition to increasing revenue, one important goal of the consumption 
tax was to restrict over-consumption. Cold noodles and cold jellies were foods that 
satisfied hunger, so they should not be taxed, while other cold foods like soda drinks and 
ice cream were luxury that not ordinary people could consume, so these products should 
be imposed the tax. Although the “special consumption tax” was canceled in 1953, the 
cold drink tax was included into the business tax, the rates of which varied from 5% to 
15%. 
 While the state made effort to restrict consumption on certain commodities in 
order to construct a socialist consumption style, it encouraged certain consumption that 
helped to reinforce the political ideology. Sweet sodas sold in stores were taxed to 
prevent over consumption, but meanwhile the state encouraged production of salty soda 
with the same ingredients but less syrup. Salty soda did not need to pay the tax. It was 
also listed as a necessity in labor protection regulations. To protect labor rights, the state 
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launched a series of educational campaigns every year to advertise the effectiveness of 
salty soda in preventing heat stroke in summer. Salty soda was welcomed by factories 
and soon became a standard and a mandatory labor protection measure to prevent heat 
stroke in hot summer. Heat stroke prevention measures were initially implemented in 
textile and steel industries where temperatures in working places were extremely high, 
but it quickly expanded to all sorts of industries. The government founded labor 
protection institutions and mobilized related institutions such as Bureau of Labor, Board 
of Health, and Labor Unions to cooperate together in educating, encouraging, and 
supervising the implementation of heat stroke prevention measures. Every year between 
1955 and 1957, the Bureau of Labor in Shanghai not only held heat stroke prevention 
classes and exhibitions, but also showed related educational documentaries.  
Related departments such as security offices and labor protection offices were 
also set up in factories to coordinate with the local and central government. At soft drink 
producers such as Aquarius Mineral Water Company, such departments with the special 
political agenda even intervened in the production process, besides protecting the labor 
right. Motivated by the socialist enthusiasm and the government’s propaganda, Aquarius 
Mineral Water Company began to shift its production emphasis onto salty soda. 
However, as an economic entity, profit still mattered to the survival of the company. 
Some managers in Aquarius Mineral Water Company suggested producing a little bit 
more sweet sodas because they thought sweet soda and salty soda were equally important 
to people’s life and it would benefit the Company, but the labor union and party members 
strongly disagreed. They argued the profit-centered ideology was wrong and people in 
the socialist country prohibited a focus on economic interest. Whenever salty soda was in 
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a short supply, the related departments and the party institutions began to warn the 
Company to focus on salty soda and supervise the production. They claimed that workers 
were the host in the socialist society, who had right to intervene and supervise 
production. The socialist theory study group organized by party members among the 
workers particularly emphasized the importance of mass production of salty soda. They 
pointed out mass production of salty soda fully reflected the state’s care to the working 
class. More importantly, salty soda was the necessity for steelworkers who were working 
in high temperatures, which were essential to production of steel. Many group members 
voluntarily declared that they were willing to work hard and endure the hardship to 
support the state’s steel industries and it was worth to earn less profit but made 
contributions to the welfare of high-temperature working workers.475 
In the first few years after the invention of salty soda, Aquarius Mineral Water 
Company was the only supplier of yanqishui in Shanghai. Every summer, a large amount 
of orders were made, especially from textile and steel industries where heat stroke was 
frequently occurred. In 1959, No.4 national cotton mill in Shanghai, having 23 workers 
who were working in high temperature conditions, planned to order 46 bottles of 
yanqishui every day, and 4,608 bottles a year. The No. 5 national cotton mill, having 36 
workers exposed to high temperatures, ordered 72 bottles a day, 6,552 bottles a year; the 
No. 7 national cotton mill had the numbers as 193 workers, 223 bottles a day, 22,380 
bottles a year; the No. 10 national cotton mill: 191 workers, 192 bottles per day, 7,800 
bottles per year… 
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Numbers of workers 
who were working in 
high-temperature 
conditions 
Amount of yanqishui 






No.4 23 46 384 
No.5 36 72 546 
No.7 193 223 1865 
No.10 191 192 650 
No.11 256 314 2416 
No.13 24 24 120 
No.16 194 899 1297 
No.17 2982 2982 29820 
No.18 80 93 814 
No.19 378 378 1894 
No.20 20 12 40 
… … … … 
 
 Although Aquarius Mineral Water Company had operated at full capacity in 
producing salty soda, the output still could not meet the demand. To efficiently allocate 
the limited resources while also protecting the labor rights, in the 1960s, the Bureau of 
Shanghai textile industries set up summer drinking quotas in the provision for each 
industry: the first industry category including steel and iron should provide two bottles of 
yanqishui for each worker every day; the second category including glass, enamel, and 
heat treatment industries should supply one bottle of yanqishui per worker per day; the 
third category including industries whose workshops were unventilated or contained 
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thermal radiation should offer a half bottle of yanqishui per worker per day.477 However, 
the summer demand for yanqishui was so large in Shanghai that in 1957 Aquarius 
Mineral Water Company could not meet it.  
 The popularity of yanqishui was not restricted in Shanghai. With the up-to-bottom 
implementation of the heat prevention and labor protection policy, yanqishui became well 
received by workers across the whole country, especially in cities on the east coast such 
as Beijing and Tianjin where heavy industries located. Like Aquarius Mineral Company, 
which led the soft drink industry in Shanghai after the national wide adjustment on 
industry structure, almost every big city had one well-known soft drink brand. For 
example, Beijing residents were familiar with soft drinks from Bei Bing Yang Soft Drink 
Company, which absorbed technologies, assembly lines, and technicians from Shanghai 
Watson’s Mineral Water Company. People in Tianjin loved drinks from Crystal Mineral 
Water Company, which previously was the Coca-Cola bottling plant. During the Mao 
period, all of these companies served as the central suppler of yanqishui in their cities 
respectively in summer. Same as Aquarius Mineral Water Company, all of these soft 
drink companies felt stressful to meet the large demand. 
As compromises, some factories set a supply priority to heavy manual workers 
who were working in extremely hot conditions.478 On the other hand, some big 
companies, whose major labor force were heavy manual workers, tried to produce 
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yanqishui on their own. In 1967, Shanghai No.5 Steel Plant sent a petition to the Bureau 
of Metallurgical Industry, stating that they wanted to produce yanqishui by themselves:  
 “Yanqishui that we consume in summer are all supplied by Aquarius 
Mineral Water Company. Because of the large labor force of our company and the 
wide range of high-temperature jobs, most of which are over 40°C (104°F), the 
demand of yanqishui is enormous. Every year conflicts on the supply are 
numerous and our workers are unhappy about it, so we decide to make yanqishui 
by ourselves. Our petition is based on following reasons: first, our company needs 
five to six trucks of yanqishui every day, while Aquarius Mineral Water Company 
could only supply three to four trucks, which are far less from our demand. Our 
company often has to adjust quotas among different jobs, making our work so 
passive. Second, Shanghai No.1, No.3 Steel Plant, and Shanghai Motor Company 
all produce their own yanqishui. Not only have they solved the supply problem, 
but also adapted to the taste of the masses by adding different essences or 
adjusting the sweetness, which are welcomed by factory workers. Third, the 
saving could be significant. Last year, the total cost of yanqishui—150,000 
dozens— as well as the transportation fee was 263,500 yuan. If we produce 
yanqishui by ourselves this year, the unit cost per dozen would decrease 0.15 
yuan. If the budget this year is same as that of last year, we could produce 
400,000 dozens of yanqishui, whose amount would almost triple.”479 
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  As more and more companies asking for self-producing yanqishui, to promote 
socialist welfare and relieve production pressure, in 1957 Aquarius Mineral Company 
shared their recipe with the public and encouraged companies to produce yanqishui by 
themselves. They expressed that they were willing to give any technical guidance or 
assistance to any company who needed help. They made the announcement on July 24, 
stating that “because of the hot weather, the demand of yanqishui is enormous. However, 
we could hardly meet the demand due to our limited production capability. For the sake 
of the health of factory workers, we now introduce the recipe of yanqishui, hoping every 
factory and industry could cooperate and try to produce on your own.”480 The recipe they 
provided was incredibly detailed:  
“Granulated sugar is , sterilizing and purifying it by filtering after melt. 
Osmanthus sugar is ; Citric acid is  ; salt is ; essence is  (mint is 
optional); the volume of CO2  is 3.5-3.7 (we use the CO2 mixer). CO2 could be 
manually added by mixing sodium bicarbonate and citric acid, but the effect is small. 
By far, our company hasn’t had any good experience on it. However, we think that 
although yanqihsui that manually produced according to the above recipe contains 
little gas, it could replenish water and salt lost by sweating and prevent heat strokes. 
Finally, use glass, pottery, or porcelain containers instead of metal and enamel 
containers in order to prevent poisoning.”481  
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With the recipe, guidance, and technical help from Aquarius Mineral Company, 
many companies began to self-produce yanqishui. Usually they simplified the recipe and 
the producing process to reduce the cost. For example, some companies replaced sugar 
with saccharin and some companies ignored carbonation all together. Big companies who 
had a large amount of workers and drinking demand, and who had more funds, started to 
build workshops only designed for yanqishui production. They organized a special group 
of people to produce and distribute yanqishui as a full-time job. Shanghai No. 5 Steel 
Plant, for example, planned to build a 1,500 m2 building and allocate 170,000 yuan to 
purchase related production apparatus. Since the 1960s, most large companies could be 
self-sufficient on yanqishui, some of whom even supplied nearby small- and middle-sized 
companies if they had surplus. Later on, many small- and middle-sized companies also 
organized workers to self-produce yanqishui. A former worker in Beijing recalled 
yanqishui in his on-line blog:  
“Producing yanqishui was very simple. First, build a big basin with bricks. 
Then, place a large tank in the middle of the basin with natural ice stuffing the space 
in between. Pour water into the tank and add some alum to precipitate impurities. 
Finally, add saccharin, essence, and salt. At that time, yanqishui was the best 
summer cooling beverage provided by factories. The condition was not improved 
until the mid-seventies when our company purchased refrigeration equipment and 
built refrigeration plant to provide workers with high-qualified iced soft drinks and 
ice-lollies. Meanwhile, sugar began to replace saccharin and citric acid replace 
essence. Not only workers in high-temperature working conditions but all workers in 
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our company could get iced drinks by showing the certificate card issued by the 
department of labor protection in our company.”482 
 
 
Table 6.2:483 budget on yanqishui apparatus from Shanghai No. 5 Steel Plant, September   
12, 1967 
 
Apparatus Number Budget (yuan) 
Lye immerser 2 6,000 
12-head bottle washer 2 1,500 
Bottle rinser 1 2,500 
Syrup machine 1 10,000 
Capping machine 1 120,000 
CO2 mixer 2 20,000 
Conveyor belt  7,000 
Roller of conveyor frame  3,000 
Building 1500 m2 60,000 
Other  20,000 
Total  250,000 
 
  
Since the demand of yanqishui was huge and the method of production was easy, 
people in rural areas also built soft drink companies. Shanghai was one of the largest 
industrial centers in the PRC, in which the demand of yanqishui was enormous. By 1981, 
there were five small soft drink factories built in the suburban counties such as 
Songjiang, Chouming, Nanhui, and Jiading, which achieved an annual output of 
96,000,000 bottles. Besides supplying their own counties, these small soft drink factories 
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delivered a part of their yanqishui as assistance to the state’s key projects such as 
Shanghai Bao Steel Company. A big industrial city like Shanghai, the major supplier of 
yanqishui were first, big soft drink companies like Shanghai Aquarius Mineral Water 
Company with an annual output of 33,600,000 bottles that supplied middle- and small-
size factories, second, suburban soft drink factories which mainly supplied local factories 
but also help the large factories as well, third, soft drink workshops inside big companies 
as the self-sufficient sources producing loose packed yanqishui. In Shanghai, for 
example, there were 204 companies built their own soft drink workshops by 1981, and 
the annual production, converting to the size of regular bottles, was 120 million bottles.484  
Considering all the three supplying sources, the annual production of yanqishui 
was increasing every year. However, as the number of workers increased rapidly every 
year, especially after the Culture Revolution, and the yanqishui welfare gradually 
extended to most workers in factories, yanqishui was still in a short supply. Particularly 
for the middle- and small size factories merely relied on the big soft drink company like 
Aquarius, the shortage remained conspicuous. To get sufficient yanqishui, factories 
located far away from soft drink companies had to send people to soft drink factories to 
wait in lines since the mid-night.485 The lines were extremely long and had no shades at 
all. Sometimes people had to wait until the dusk and most likely the storage was 
insufficient for their purchase. Furthermore, during the long waiting hours, the 
purchasing people were exposed to the scorching sun and sometimes even got wet in the 
                                                 
 
 
484 “yanqishui gongying jiang you suo gai shan,” (The supply of yanqishui will be improved) Wen Hui Bao, 
July 23, 1981, 2. 
485 “jin nian gao wen qi jian yanqishui que kou da” (Huge shortage of yanqishui this summer: the Municipal 
Government called for taking measures immediately), Wen Hui Bao, June 21, 1987, 4. 
 256 
rain. Because of the supply shortage, some workers in some factories exposed to high 
temperatures could only get one bottle of yanqishui every two days.486  
In soft drink workshops of big companies, work was not easy, either. Every 
summer, soft drink workshops probably became the busiest place in the factories. 
Delivering trucks lined up in front of the workshops, while the bottling machines were 
running around the clock inside of the buildings. An assistant engineer in the yanqishui 
workshop of Number 5 Steel Plant in Shanghai said the work in their workshop was very 
intense, where the bottling machines bottled more than 140 bottles of yanqishui every 
minute.487 In addition to supply their own workers, the workshop in Number 5 Steel Plant 
also tried their best to supply other 120 companies in Shanghai which asked for help. The 
53 years old director of the workshop, Li Jiazhen, who was the first to go to work and the 
last to leave, slept in the factory to guarantee the production. Every day, workers in that 
workshop started to work at eight in the morning and did not leave until 2 or 3 a.m. next 
day. Inside the workshop, hot steam came out of the two large syrup caldrons, by which a 
woman was stirring and worked almost ten hours every day. On the other side of the 
room, the bottle washing machine was running in a full load, by which workers put 150 
empty bottles on the conveyor belt every minute.488 
Facing the production challenge, the government took a series of measures to 
expand the production of yanqishui in summer. In Shanghai, for example, the municipal 
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government encouraged the Aquarius Mineral Water Company to expand production on 
yanqishui. In addition to the two existing soda machines that only produced yanqishui, 
the government asked the Company to shift the other two machines that were originally 
used for producing other beverages to produce yanqishui. Meanwhile, they also 
encouraged the Company to update their facilities and extend the working hours. With 
regard to the self-sufficient soft drink workshops, the government not only encouraged 
them to increase production for their own workers but also urged them to support other 
middle- and small-size factories. In a planned economy, yanqishui was distributed in 
rations, which meant that theoretically people should not wait in lines. However, there 
were some problems in production and transportation and some factories only purchased 
yanqishui in hot weather, so the supply chain was frequently disturbed. To scientifically 
manage the imbalance between supply and demand, the government suggested all 
factories must register and order in advance and pick up sodas on time.489 
Very year before summer, government and company leaders vigorously mobilized 
the heat stroke prevention campaigns in advance. They provided physical examinations to 
workers who were exposed to high temperatures and personally checked facilities such as 
soft drink machines, lounges, and ventilation equipment in the working places. On 
extremely hot days, to show concerns to workers, government leaders, company 
managers, and party members personally delivered towels, cold green bean soup, and 
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yanqishui to the hands of front-line workers and warmly greeted them.490 This campaign 
was repeated year after year. Some people questioned, given the heavy duty of 
production, why the leaders bothered to pay such attention to the summer stroke 
prevention measures. Others complained that the measures had nothing new but were 
repeated every year. In response, the leaders emphasized that everything related to 
people’s livelihood was the most important task for them. Leaders and party members 
were the representatives of the working class and were leaders and organizers of the 
revolution as well as people’s livelihood. Therefore, they argued that heat stroke 
prevention was not only an issue of working methods, but also reflected the proletarian 
sentiment and attitude toward the masses.491 
Although yanqishui was propagandized as workers’ welfare that reflected the 
meticulous care from the state, this does not necessarily mean that workers liked it. In 
fact, the taste of yanqishui, salty and bitter, was not as palatable as that of ordinary sweet 
sodas, especially the well-known brands. Han Shangyi, a man born in the early twenties, 
recalled that the Dutch water and soft drinks made by Aquarius Mineral Water Company 
were his favorite when he was young, but salty soda tasted terrible. Whenever his factory 
gave out heat stroke prevention drinks—salty soda—in summer, he always gave them 
away to others. However, when Han was labeled as the rightest in the Anti-Rightist 
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Movement492 and forced to get re-educated through labor, salty soda became his best 
memories in the difficult years. There were no soft drinks to drink in the hard time, so 
even the bitter and salty yanqishui became attractive to Han. Whenever Han was sent to 
deliver yanqishui, he was very happy because he could temporarily become a free man, 
confidently leaving the small room where he was forced to write the statement of 
repentance. One fully-load delivery tricycle with yanqishui was very heavy and the soda 
factory was far away from Han’s factory, so everyday Han was allowed to take a rest 
twice and drink one bottle of yanqishui on the way, which was the most wonderful time 
that Han was still missing in the late eighties.493  
Nostalgia of yanqisui was widely heard in the Chinese society. For most people 
who experienced the Mao period, yanqishui was not really a cold drink that prevented 
heat stroke or a drink that pleased taste buds, rather it reminded them of a pleasant 
interlude in the harsh economic and political conditions of the day. It was a placebo for 
the Rightists like Han Shangyi, it was also a proud identity for the working class. A 
worker in Beijing who once participated in yanqishui production said that it reminded 
him the most wonderful time in the factory:  
“When we were young, Bei Bing Yang was the only soft drink brand in 
Beijing. Because everybody was poor at that time, it was a luxury to drink soft 
drinks in summer. Every summer, some big companies organized workers to self-
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produce a beverage called yanqishui. Most jobs in my company were outdoor, 
heavy manual labor, so we made this beverage every year to prevent heat stroke. 
One year, I was assigned to producing yanqishui, which was the easiest and the 
most comfortable job in our company. Every morning, the first job for me was to 
get ice from the icehouse. After finished making yanqishui, I delivered them to all 
departments and meanwhile got back all empty bottles that were used the day 
before. The job in the afternoon for me was washing all the bottles to prepare 
them for tomorrow. Although nowadays yanqishui was seen as an unhealthy 
beverage, in Maoist China not every company was able to self-produce it. 
Therefore, many workers, especially those who had younger siblings or kids often 
brought yanqishui back home.”494 
 
Conclusion 
Production, processing, distribution, and consumption of yanqishui made summer 
cooler in Maoist China, but they were also unique, creative responses to a challenging 
food situation and the Cold War tension. For over thirty years, Coca-Cola, the once 
beloved exotic soft drink in summer, was closely associated with capitalist exploitation 
and western life styles and was totally removed from communist China. Instead, the 
Chinese “invention”—yanqishui, crude and tasteless with only slightly difference in 
recipe comparing to ordinary sweet sodas, symbolized a socialist welfare that represented 
the interest of working classes, and was widely distributed in ration to factory workers 
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who were working in high-temperature conditions in summer. During this process, the 
communist state played a central role in regulating and allocating people’s everyday 
consumption, trying to reconstruct a socialist consumption model that was equal and 
proletariat-centered. As sugar had a “sweet power” for Sidney Mintz, Yanqishui, crude 
and tasteless though, had a “cool power,” “discovered” by the communist state, and 
became an embodiment of the social good that appealed to both the socialist sentiment 
and nationalism of the authoritarian state. Meanwhile, it was also applied as a weapon for 
the communist state to consolidate the nation state and fight against the western world in 
the Cold War.  
If Coca-Cola in the United States and in the late Republic of China represented 
the emerging mass-produced, industrial commodity and the growing mass consumption 
culture that distinguished “modern” from “tradition” in the early twentieth century, 
yanqishui for communist China symbolized some sorts of “progress,” that is, a transition 
from polarization consumption to real mass consumption, equal and democratic across all 
classes. In this sense, the state power and the modernization force converged when the 
political agenda met with the populaces’ expectation, which produced a unique 
production and consumption pattern in Maoist China.   
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CHAPTER 7 
WHEN COKE KNOCKED ON THE DOOR: CHINA’S REFORM 
AND RETURN OF COCA-COLA, 1979-1990 
Coca-Cola completely disappeared on the Chinese market in the Maoist period. 
During the three decades, the memory of Coca-Cola in Chinese people’s minds was 
gradually fading away, but American Coca-Cola Company’s China dream never ceased. 
They not only built affiliations with American political parties to boost business in the 
United States, but also made every effort to expand overseas. Their endeavor, known as 
soda politics, was quite successful. In the Cold War, Coca-Cola was regarded as a soft 
power, the most effective and important weapon, to Americanize the world. However, 
their China dream did not have any progress in Mao China until 1978 when Deng 
Xiaoping came to power and opened the door to western countries. Through a series of 
long and difficult negotiations, Coca-Cola finally became the first foreign company 
which entered Communist China in 1981.  
This chapter starts with an introduction on American soda politics, which rose in 
the twentieth century and expanded rapidly to the world along with the rise of American 
hegemony. It got a chance to penetrate into China in the late seventies when Sino-US 
relations were thawing and China shifted its domestic policy from the planned economy 
to the market economy. By examining the step-by-step negotiations between the Chinese 
Government and the Coca-Cola Company, this chapter displays the pains of the Sino-US 
business cooperation after China’s reform, and shows how the state and Chinese 
intellectuals actively participated in shaping Chinese consumer market. The second half 
of this chapter shifts the perspective from the state to the masses. By interviewing 
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ordinary people, this study reveals a huge disparity between the state’s intention and the 
grassroots’ interpretation of consumption. Rather than having political sensitivity, 
ordinary consumers centered on economic interests and pragmatism, endowing Coca-
Cola particular social meanings through everyday practice in social interactions, which 
was far away from the original vision of the state.  
 
The Soda-pop Politics 
In the 1950s, Chinese newspaper commented that “the Marshall Plan, Hollywood 
movies, and Coca-Cola were three important weapons by which Americans enslaved 
people across the world.”495 In the hoopla of the escalating Cold War, business and 
culture, in Reinhold Wagnleitner’s word, became important instruments of political 
influence in the competition.496 When cola fever prevailed in most areas of the world in 
the second half of the twentieth century, politics, to some extent, was rephrased as soda-
pop politics.   
 Soda-pop politics was initially buried in U.S. domestic politics, in which, major 
cola companies built closed connections with political parties: Coca-Cola, the drink of 
Democrats, and Pepsi-Cola, the Republicans’ refreshers. Although there were third-party 
colas, as in politics, not much was said about them.497 Coca-Cola had been the undisputed 
majority cola since the New Deal: the cola connection was formed in 1932, when the 
Democratic National Chairman, Postmaster General James Farley, left the 
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Administration—he had quarreled with Franklin D. Roosevelt over the issue of a third 
term—to become chairman of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation. Farley’s political 
connections helped Coke escape the sugar rationing and became a war priority item 
during World War II. Pepsi retaliated by forming a political alliance of its own, with a 
little known junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy. In a battle that 
foreshadowed his later anti-Communist crusade, “the Pepsi-Cola Kid” fought for an end 
to rationing. However, his usefulness came to an end, when it was revealed that Pepsi’s 
Washington representative had given him $20,000. Pepsi soon forged a more successful 
political alliance, with Richard Nixon, then the Vice President. Thanks to some pushing 
by Pepsi chairman Donald Kendall, Pepsi was the only soft drink represented at the 
American International Exposition, the site of Nixon’s famous “Kitchen Debate” with 
Nikita Khrushchev. Nixon even got Khrushchev to drink some Pepsi and the photos of 
the historic drink were seen around the world.498 When Nixon’s political career faltered 
in the early 1960s, Mr. Kendall hired him as an international ambassador for the Pepsi 
Company. 
 As the domestic competitions were intensifying, Coca-Cola and Pepsi never 
stopped seeking opportunities to expand overseas. While the soda business was 
expanding hand in hand with American political agendas, soda politics also upgraded to 
an international level. In the Second World War, following Coca-Cola’s chairman Robert 
Winship Wooddruff’s patriotic proposal that every man in uniform could get a bottle of 
Coca-Cola for five cents wherever he was and whatever it cost, Coca-Cola as military 





goods built 64 bottling plants around the world all at Government expense. In China 
alone, there were a total of three Coca-Cola bottling plants were built before 1949. 
Although Pepsi could not overtake Coca-Cola in terms of the scale, Pepsi sales went right 
along with Nixon in the late 1960s when he gained momentum. In 1968, when the 
Democrats lost the Presidency, Pepsi vendor machines were installed in the White House 
cafeteria. In 1971, Nixon sent Mr. Kendall on a trade mission to Moscow. In 1973 Pepsi 
won exclusive rights to sell cola drinks in the Soviet Union until 1984, with the exception 
of the Olympic Games. Meanwhile, Coca-Cola, based in Atlanta, was looking for another 
Democrat to support. It found a hometown boy, Jimmy Carter, who was a longtime friend 
of Paul Austin, the chairman and the chief executive officer of the Coca-Cola Empire. 
During Jimmy Carter’s long march to the White House, he used Coca-Cola money, Coca-
Cola jets and Coca-Cola’s advertising company. When he was elected, the Pepsi vendor 
machines in the White House were replaced by Coke vendor machines.499 Coke also, as 
the rumor said, used the Carter connections to reach China four days before the 
announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC, which was just 
like how Pepsi breezed into the Soviet Union in the Nixon years. 
 The negotiations on normalizing Sino-America relations and selling Coca-Cola in 
China started simultaneously in different conference rooms of the same hotel, the Beijing 
Hotel. The conferences were held in mid-December 1978, six years after Nixon’s first 
visit, a milestone that symbolized an end to the 25 years of separation between the two 
countries. Coincidentally, the agreement that Coca-Cola got exclusive rights to sell cola 





products in China was made on December 13th, four days before the Joint Communique 
on the Establishment of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations was signed. The agreement 
indicated that Coca-Cola became a folk ambassador, entering China before the U.S. 
Government. The coincidence as well as the friendship between Carter and Paul Austin 
caused a public suspicion that Carter’s might intervene in the Coca-Cola’s China 
agreement, but Austin denied it. He said the President wasn’t even told of it.500 For its 
defense, the Coca-Cola Company claimed that its drinks were sold on the Chinese market 
before the Communists took power and their China diplomacy actually started a decade 
before the formal diplomatic relationship was established. In the early sixties, the Coca-
Cola Company tried to contact China through their Japanese bottler, Yuko Murofushi. He 
talked to Liao Cheng Chih, head of the China-Japan Friendship Association, about selling 
Coca-Cola in China in the 1960s. But the effort was in vain, since Liao reminded him that 
the Cultural Revolution was in full sway and it was impossible to do anything.501 In the 
mid-1970s, the company still did not stop trying. It sponsored many sport and cultural 
events between the United States and China. It even sent Peter Lee (李励生), who had a 
doctorate in chemistry from Michigan State University and later became the manager of 
Coca-Cola Company in China, to study and work with the well-known China scholar 
Joseph Needham at Cambridge University in 1976.502 The Coca-Cola company could not 
directly contact China until 1972 when the Sino-American relationship finally thawed 
after Nixon’s visit.   
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China’s Reform and Opening up 
 While the Coca-Cola Company waited for chances to return China, the Chinese 
society was changing tremendously and finally provided an opportunity to Coca-Cola to 
come back. During the Cold War, China’s embargo imposed by western countries as well 
as the ideological conflict isolated China from the world capitalist economy for several 
decades. It was exacerbated in the Cultural Revolution,503 when Lin Biao and the Gang of 
Fourfuriously attacked foreign trade as traitorism and slavish comprador philosophy. 504 
After Lin Biao died in an air crash in 1971 and the Gang of Four was smashed in 1976, 
Deng Xiaoping, a reformist who was interested in developing a market-oriented 
economy, emerged as the de facto leader of China and finally took office in 1978. When 
the nation was immersed in the joy of celebrating the crushing of the Gang of Four, a 
group of Chinese leaders represented by Deng began to feel the pressure of rebuilding the 
nation’s economy which had been seriously devastated by a decade of turmoil from the 
Cultural Revolution.  
In order to learn experiences from western developed countries and promote 
China’s own science and economy, Deng Administration in 1978 sent a government 
economic delegation led by Gu Mu (谷牧), the Vice Premier of the State Council, to visit 
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Western Europe. The major tasks of the visit were to investigate western countries’ 
advanced science and technology, especially in the field of agriculture and industry, to 
explore the reason for the rapid economic development in these countries during the 
fifties and the sixties, and to learn western countries’ experiences on management of 
mass production.505 During the one-month visit, the delegates, who had never been 
abroad before, for the first time saw the huge gaps between China and the West. They 
were shocked by the rapid economic development in capitalist countries in West Europe 
after the Second World War. Particularly in the fields of agriculture, industry, and 
transportation, West Europe had reached a high level of modernization. Meanwhile, the 
delegates found that these countries were very interested in developing economic 
relations with China, because wherever they went, the visiting team was warmly 
welcomed by either the president or the prime minister, who regarded China as the most 
important element for the peace of the world. Equally important was the team learned 
some general practices in international trade, such as compensatory trade, buyer’s credit, 
and seller’s credit, which fit well into China’s economic circumstances and could 
significantly mitigate China’s shortage of foreign exchange.  
As soon as returning to China, the delegation wrote a visiting report and 
submitted it to the major leaders of the State Council. It was then followed by a detailed 
conference report presented by Gu Mu. The meeting started at half past three in the 
afternoon and did not end until eleven in the evening. Over nearly eight hours, all 
participants actively participated in discussion, especially the leaders, who had fought for 
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justice in the Cultural Revolution and had been suppressed by the Gang of Four, argued 
straightforwardly that China had to shift its focus to economic development. They 
thought China’s development should be based on self-reliance, but also had to depend on 
foreign assistances and cooperation. General Ye (Ye Jianying 叶剑英) critically pointed 
out that a part of China’s propaganda on the West in the past was biased, which in turn 
restricted China’s own development. He thought Gu Mu’s investigation on Western 
Europe was comprehensive, allowing Chinese leaders to see clearly what China should 
import and where China could import. Ye suggested the groups stop talking but make a 
decision immediately.506 Meanwhile, other participants in the meeting warned the 
Government the danger of over centralization. For example, Li Xiannian (李先念) 
pointed out that centralizing foreign trade, a policy formulated by Mao, was a 
requirement targeting a corrupted domestic bourgeoisie, which was dictated by domestic 
and international circumstances at that time. Now, the situation had changed. Although 
international affairs should still be firmly controlled in the hands of the central 
Government, the Government should give local authorities some freedom on 
international business.507  
After several rounds of intensive discussion, a decision was made in the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping 
officially announced a state policy: actively develop equal and reciprocal economic 
cooperation with countries around the world on the basis of self-reliance and make every 
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effort to adopt the most advanced science and technology in the world. The policy 
encouraged China to ask for loans from western countries and attract foreign direct 
investment, which was impossible in the past. To break over-centralization and increase 
flexibility, the Government gave the right of import and export of certain products to 
local departments. Finally, Guangdong and Fujian provinces were set as Special 
Economic Zones, offering preferential policies to enterprises with foreign investment. In 
addition to attracting foreign high-tech industries, which the Government especially 
desired, service industries also got attention from the central Government. In January 
1979, Deng Xiaoping called a meeting with Vice Prime Ministers, who were in charge of 
economy, particularly emphasizing on the possibility of developing tourism. He 
suggested putting more effort into tourism, as it was highly lucrative yet required little 
cost. In the meeting, Deng delineated a very detailed agenda on how to promote tourism: 
there were so many things that we could do. For example, we could open restaurants, 
hotels, stores, and bars, and organize some recreational activities such as dancing, 
billiards, and bridge games. Meanwhile, we could also import foreign wines and Coca-
Cola.508  
Developing Chinese service industries became urgent when more and more 
foreigners came to visit and invest in China. The first big problem China met after the 
opening up was the lack of tourist hotels and restaurants. In Beijing, for example, there 
were only three hotels: Beijing Hotel, Qianmen Hotel, and Minzu Hotel. Many foreign 
tourists visiting Beijing could not check into hotels until late evening. Some of them even 
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had to go to Tianjin, a city next to Beijing, to find a hotel to stay. Moreover, the living 
conditions in those hotels were too poor to satisfy westerners. Among the three hotels in 
Beijing, only Beijing Hotel had some modern facilities, but still unsatisfactory. Staying in 
simple and crude hotels with little service, many foreigners began to complain about 
China’s investment environment. Food scarcity made the complaints even bigger. In big 
joint-venture companies such as Beijing Jeep, discontents were especially conspicuous, 
for the percentage of foreign employees in those companies was larger. Western 
businessmen might eat in a Chinese dining room for a few weeks, but after a while they 
found that they couldn’t take the food anymore. It was not like Chinese restaurants 
abroad. Foods in restaurants in China had strange ingredients, low-grade cooking oils, 
and peculiar smells. After a while it all tasted the same.509 A foreign employee of 
American Motor Corporation in Beijing named Schulze had to drive from the jeep 
factory to Jianguo Hotel, where he ate with other Westerners at the buffet of Charlie’s 
Bar. Many foreigners commented that foods in western hotels contained too many 
artificial flavors and lack of diversity. Hamburgers in restaurants didn’t taste right. Most 
foods looked like plastic. You could get awfully tired of Qingdao beer and anned Sunkist 
Orange soda, but at least they were vaguely familiar.510  
Some representatives of foreign businessmen presented a report to the Chinese 
government, complaining about the living conditions in China “are now so serious as to 
act as a deterrent to some companies setting up offices here.”511 To solve the problem, the 
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Government first built six tourist hotels in big cities including Beijing, Nanjing, 
Guangzhou, and Shanghai by using foreign investment, oversea Chinese investment, and 
domestic and foreign loans. In addition, services for eating, shopping, traveling, and 
entertainment etc. were also gradually integrated into the system in order to create a 
homelike environment for foreigners. A big news for foreigners came in 1984, when 
imported bananas became so abundant that they were available in the streets of Beijing at 
virtually any time of year. Another watershed occurred in 1986, when a Western 
“supermarket”—actually a small package store—opened up inside Lido-Holiday Inn 
Hotel, which meant that businessmen with small children no longer had to lug a three-
month supply of Pampers on the flight from Hong Kong.512 However, the most explosive 
news for foreigners in China in the 1980s probably was the availability of Coca-Cola.   
  
The Negotiation  
 Contact between the Coca-Cola Company and the PRC was in fact started before 
China’s reform and opening up, but the formal negotiation did not start until 1978. In 
1972, the Coca-Cola Company had set up a temporary office in Beijing Hotel, though 
there was not any business in China at that time. In 1976 when “the Gang of Four” was 
smashed, the CEO of the Coca-Cola Company, Martin, visited China’s liaison office in 
the United States and told Tong Guangzhi (佟志广), the commercial secretory of the 
office and later the Vice Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation in China, 
of his hope to export Coca-Cola and build bottling plants in China. To show his sincerity, 
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Martin invited Tong Guangzhi to visit Coca-Cola’s headquarters in Atlanta and told him 
that the Coca-Cola Company always had a keen interest in China and had been waiting 
for an opportunity to enter the Chinese market the sooner the better. Initially, Tong did 
not treat this visit seriously, for he knew it was a common tactic of American companies 
and he thought Coca-Cola had nothing high-tech but was just one kind of soda water, a 
mixture of water and sugar. However, when Tong saw the complex bottling line, on 
which each bottle was automatically bottled and sealed, and the productivity was several 
times higher than those of Chinese soft drink companies, he was astonished. Compared 
with Coca-Cola, the best Chinese soft drink in Beijing that Tong knew was Bei Bing 
Yang soda (北冰洋汽水), which was hard to preserve and tasted sour when it went bad. 
Therefore, the preservation technologies that enabled the Coca-Cola Company to do a 
worldwide business particularly interested Tong. Considering China’s situation in the 
1970s, Tong still declined Martin’s request on entering China, although he was full of 
curiosity and surprise. During the visit, Tong told Martin that he was, in fact, familiar 
with this drink because he drank it twenty years ago. He said before 1948 Coca-Cola 
were sold in many cities such as Shanghai and Nanjing, but then disappeared after the 
establishment of the PRC and the pullout of the American army. Since then, the Chinese 
never saw the brown drink, except in movies in which Coca-Cola frequently related to 
American Armies. This image that Coca-Cola was not simply a beverage, but represented 
the corrupted western life style and evil capitalism was reinforced in the Chinese minds 
after the Koran War and the Vietnam War.513 Although China’s policies started to change 
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in the late 1970s, Tong Guangzhi thought it was still too early for Coca-Cola to enter 
China. After the conversation, Martin was very disappointed, but he did not give up. 
Since then the Coca-Cola Company regularly supplied Coca-Cola drinks to the liaison 
office of China in the United States for free.  
 A year later when Deng Xiaoping came to power, Tong Guangzhi was working 
for the China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) and met Martin again when he 
came to visit Beijing. This time Tong raised the question first: “do you think it is the right 
time for Coca-Cola to enter China and do you think the Chinese will accept it?” Martin 
answered “we are businessmen, and we go anywhere that needs us.” He explained to 
Tong that the goal of building Coca-Cola bottling plants in China was not for Chinese 
consumers, but targeted at foreigners who were working and traveling in China, 
especially Europeans and Americans. “Americans and Europeans grew up by drinking 
Coca-Cola, and they are used to drink Coca-Cola wherever they go, so we hope we can 
supply Coca-Cola in every place where tourists visit.” As to the symbolic question that 
Coke related to American Army and imperialism, Martin said “we have no relationship 
with American Army. We are merely a producer, and American soldiers are consumers. 
We are nothing unique but a company making profit by selling sweet sodas.”514 Tong and 
Martin had a long conversation over the dinner, during which Tong asked Martin a 
question that interested him for a long time: the flavor of Coca-Cola. “Why Coca-Cola 
tastes like cough syrup?” Martin’s answer surprised him, “although Coca-Cola’s recipe is 
confidential, I can tell you that it is the taste of the Chinese medicine. Coca-Cola contains 





Chinese cinnamon oil and licorice.”515 After Martin left, Tong Guangzhi did some 
research and found out that the Coca-Cola Company had been importing cinnamon oil 
from China all the time. Even during the confrontation period before 1972, the Coca-Cola 
Company still tried to import cinnamon oil from China.  
 Nevertheless, Tong Guangzhi did not accept Coca-Cola Company’s request until 
1978, when China’s doors were finally open. With increasing interactions with foreign 
countries, the COFCO was assigned to be in charge of food import and export, and thus 
contacts between the COFCO and the Coca-Cola Company became frequent. At the 
beginning, Coca-Cola Hong Kong Company suggested giving 20,000 cases of Coca-Cola 
samples to the COFCO, but the offer was declined. Then the Company suggested giving 
2000 cases, but the COFCO still did not accept. In the end, the COFCO leaders decided 
to accept 20 cases after a long and intensive discussion. When the drinks arrived, people 
in the COFCO did not like it because Coke tasted like Chinese medicine. Recognizing 
that Coca-Cola’s bottling technology was much more superior to China’s and considering 
that many foreign companies such as IBM and Ford were going to establish companies in 
China, Tong decided to formally talk to the Coca-Cola Company again. When Tong 
submitted the Coca-Cola Company’s request to the central Government, the manager of 
the COFCO, Zhang Jianhua (张建华), who used to be the commercial counselor in the 
China’s liaison office in the United States, once and again persuaded the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade that there were multiple benefits of introducing Coca-Cola. After a long 
period of persuasion, the Coca-Cola proposal was supported by Li Qiang (李强), the 





Minister of Foreign Trade, and negotiations between the Coca-Cola Company and China 
finally started. 
 Having an informal letter handwritten by Vice President Li Xiannian (李先念), 
stating that this project was feasible, the COFCO began to take full responsibility in the 
negotiation. The China side (the COFCO) was represented by Sun Shaojin (孙绍金), the 
vice director of Sugar, Wine, and Grocery Department516, while the Coca-Cola side was 
headed by Peter Lee, an American citizen born in China who was Mr. Austin’s special 
assistant for China affairs. As the Company’s representative of the Asian area, Lee had 
his headquarters in Hong Kong and was responsible for thrashing out all the fine details 
during the whole process began in January 1978. From the beginning until reaching an 
agreement, they discussed three rounds, during which the location was changed from 
Beijing Xi Yuan Hotel to Beijing Hotel, and Sun Shaojin always reported promptly to 
Zhang Jianhua. When recalling the first Sun contact with Coca-Cola, Shaojin said Zhang 
Jianhua was very open-minded and played a significant role for the final success. After a 
year of negotiations, the two sides finally made an agreement on December 13, 1978 that 
Coca-Cola bottles and bottling equipment were allowed to be imported to principal 
tourist cities in China in a form called compensatory trade.517 China would build bottling 
plants in the near future, but before that, the COFCO was responsible for importing Coca-
Cola drinks through consignment business. In other words, in 1979 the COFCO began to 
be in full charge of distributing and selling Coca-Cola. 
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One year later, assisted by Ng Fung Hong Limited, the largest and leading 
supplier of fresh, live, and frozen foodstuffs in Hong Kong, the first 3,000 cases of Coca-
Cola was shipped from Hong Kong to Beijing. According to the agreement, Coca-Cola 
could only be allowed to sell in Friendship Stores and foreign tourist hotels, and its 
targeted market was highly restricted to foreigners who were working and travelling in 
China. The consignment business was very common in western countries, but it was new 
in China and many problems remained to be solved. One of the controversial problems 
was the tariff. According to the tariff regulation at the end of the 1970s, the rate on 
imported wine and soda water was around 200%. However, in the consignment business, 
which mainly targeted foreigners, if the tariff was still collected based on the original 
rate, the retail price would be too high and would significantly impede the development 
of the business. After careful study and discussions with the General Administration of 
Customs, the Government decided to cut 50% of Coca-Cola’s tariff, though later the 
tariff was gradually adjusted from 100% to 120%.518  
The second problem was currency. Considering Coca-Cola’s customers were 
basically foreigners and China’s lack of sufficient foreign exchange, retail stores only 
accepted four foreign currencies including Yen, U.S. dollars, Hong Kong dollars, and 
pound. To solve the exchange problem in retail stores, the Bank of China transferred 
some fractional currency from abroad. After circulating for a while, embassies of other 
countries also requested to use their currency such as Deutsche mark, Canadian dollars, 
and Singapore dollars in these stores. Considering the requests as well as the 
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inconvenience and disadvantages of using foreign currency in transactions, State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange decided to replace foreign currencies with standard 
foreign exchange certificate, which could be exchanged in ports of entry and circulated 
across the country. It kept in circulation until 1995, when China’s foreign-exchange 
reserves increased with its rapid development of export.519 
The third problem was caused by the political sensibility of Coca-Cola. When the 
first 3,000 cases arrived in Beijing, no stores and hotels were willing to sell Coca-Cola. 
Leaders in the COFCO had to contact hotels and restaurants by means of their business 
relations and personal friendship. They finally persuaded the Beijing Hotel, which was 
very influential in Beijing, to make room for Coca-Cola and foreign wine in the Hotel 
lobby. After a while, other hotels and restaurants such as the Friendship Store also 
opened Coca-Cola business. The Coca-Cola business then gradually spread to other big 
cities.520  
In addition to the consignment business, in 1980 the Coca-Cola Company gave 
the COFCO an automatic bottling line with a capacity of bottling three hundred bottles 
per minute in the form of a compensatory trade. They signed a ten-year contract with the 
COFCO, the only bottler and the distributor in mainland China. The COFCO agreed to 
spend 300,000 U.S. dollars on purchasing the Coca-Cola concentration every year. 
However, this event created some controversies in China. As soon as the news spread, 
many Chinese Americans, overseas Chinese, and experts in China strongly opposed the 
decision. They pointed out that two things imported from the United States were toxic: 






one was the discotheque and the other was Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola not only cost foreign 
exchange, but also was not good for people’s health. Therefore, resuming Coca-Cola 
business largely went against the nation’s effort on achieving the Four 
Modernizations.521,522 
 
Three Crises  
The debate in China was so intense that it lasted several years following the 
signing of the contract. The first problem encountered by the Coca-Cola Company and 
the COFCO was where to build the first Coca-Cola bottling plant. Since Shanghai used to 
have the most successful and the biggest Coca-Cola oversea bottling plant before the 
PRC, the COFCO suggested building the first bottling line in Shanghai. However, when 
they contacted the related department in Shanghai, their proposal was fiercely resisted. 
Critical articles, letters, and editorials in the name of either individuals or the collective 
such as companies and research institutions widely appeared in all kinds of newspapers 
and magazines. Opponents accused the COFCO of treason, slavish comprador 
philosophy, importing American life style and destroying national industries. Because of 
strong opposition from the municipal departments in Shanghai as well as the negative 
reports and comments in the mass media, the Shanghai plan was abandoned.523 Without 
any other choice, the first bottling line had to set up in Beijing. Thanks to the foresight of 
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Lin Hujia (林乎加), the Secretary Municipal Committee of the CPC, the bottling line was 
finally settled in a small room of a roast duck factory in Wu Li Dian (五里店) of Feng 
Tai district (丰台区) in Beijing, a plant belonging to the Beijing branch of the COFCO. 
In the early 1980s, Wu Li Dian was a remote rural area where conditions were very hard 
and no running water was available. Only relying on groundwater, which contained 
impurities, mainly calcium, how could the Company ensure the quality of water? This 
question always bewildered Tong Zhiguang, who time and again asked the Coca-Cola 
Company for solutions. The answer was revealed a half year later when the Beijing 
bottling plant was put into operation: a set of imported water filtering equipment was 
installed. In addition, since Chinese-made carbon dioxide contained a befouling odor, 
special filters were also imported to purify the gas.   
On April 15, 1981, the first bottling plant in the PRC was officially opened. 
Official joy transpired that morning when hydrogen-filled balloons were lofted and 
firecrackers exploded at the ribbon-cutting ceremony at the plant. In the following 
reception, the Coca-Cola theme song “Coke adds life, have a Coke and a smile” sang by 
Aretha Franklin, a popular American pop star, was playing loudly at the Great Hall of the 
People where some 500 Chinese officials and Americans attended. The tape was 
submitted a few days ago for official clearance. The event was celebrated as a symbol of 
Chinese-American friendship. Later Roberto C. Goizueta, Coca-Cola’s chairman, made a 
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public speech, stating that “April 15, 1981 may be one of the most important days in the 
history of our company, and, in more ways than one, in the history of the world.”524  
 
Figure 7.1: The Ribbon-cutting Ceremony for China’s first Coca-Cola bottling line in 
April 1981  
Source: The Beijing News, December 14, 2008, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-
14/090116844112.shtml, accessed by 8-17-2012. 
 
While Americans were celebrating their success, Chinese people had their own 
philosophy that far differed from the westerners. On the first day of operation, when 
Tong Zhiguang came to visit, he was shocked when seeing streams of Coca-Cola were 
pouring into the sewer. When he got to know that it was a convention of the Coca-Cola 
Company to discard Coca-Cola produced in the first minutes after opening the producing 
line to ensure the quality, Tong became even more startled, because the waste was 
unbelievable and impossible to fathom in China, where most people were still struggling 
on the poverty line. After a while, the first bottles of Coca-Cola came off the line and 
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Tong recalled it tasted exactly the same as the Coca-Cola in America. After Tong, many 
other Chinese leaders such as vice premier Chen Muhua (陈慕华), Tibetan leader Ngapoi 
Ngawang Jigme (阿沛阿旺晋美), and other vice premiers came and visited the Coca-
Cola Beijing plant. Although the plant adopted a foreign brand and introduced some 
western management modes, some government leaders emphasized that it was absolutely 
a Chinese-invested company, manufacturing Coca-Cola drinks by purchasing 300,000 
U.S. dollars of Coca-Cola concentration every year. The entry of Coca-Cola symbolized 
the beginning of China’s introduction of foreign investment, but the Coca-Cola Beijing 
plant was totally invested and operated as a Chinese company, because no one dared to 
think of a real introduction of foreign capital at that time. 
 Even though the nationality of the Beijing plant was very clear to many Chinese 
leaders, questions and troubles never ceased. As soon as the construction was done, a 
senior party member questioned “couldn’t the China-made sodas meet the demand of 
people and foreigners? Why must drink Coca-Cola? It’s treason!” The COFCO had to 
write a special report to explain:  
 “First of all, Coca-Cola is one kind of beverage, whose reputation is due to 
its business success. Americans are used to drinking it wherever they go. Now 
that more and more foreigners come to China after China’s opening up, Coca-
Cola becomes an important beverage and we have to meet this demand. Second, 
Coca-Cola’s recipe contains Chinese medicine such as cinnamon oil and licorice, 
which means Coca-Cola drinks contain Chinese elements. Since the end of the 
last century, every year the Coca-Cola Company imported Chinese medicine from 
China National Native Produce and Animal By-products Import and Export 
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Corporation at the amount of 350 to 400 million RMB. Third, as we haven’t 
mastered the bottling technology, imported bottling lines will facilitate our 
technological development. Fourth, comparing with the 300,000 U.S. dollars 
spent on Coca-Cola concentration every year, the annual profit will double or 
even triple. Fifth, not only the bottling plant is constrained in Beijing, but also the 
scale of the Beijing plant is controlled by state policies which restrict the Coca-
Cola output within 5% of the total amount of national beverages.”525  
 With regard to the restrictive policy, Tong Zhiguang explained that on the one 
hand we were afraid of Coca-Cola impeding our national soft drink industry; on the other 
hand, the restriction was also a kind of political protection to avoid too many disputes and 
troubles. Moreover, in the Cold War, Tong admitted even though he had worked in the 
United States for a long time and could accept many new ideas, he was still vigilant to 
Coca-Cola. Recently, the vice president of Coca-Cola (China) limited Company, Zhao 
Zhongbin (赵仲彬), a Hongkongnese, recalled people in Hong Kong in the seventies and 
the eighties always glanced back when walking in the street, afraid that there might be 
spies from Communist China hiding among pedestrians.526 Similarly, in mainland China, 
Coca-Cola was often seen as a particularly dangerous sign of evil Capitalism. 
 After careful and patient explanation and persuasion, the tension was relieved. 
Within a year, the COFCO and American Coca-Cola Company were planning to build a 
second bottling plant in Shenzhen, with an automatic bottling line of a capacity of 
bottling 500 bottles per minute supplied by the Coca-Cola Company. In this trade, 50% 
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of the price of the line was given to the COFCO for free, while the rest was compensated 
by importing the Coca-Cola concentration from the Company. At the beginning, 
provincial leaders in Guangdong agreed to allow the COFCO to build the plant in 
Shenzhen, but when all paperwork was done, they changed their minds, insisting to build 
the factory in Guangzhou instead of Shenzhen. The COFCO and the Coca-Cola Company 
accepted the change and had to go through all the formalities again. However, resistances 
appeared again before the vice president of the Coca-Cola Company went to Guangzhou 
to sign the contract in early 1982. It was also the time when all provincial leaders of 
Guangdong were attending the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference in Beijing. In the conferences they asked for taking 
extreme discreetness and postponing signing the contract, but the central Government had 
already issued the entry visa to the Coca-Cola vice president who would arrive in Beijing 
on time and then fly to Guangzhou next day. In this emergent situation, the Minister of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Wang Pinqing (王品清), had to ask for 
instruction from the State Council. Fortunately, the Vice Premier of the Council Gu Mu (
谷牧) commanded to follow the original plan. The instruction was delivered to the 
leaders of Guangdong province, who then informed the representatives of the Foreign 
Trade Bureau of Guangdong to fly to Beijing to welcome Coca-Cola’s vice president and 
his team. On that day, Wang Pingqing also personally went to the airport to welcome the 
vice president. After one year of construction, the Coca-Cola Guangdong bottling plant 
was put in operation in 1983. 
 With bottling plants in Beijing and Guangdong finished successively, resistance 
against Coca-Cola gradually moderated. When the COFCO proposed building a third 
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bottling plant in Shanghai, the Mayor of Shanghai, Wang Daohan (汪道涵) said “as long 
as the central Government agreed, we had no problem.”527 Subsidized by the Coca-Cola 
Company, the Shanghai plant, invested by the COFCO, was designed to produce glass 
and plastic bottled Coca-Cola as well as the canned. After its completion, Jiang Zemin (
江泽民), who was the secretary of Shanghai municipal committee of the CPC at that 
time, visited the plant and made an inscription for it. After that, other cities began to 
actively contact the COFCO and the Coca-Cola Company for requesting to build bottling 
plants in their regions.  
 Just as the problem of the plant sites was solved, a marketing crisis appeared. 
Since the operation of the Beijing plant in April 1981, Coca-Cola drinks were sold in 
foreign tourist hotels to earn foreign exchange. In order to make full use of productivity 
and increase economic efficiency, after supplying the tourist hotels, the COFCO assigned 
Beijing Sugar, Wines, and Cigarettes Company to put the surplus to the domestic market 
in Beijing, with the permission obtained from the Department of Commerce in 1982. The 
price of Coca-Cola was four yuan528 a bottle, while it cost 20 yuan in big hotels and 
restaurants, which was very expensive for common Chinese people.529 To open the 
market as soon as possible, the Coca-Cola Company decided to launch a sale promotion 
in Beijing Xi Dan Department, in which balloons and chopsticks were given away. If 
someone drank two bottles of Coca-Cola, the person would get a balloon. If someone 
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drank five bottles, he or she could get a bottle opener marked with Coca-Cola trademark. 
If somebody bought ten bottles, the person could get a radio shaped like a Coca-Cola 
bottle. Even though many people came and gathered around, few of them actually bought 
and drank, as the price was high and few Chinese could afford.530 Afraid of causing 
unnecessary troubles, the COFCO warned the leaders in the Coca-Cola Beijing Branch 
and Peter Lee that mainland China differed from Hong Kong. Developing a market could 
not occur too hastily, as the result might backfire. But the confident Coca-Cola Company 
did not heed the warning and accept this advice. 
COFCO’s anxiety was correct. In the time when everything was in short supply, 
gift-giving always stimulated a great repercussion in the Chinese society. The first Coca-
Cola sale promotion happened to be at the same time period as the two big conferences—
National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC)—were on in Beijing. During the intermission, some delegates went 
to Xi Dan and saw the event. They immediately reported in the conferences, criticizing 
that the Coca-Cola promotion was a capitalist selling method that corrupted the society. 
Soon criticizing voices appeared in a variety of newspapers and magazines. The Beijing 
Daily, for example, published an article entitled “delicious but not happy.” It pointed out 
that in the situation of the foreign exchange shortage, introducing Coca-Cola drinks was a 
waste of foreign exchange. At the end of the article, Chen Yun (陈云), a member of the 
Standing Committee of Political Bureau, commented that Coca-Cola could only be sold 
to foreigners while the Chinese were not allowed to buy a single bottle. This statement 
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was also agreed by many other central leaders in Beijing. Following the instruction, the 
Department of Commerce stopped the domestic sale of Coca-Cola and all Coca-Cola 
drinks were removed from the domestic stores overnight. Thereafter every truck painted 
with a Coca-Cola advertisement, shipping Coca-Cola drinks from the plant in the suburb 
to the city, was intercepted by the police.  
The Beijing turmoil upset the Coca-Cola Company, which could not understand 
why a simple sale promotion was unexpectedly intervened by the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee. Forbidding domestic sales that caused economic loss and insufficient 
use of production capacity annoyed the Company, which had to ask for help from the 
COFCO. The Vice Director of the coordinating department, Sugar, Wine, and Grocery 
Department, Chen Guang (陈光), sent the New Observer a rebuttal essay, but was 
rejected. He then wrote letters to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, but it could not help either. Seeing almost every formal channel was closed, 
the other Vice Director, Liu Changxi (刘昌玺), suggested directly sending a letter with 
signatures by “people” to the central leaders through a personal channel—a girl working 
in the Sugar, Wine, and Grocery Department, who was the daughter of the Vice Minister 
of the International Department Central Committee of CPC, Chen Muhua (陈慕华). 
When Liu asked his manager Zhu Jinchang (朱晋昌) whether he dared to sign, Zhu said 
“if you sign, I will.”531 The letter with the two signatures was soon sent to the central 
leaders by Chen Muhua, who orally reported the Coca-Cola crisis to the chairman of the 
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Committee, Wan Li (万里), when they were seeing off Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang (赵
紫阳) for visiting abroad at the Beijing airport. In the letter, Liu Changxi wrote 96% of 
the Coca-Cola recipe in the Beijing plant came from China, while the percentage of the 
imported Concentration was only 4%. Selling Coca-Cola in Beijing did not cost a single 
penny of the foreign exchange; instead it earned a significant amount of foreign exchange 
through the sale in tourist hotels. Moreover, putting the surplus into domestic market not 
only diversified and increased the market supply; equally important was the factory could 
make a considerable profit which would ultimately contribute to the state revenue. As to 
the American Coca-Cola Company, they did not take a penny from the profit except 
supplying Coca-Cola concentrate at the international market price.  
After careful consideration, Prime Minister Wan Li agreed to resume the domestic 
sale and signed “Yes” at the end of the letter. However, when it was showed to the 
Department of Commerce, they still felt reluctant to make the announcement since 
considering the stop had been commanded by the central leaders, it seemed better to get a 
formal official document before the announcement. Following the suggestion, the 
COFCO drafted a request and submitted it to the State Council, the leaders of which 
included Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), Chen Yun (陈云), Li Xiannian (李先念), Yao Yilin (姚
依林), and Gu Mu (谷牧). All signed “Agree” on it. With leaders’ agreement, the 
Department of Commerce finally issued an announcement of resumption, and thereafter 
other bottling plants such as those at Guangzhou and Shanghai were also allowed to sell 
Coca-Cola drinks on the domestic market.  
Since then, the Coca-Cola Company became prudent on advertising in China. In 
1986, Cui Jian (崔健), the father of the Chinese Rock, won an honor in the “Printemps de 
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Bourges” festival sponsored by the Coca-Cola Company in Pairs. Shortly, he asked the 
Coca-Cola Company to sponsor his personal concert in Beijing. Although the Company 
happily agreed to sponsor him at the very beginning, Lu Bingsong (卢炳松), the first 
Chinese in charge of public relations in the Coca-Cola Company, rejected him 
immediately. Lu explained that Rock and Roll was new and fashionable but still 
controversial in China at that time. If the Company sponsored Cui, it could ruin Coca-
Cola’s future in China.  
This passive situation was not improved until October 1986 when the queen of the 
UK visited China for the first time. During this trip, the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) filmed an excellent documentary. To purchase and play it in China, the China 
Central Television (CCTV) went to the Coca-Cola Company and hoped it sponsor 20 
million U.S. dollars. In return the Company could introduce Coca-Cola advertisement 
before and after the documentary. Although 20 million U.S. dollars was a sky-high price, 
which was far more than the annual profit earned by the Company in China, Americans 
knew that once Coca-Cola advertisement appeared on the CCTV channel, they could 
openly advertise at everywhere in China.532 The Company wisely seized the opportunity, 
which became an icebreaker of their Chinese business.  
In addition to its highly political sensitivity in the 1980s, Coca-Cola was also 
criticized by Chinese health experts who accused Coca-Cola of containing Caffeine 
which was unsuitable for drink. Health Departments in some provinces forbade sales of 
Coca-Cola based on the fact that rats got excited after drinking Coca-Cola, an experiment 
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conducted by a research institute in Northeast China. A cardiologist in Fuwai 
Cardiovascular Disease Hospital confirmed the argument by writing an article in Beijing 
Evening News, stating that people who had heart disease might die if they drank ten 
bottles of Coca-Cola in one time.533 This philosophy may sound ridiculous today since 
any food or drinks will cause harm if eating too much, but if referred to Coca-Cola, an 
American brand, the influence and scale of the rumor were magnified hundreds of times 
in the early stage of China’s reform.  
Facing the new problem, the Coca-Cola Company called for conferences several 
times, in which the Company was divided into two groups: the “hawks” and the “doves.” 
The “hawks” suggested resorting to the law and arbitrating on the international court of 
justice. This opinion was once prevailing in the Company. In contrast, the “doves” 
proposed a soft approach—persuasion. They pointed out that even if the Company won 
the lawsuit, Coca-Cola drinks would not get a foothold on the Chinese market in the 
future. Many senior officials of the United States, who were counselors of the Coca-Cola 
Company, supported the soft approach, and finally the “doves” defeated the “hawks.”  
The Coca-Cola Company invited Chinese experts in the Health Departments to 
visit the United States and Europe to understand the Caffeine regulation in the western 
world, but the Chinese experts insisted that there should be no caffeine in any Chinese 
drink. Without any progress, the Coca-Cola Company began to conduct a worldwide 
research on drinks, collecting caffeine-related sources from over 200 countries. They 
showed to the Chinese Government that caffeine in Chinese traditional drink—tea—was 
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six times more than that in Coca-Cola, and questioned the Chinese why they did not ban 
tea but only Coca-Cola? In addition, they pointed out that coffee, the popular worldwide 
beverage, contains several times more caffeine than Coca-Cola, but no one heard of any 
country banning it. However, the Chinese experts were not convinced, and argued that 
the caffeine in tea was a natural composition while that in Coca-Cola was artificial. The 
Coca-Cola Company explained the caffeine in Coca-Cola was also natural, because the 
raw materials they used came from one kind of plant called Coca-Cola, a name later 
applied to the drink, and this plant contained a high percent of caffeine. Since the Health 
Departments could not find other reasons for objection, they had to stop intervening and 
issued licenses to each bottling plant.  
 
The Worldwide Repercussions 
Right after Coca-Cola entered China, an ordinary Chinese young man who was 
smiling and holding a bottle of Coca-Cola appeared on Time Magazine’s cover. He wore 
a dark blue hat and an army green jacket, two colors that had dominated the Chinese 
society since 1949. However, the bottle of Coca-Cola with the Chinese trademark “Can 
mouth, can happy,” or extension, “tastes good, tastes happy” stayed in sharp contrast to 
the green and blue colors as well as the Great Wall in the background, symbols of 
tradition and Chinese. The catching title on the top of the cover, “China’s new face, what 
Reagan will see,” shows very straightforward that China was opening up and the Chinese 
were ready to start a new life style, a scene that President Reagan would see when he 
visited China.  
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Figure 7.2: The cover of Time Magazine, April 30th, 1984.  
A Chinese young man is cheerfully holding a bottle of Coca-Cola with a Chinese label on 
it.  
Source: Time April 30th, 1984.  
 
While the image on Time Magazine’s cover implicitly embedded some sorts of 
American pride and projected global Americanization, resuming business with the PRC 
still upset many Americans. Some anti-Chinese Americans declared that they would not 
drink Coca-Cola any more out of protest against the Sino-US trade of the Coca-Cola 
Company. Some American newspapers predicted that the large amount of empty Coca-
Cola bottles would ultimately cause serious environmental problems in China. Other 
American newspapers sarcastically said that if 900 million Chinese people went to the 
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United States to return empty Coca-Cola bottles, U.S. international trade deficit would 
greatly expand and it might even lead to the bankruptcy of the country.534  
Nevertheless, in the regional political context, Coca-Cola entering China meant 
much more than Americanization. In the 1950s and the 1960s, China and the Soviet 
Union, the two largest Communist States in the world, were debating about the 
possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Yet, to the Chinese public, 
Mao Zedong insisted upon a belligerent attitude towards capitalist countries, an initial 
rejection of peaceful coexistence, whereas the Soviet Union proposed a peaceful way, 
which was perceived by Mao as Marxist revisionism. Since 1956, China and the USSR 
had progressively diverged about Marxist ideology, and by 1961, when the doctrinal 
difference proved intractable, the Communist Party of China formally denounced the 
Soviet variety of Communism as a product of “Revisionist Traitors,” i.e., the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union headed by Nikita Krushchev. The divide fractured the 
international Communist movement at the time and opened the way for warming 
relations between the United States and China in 1971. With the decreasing Soviet-
American tensions, Pepsi-Cola entered the Soviet Union, while after Nixon’s visit, Coca-
Cola had China. As a result, the confrontation between Communism and Capitalism was 
overshadowed by the confrontation between the Soviet Union and China. A Japanese 
newspaper, the Nihon Keizai financially daily, ominously commented that “a war 
between the colas is not out of the question. Pepsi-Cola, Coca-Cola’s great rival, has 
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landed on Russia. If not entirely seriously, and if things go smoothly in China, the 
confrontation between Russia and China will extend to the world of soft drinks.”535  
 
Figure 7.3: The Shoot-out in Soda Pop 
This cartoon indicates that a series competition between Coca-Cola and Pepsi was going 
on in the world during the Cold war era.  
Source: Edwin McDowell, “The Shoot-out in Soda Pop,” New York Times, Oct. 19th, 
1980. 
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s specialist for cola affairs, foresaw the 
cola war heating up after Coca-Cola moved into China and discussed the perils in an 
article published in the distinguished quarterly, Cola Policy. “The struggle to carbonate 
man’s stomach enters a new stage. Pepsi-Cola has already locked up the Soviet Union 
with a similar arrangement. Thus the two superpowers, Coke and Pepsi now confront 
each other across one of the world’s most explosive borders. The risks are chilling to 
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contemplate.536 What might happen, he asked, if a Soviet border patrol were to taunt any 
Chinese within earshot by singing, “Pepsi-Cola hits the spit!”? It is far-fetched to suppose 
that the incensed Chinese might retaliate by massing their Coca-Cola on their side of the 
frontier and singing, “It’s the Real Thing!”? He said this could readily escalate into nasty 
business, with the Soviets boasting that they were the Pepsi generation and the Chinese 
answering with provocative declarations that only China enjoyed the pause that refreshed. 
It could easily end with both sides uncapping their bottles, shaking vigorously and firing 
across the border.”537 
To reduce such risks, Americans tried bubble diplomacy—Strategic Colas 
Limitation Talks. Secretary of State Vance, meeting with the ministers from Pepsi and 
Coke in Geneva in December 1978, proposing a Phase One treaty under which each 
company would agree not to package its cola in anything bigger than a 10,000 gallon 
bottle. Explosives research showed that a 10,000 gallon bottle of either Coke or Pepsi, 
when shaken vigorously by a full army division, has a trajectory of 22 miles and the 
power to produce violent belching in anyone caught with his mouth open during the 
attack. Coke and Pepsi said they were not interested in providing either China or the 
Soviet Union with anything larger than the family-size bottle. They were reluctant, 
however, to abandon the right to make the super 10,000 gallon bottle unless other 
carbonated-beverage manufacturers subscribe to the treaty.538  
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Coke’s Chinese Experiences in the 1980s 
Since 1979, Coca-Cola drinks, targeting foreigners in China, were only allowed to 
be sold in Friendship Stores, the symbol of luxury in the planned economy. Each bottle of 
Coke was sold at the price of four yuan,539 an unaffordable price for most Chinese, who 
had a very low purchasing power. Take Shanghai, for example. The average monthly 
income for workers in 1978 was 50 yuan, while one bottle of Coca-Cola cost 8% of it. 
After consistent income adjustments, the average monthly income increased to 83.25 
yuan. Since the establishment of the PRC, the most substantial increase in wages was in 
1985, when the monthly income reached to 109.50 yuan, 32.5% more than that in 
1984.540 Yet a bottle of Coke still cost 3.7% of a Shanghai worker’s monthly income. 
With the same amount of money, a Shanghai worker could buy a lunch instead of a bottle 
of Coca-Cola.541  In smaller cities, Coca-Cola was even more unaffordable. In Suzhou, 
for example, the average monthly income in the early 1980s was around 40 yuan, and the 
average cost of a meal was 50 cents to 1 yuan. In factory’s cafeterias, a vegetable dish 
was 3 cents and one small piece of stewed pork was 20 cents. If somebody spent 1 yuan 
for lunch, buying two meat dishes and one vegetable dish, it was considered very 
luxurious. If people ate at home, the price was even cheaper. On the market, raw pork 
was 78 cents a pound. Rice was 14 cents and flour was 16 cents.542 Even if on the black 
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market, where people could buy food without ration coupons, rice was more than one 
yuan a pound, which was still cheaper than a bottle of Coca-Cola.  
 
Table 7.1: The average monthly income sorted by industry and company 
categories in Shanghai, 1970-1985 
 
The average monthly income by business, Shanghai543                 Unit: yuan 
year 1971 1978 1980 1984 1985 
  whole544  collective545 whole  collective whole  collective whole  collective whole  collective  
average 48 39 50 45 67 60 85 82 104 115 
industry 32 34 50 46 64 59 81 79 110 104 
architecture       44   61   93 114 139 
transportation 53 58 51 50 67 64 91 94 115 126 
service 46 40 52 41 62 59 86 82 116 127 
public utility 43   44   62 58 74 81 79 113 
agriculture 49   45 47 61   87 83 100 118 
education  47 39 48 43 66 59 84 81 102 102 
research     42   63   87 77 81 108 
government 63 40 54 39 68   87 58 98 85 
 
There were some ordinary Chinese who were lucky enough to become the first 
group of people who tasted the luxury drink. Zhang Shoujun (张寿君) was one of them. 
In 1980, when twenty-one-years-old Zhang, one of the Educated Urban Youth,546 
returned to Beijing from the countryside, he was informed that he would be employed by 
the COFCO. According to recruitment policy at that time, 30% of a firm’s labor must 
recruit from society, for example, its neighborhood. Zhang luckily lived in the same 
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neighborhood community as the COFCO. Although Zhang neither had an outstanding 
resume nor was a communist party member, he was honored as “Excellent Educated 
Urban Youth” in the countryside, which, he thought, might have some help on the 
competitive job market. At the beginning, Zhang did not know Coca-Cola was an 
American company and he knew nothing about Coca-Cola. He thought Coca-Cola was a 
candy during the job interview. When the interviewers told him the factory located in Wu 
Li Dian (五里店), Zhang felt reluctant to accept the job because he lived almost 10 miles 
away from the working place, and the public transportation system in the 1980s was quite 
underdeveloped.547 Zhang joined a company tour a few days later after the interview. 
When he saw that all teachers in the newly-hired employee training program were 
foreigners, including Americans, Australians, and Japanese, he changed his mind. He told 
his family that he decided to accept the job offer. Zhang’s family was very happy for him, 
because it was very difficult to find a job in the 1980s, let alone a job that had many 
chances to work with foreigners. They believed this job could broaden Zhang’s horizons 
and Zhang definitely could learn a lot from those foreigners.  
In the end, there were over thirty people hired by the COFCO and Zhang Shoujun 
was one of them. Zhang’s job was making syrup, which was mixing Coca-Cola 
concentration and water together. The job was as easy as any other job in state-owned 
companies. Zhang went to the plant at 8 o’clock every morning and had lunch at around 
11a.m. In the afternoon, work started at 1:30 p.m. and finished around 5 p.m. Since the 
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output was not large, about 300,000 to 400,000 cases in the first several years, Zhang’s 
job was not very busy, especially in off-seasons. The best thing of the job for Zhang was 
its high salary, which was about 10 yuan more than the salary in ordinary state-owned 
companies. Zhang said the COFCO was regarded as a good company in China at that 
time. My monthly income was 33 yuan, which was really high compared to workers’ 
average income in Beijing. In state-owned companies, newly-hired employees usually 
worked as apprentices whose income was only 16 yuan a month, while we earned 33 
yuan at the beginning. What’s more, Zhang was lucky enough to become the first few 
Chinese who drank Coca-Cola in the 1980s. Zhang never saw and drank Coca-Cola until 
he worked for the Beijing bottling plant. The first bottle of Coca-Cola he drank was from 
Hong Kong. The trademark on the bottle was still English. When recalling his first 
drinking experience, Zhang said it tasted like carbonated medicine. It was fizzy, much 
stronger than Bei Bing Yang (Arctic) soda, the best soda in Beijing, and my nose could 
barely stand it.  
 
Figure 7.4: Zhang Shoujun and Coca-Cola Beijing plant (Wu Li Dian 五里店) in the 
beginning of the 1980s 
Source: Photo clipped from the interview video conducted by Netease 
http://money.163.com/09/0828/14/5HQFDNT300253JPE.html, accessed by 8-25-2012. 
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Although Coke tasted strange to most Chinese, it soon became popular on 
Chinese market. Its popularity was first stimulated by its scarcity, but more importantly 
by advertisements shown after the Asia-Pacific football games on CCTV, which was the 
first Coca-Cola advertisement in mainland China. The advertisement themed on “the 
irresistible feeling” accurately captured the personal-tie-oriented Chinese culture, which 
Coke nicely fit in. It started with a Coca-Cola bus swiftly passing the Tiananmen Square 
in a hot summer when temperature reached 40°C (104°F) and a huge bicycle army was 
marching and sweating across the town. The lens soon switched to a cup of Coca-Cola, 
full of bubbles, making people suddenly feel cool. Faces tortured by the scorching Sun 
gave way to three women, who were drinking Coca-Cola, chatting and laughing while 
perming their hair. The next shot captured the wedding moment when families and 
friends were gathering together. All of them were smiling with Coca-Cola in their hands. 
The advertisement ended with a traditional Chinese New Year dinner, which was the 
most important event in China. All family members were sitting around the table, 
greeting and toasting for a prosperous new year. The lyrics of the advertisement song, 
“drinking Coca-Cola is so happy and so cool when sharing the wonderful time with 
family and friends. The feeling is irresistible in the moment of reunion” particularly set 
Coca-Cola quite well into the Chinese culture, in which people value family and 
friends.548  
After the advertisement shown on CCTV, ordinary Chinese people started to 
know Coca-Cola, though their concepts about the drink remained vague. Since Coca-





Cola could only be sold in tourist restaurants and friendship stores and the price was very 
high, it soon became a fashion and the most decent gift in the society, which in many 
cases was even more useful than money. For example, if bringing several bottles of Coca-
Cola as a gift to ask somebody for help, everything will be easier. Zhang Shoujun said 
once one of his nephews in Beijing was very sick in hospital and needed a surgery right 
away. Many doctors refused to operate for him because surgeries for bursitis, which he 
got, were very risky and a surgery failure would ruin the doctor’s reputation. When 
Zhang’s sister came to ask for help, Zhang gave the doctor two cases of Coca-Cola, and 
then the surgery was accepted. Generally, Zhang said if you gave the doctor two cases of 
Coca-Cola, any big surgery could be done. Another interesting example was the 
experience of Zhang himself. Once he went to see a dentist, whose patients were waiting 
in a very long line. When the nurse at the front desk where he was registering knew that 
he was working at the Coca-Cola Company, she was so surprised and let him to see the 
dentist right away. Later, as a thank-you gift, Zhang gave a bottle of Coca-Cola to the 
nurse. Since then on, whenever Zhang went to see doctors in that hospital, he did not 
need to wait in lines.  
Coca-Cola’s power in the 1980s was more than solving problems, but extended to 
almost every corner of social life such as dating. If roses and chocolate are the catalyst of 
romance today, Coca-Cola was Cupid’s arrow for young Chinese people in the 1980s. It 
was said that if a young man dated a girl and treated her with Coca-Cola, the success rate 
of their relationship would be 100%. An essay published in People’s Liberation Army 
Literature and Art in1982 vividly illustrates the social meaning of Coca-Cola, though the 
purpose of the article is promoting moral justice. It tells a story that a modern young 
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woman named Zhang Caifeng, who was a daughter of a senior government official and 
worshiped everything foreign, tried to stow away to Hong Kong by hiding in the frontier 
guard’s truck. To win the trust of the truck driver, Wang Ruimin, a soldier of the People 
Liberation Army (PLA), Zhang dated and flirted with him by giving him Coca-Cola. She 
told him Coca-Cola was the most popular drink in the world. Wang soon fell in love with 
Zhang and agreed to give her a ride, but when he shared the Coca-Cola with his best 
friend in the army, Zhang Caifeng’s trick was seen through. Warned by his friend, Wang 
realized that he was cheated and used. Next day when Wang gave a ride to Zhang, he 
directly sent her to the police office.549 Although this story was not about an ordinary 
romance, it still verified how important the role which Coca-Cola played in romance, 
even a PLA soldier, who was regarded as the best and the noblest people in China, could 
not resist. In fact, the story, to some extent, reflected what exactly the first advertisement 
in mainland China described—“the irresistible feeling.” In addition, the fact that Wang 
shared Zhang Caifeng’s Coca-Cola with his best friend in the army also resonated with 
the theme of the advertisement, which is, drinking Coca-Cola meant sharing happiness, 
and reuniting with family and friends.  
As Coca-Cola was assigned particular social meanings in the 1980s, it gradually 
became a necessity in many big events such as weddings and festivals. Zhang Shoujun’s 
wedding was in 1986. Since he was an employee in the Beijing Coca-Cola bottling plant, 
Coca-Cola shouldn’t be absent from his wedding banquet. However, what surprised 
Zhang was he could not see Coke in the pictures taken on that day. Zhang later recalled 
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“there must be some Coca-Cola on my wedding banquet, which I was one hundred 
percent sure. At least I had bought one case, because it was not difficult for me. Maybe 
because the canned Coca-Cola was just put onto market, all empty Coke cans were 
collected by children. Or maybe somebody saved them and brought home, because 
everyone knew Coca-Cola was rare and expensive, five to ten yuan a can.” Zhang said in 
1986, the sale of Coca-Cola increased a lot, but the whole output and people’s living 
standard were still low.  
To buy a bottle of Coca-Cola in the 1980s was not as easy as today. Zhang 
Shoujun, who worked for the Coca-Cola bottling company, thus became a capable person 
in many people’s eyes, especially when people needed Coca-Cola as a gift to solve 
difficult problems that money could not solve. As a Coca-Cola employee, Zhang could 
easily get Coca-Cola without waiting in lines. Every festival and holiday, the bottling 
plant gave out Coca-Cola drinks to employees as company benefit. The amount increased 
from a half case for each worker at the beginning to one case, and later it reached two to 
three cases every time. However, Zhang said as soon as the Coca-Cola drinks arrived 
home, they were immediately gone, because all his relatives and friends assumed Zhang 
drank Coca-Cola every day. As a result, every year Zhang kept four to five bottles for 
emergency use, while his family did not have drinks at all. Zhang said as the sale and 
production of Coca-Cola was strictly controlled, Coca-Cola’s supply and demand in the 
1980s was extremely unbalanced. The market demand was huge, while the supply was 
very small, and this tendency grew sharper and sharper as time went by. If any company 
or institution wanted to buy Coca-Cola from the plant, they had to go through some 
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inside networks; otherwise they could not get any Coca-Cola even if they stayed in the 
line for two days, because trucks lined up in front of the plant every day.  
When a thing is scarce, it becomes precious, and anybody who owns it gains 
certain type of superiority in the society. For example, the second son of Zhou Yueming, 
who lived in the west side of Beijing, was a diplomat, who could use foreign exchange 
certificates to buy Coca-Cola and foreign candies. When he treated his guests with the 
new and rare drinks at home, every guest was jealous of him.550 The superiority was more 
apparent in the case of Zhang Shoujun. In addition that he could jump the queue for 
treatment in hospital, nurses and doctors were more willing to talk to him when they 
knew that he was working for Coca-Cola. Meanwhile, Zhang Shoujun also felt very 
proud of himself, because in a time when the national living standard was low and 
nobody could afford to drink Coca-Cola every day, he suddenly became the privileged 
class who had the priority to access and drink. In fact in the 1980s, even the local brand 
such as “Bei Bing Yang Soda” in Beijing, was too expensive for ordinary people, let 
alone Coca-Cola. When talking about his privilege, Zhang’s eyes were full of joy. “We 
did not want to go home after work because the Coca-Cola plant was nicer and more 
comfortable than hotels. All workers in our plant were young people who had common 
interest and topics and we never got bored. In the 1980s, we were the few people who 
could drink Coca-Cola. Imagine what you felt when you were eating pancakes while 
drinking Coca-Cola every morning?—cool!” During the interview, Zhang showed a worn 
Coca-Cola T-shirt, which was the first advertising T-shirt since China’s reform and 
                                                 
 
 
550 The Economic Observer, ed., Open China, Thirty Years Memory of Reformation, 24-32.  
 305 
opening up, and which was still carefully kept by Zhang. Pointing to the slogan—Enjoy 
Coca-Cola—on the T-shirt, Zhang Shoujun said “the shirt represents an era. We were so 
happy and proud when wearing this T-shirt and wore it almost everywhere we could. 
Whenever people saw us in this shirt, they were so jealous, especially when we were 
handling things in this shirt in Beijing, everything became easy.” Moreover, Zhang’s 
daughter felt proud, too, because both of her parents were working for Coca-Cola, and 
she could treat her friends with Coca-Cola when hanging out with them.  
 
Conclusion 
When China’s open-door policy launched in 1978 after decades of isolation, joint 
venture was the first and the only form that communist China used to attract foreign 
investment and high technologies to modernize the state. It in effect was an updated 
version of the old Chinese “comprador” system, under which a few selected Chinese 
were assigned to deal with foreign companies and kept them at some distance from the 
rest of Chinese society. Jim Mann in his book Beijing Jeep has thoroughly discussed the 
tortuous negotiations between Chinese officials at the top and American Motors (AMC), 
depicting the difficult birth and development of Beijing Jeep, a joint-venture formed 
between AMC and the state-owned Beijing Automotive Works (BAW). The process was 
typically characterized by a Chinese proverb “same bed, different dreams,” which means 
that the western corporations starting up in China were dreaming about a market of one 
 306 
billion people, whereas China wanted to obtain science and technology to modernize and 
catch up with the West and Japan.551  
This study looks beyond the business negotiations between China and the West. 
In addition to delineating the tortuous process of cooperation between the selected 
Chinese officials and the Coca-Cola Company and how the government discreetly kept 
Coca-Cola away from the masses, it reveals the limitation of the government authority 
and the inconsistent perceptions between the state and the grassroots. If Jim Mann’s work 
shows the Chinese state and foreign companies stayed in the same bed with different 
dreams, this study, on the other hand, shows the state and the public stayed in the same 
bed with different dreams. In other words, there was a disparity between envisions of the 
state and practices of the public. In the case of Coca-Cola business after 1979, the 
Chinese Government was highly politically sensitive and economically oriented, hoping 
to modernize China by importing science and technology from foreign companies while 
preventing capitalism from corrupting the society, whereas the Chinese public followed a 
different philosophy. Rather than seeing Coca-Cola as a symbol of capitalism, the 
Chinese public was very pragmatic, accepting Coca-Cola joyfully and endowing Coca-
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CONCLUSION 
 Soft drinks were one of China’s fast-growing modern commodities in the 
twentieth century. In the early time, soft drinks, based on Chinese medical traditions, 
were seen as exotic beverages which were neither healthy nor palatable. However, along 
with major political, economic, and social changes in modern China, they have been 
gradually accepted by the Chinese as a type of trendy drink and a symbol of social 
identity. Soft drinks witnessed and experienced China’s century-long changes. Although 
their bottles were small and static, they engraved with stigmas of times and epitomized 
modern China at large, reflecting the history and the changes and carrying memories of 
the society, the country, and the nation. During the encounter and interactions with 
different social forces over the century, the meaning of the bottle was constantly 
constructed, interpreted, and revised.   
From an exotic and strange beverage to a popular drink, the popularity of soft 
drinks in modern China, as what Karl Marx argued, was due to fetishization of 
commodities.552 Timothy Burke borrowed from Marx and suggested that “fetishism is 
more than (but includes) the meanings invested in goods; it is also the accumulated power 
of commodities to actually constitute, organize, and relate to people, institutions, and 
discourses, to contain within themselves the forms of consciousness through which 
capitalism manufactures its subjects.”553 Yet, Burke raised a thought-provoking question: 
what are the mechanisms that make fetishism, because not all commodities are equally 
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fetishized or equally powerful or constitutive in their social meanings.554 In his research, 
Burke showed that the development of commodification of cosmetic products in East 
Africa largely attributed to the spread of advertising, which highly corresponded to the 
social history of hygiene in modern Africa.  
Burke’s question and approach was inspirational and meaningful in studying the 
fetishization of soft drinks in modern China, since both Africa and China encountered the 
same question: how did people in the colonial or semi-colonial context come to desire 
products they never needed before? Burke paid particular attention to the role of 
advertisement and consumers and showed how the production of these needs “grew out 
of a massively complex intersection of micro-powers and macro-powers, local desires 
and collective interests, imagination and restriction.”555 In contrast, this dissertation, with 
a particular attention to the political economy in modern China, attempts to reveal that 
commodification of soft drinks was more than advertisement, emulation, and education; 
it was also a process of localization and hybridization. Soft drinks in modern China 
developed alongside of China’s search for rejuvenation and modernity. By showing how 
soft drinks transformed from a strange and undesirable product to a modern and popular 
one through education, advertising, and emulation, this dissertation argues that modernity 
in modern China has become an ideology in consumption. But the modernity in the 
dissertation was not simply the one transplanted from the western world. Instead, 
modernity in modern China somehow deviated and turned into a variation what might be 
called “hybrid modernity” or “domesticated modernity.” Entangling with nationalism, 
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pragmatism, and social identity, modernity was constantly shaped and recreated by the 
nation-state, businesses, and consumers in modern China.  
 
Science and Modernity on Their Own Terms  
Diet was closely linked to health and longevity in traditional China. It was 
especially true to members of the educated upper classes, as what Joanna Waley-Cohen 
has indicated that in the Confucian society, “regulating one’s food intake to prevent or 
cure corruption of the body was a moral duty, therefore, not just something to be done for 
the sake of pleasure.”556 To keep health, food preparation and consumption in traditional 
China largely depended on knowledge from traditional Chinese medicine, which in 
modern times became one of the biggest obstacles in developing soft drink market in 
China. TCM, as all of the Chinese sciences, was derided by modern scholars as 
superstitious forms of knowledge, but Benjamin A. Elman revealed that “premodern 
science in China denoted a rational and abstract understanding of the natural world, 
whereas the rise of modern science in the 18th and 19th century melded the exact science 
with machine-driven technologies that surpassed the rich artisanal traditions of that early 
modern world.”557 Therefore, TCM as a form of Chinese science in premodern China was 
equally important as western science in the modern world history. For thousands of years, 
TCM guided Chinese people, the upper class in particular, to eat appropriately. Chinese 
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elites had a long tradition of consciously or unconsciously following Chinese science in 
daily diet.     
When soft drinks were introduced to China, besides foreigners, the Chinese upper 
class were the potential consumers, because of the high prices. Putting aside the issue of 
taste, the first challenge for soft drinks was how they fitted into Chinese eating habits, a 
scientific system founded upon TCM. Luckily, under the rhetoric of modernization, TCM 
was under fierce attack by modern scholars who consisted of a significant part of 
population of the upper class in the early twentieth century. Decline of TCM provided 
soft drinks an unprecedented opportunity in China. As TCM was significantly 
undermined, TCM as a philosophy for food consumption also gave its place to modern 
science. In food consumption, especially for Chinese elites, their acceptance for soft 
drinks indicated the transition of their epistemology of science: from Chinese science to 
modern western science. When many of the Chinese elites enthusiastically advocated 
modern science in the society, soft drinks, a commodity that was frequently advertised 
and presented as modern and scientific, naturally integrated into their way of life.  
For ordinary Chinese people, although they knew TCM from experience and 
education and believed it, they did not always eat accordingly. They “pragmatically and 
nondogmatically applying this kind of information where it seemed reasonable, heeding it 
more fully when he was ill, enjoying its symbolic implications even as he ignored its 
instructions, and savoring it as an additional dimension of the all-absorbing subject of 
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food and eating.”558 However, Frank Dikötter argued that the life-style of the elites was 
always the object of imitation in China’s two-tier economy.559 When Chinese elites 
welcomed modern science and technology and associated soft drinks with their social 
identity, ordinary people enjoyed drinking soft drinks as if they were as educated and 
modern as the elites.  
Paul Cohen reminded us that the Chinese society “was not as an inert body acted 
upon by an all transforming West, but as a changing thing in itself, with its own capacity 
for movement and powerful inner sense of direction.”560 When could not afford 
expensive soft drinks, ordinary Chinese people turned into cheap imitations. Street 
peddlers sold shoddy soft drinks bottled in recycled brand-name bottles in tea booths and 
teahouses. Some peddlers creatively stored soft drinks with iron buckets, which was in 
fact not much different from their traditional herbal tea and plum juice business. As what 
chapter 4 has showed, the street cries on soft drinks were so familiar to Chinese urbanites 
that it became very hard to tell what was Chinese and what was western. Taking into 
account that “neither tradition nor modernity could be reduced to a simple integrated 
system,”561 Chinese people further blurred the boundary and produced a sort of “hybrid 
modernity.” Perhaps one will argue that the hybridity reflected the resilience of Chinese 
culture, because the grassroots consumer culture after all had nothing to do with modern 
science and it even caused serious sanitary problems. But Benjamin I. Schwartz pointed 
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out that “some tradition, far from impeding certain aspects of modernization, may have 
actually facilitated them.”562The emergence of hybrid consumer culture at the grassroots 
level, in fact, was a reflection of a widespread change of people’s values: the desire for 
science and modernity, to some degree, transcended basic daily needs and became an 
ideology of consumption.  
 
The Politics of Soft Drinks  
Recent scholarship has acknowledged that Chinese modernity was plural, and 
“modernity was a dynamic process that welcomed the participation of various sectors of 
Chinese society.” 563  The “hybrid modernity” that I am discussing here, therefore, was 
one form of modernity that “in a Chinese-centered action characterized by Chinese 
appropriation of their own and foreign culture.”564 It was also produced by multiple social 
and political groups, who constructed science and modernity on their own terms. When 
studying the change of consumer culture, one could not neglect the role played by the 
state and business. In modern China, in which China’s political regime underwent 
dramatic changes from monarchy to republic and finally to communism, the role of the 
state in shaping modernity became particularly apparent and important. The state 
deliberately channeled modern production and consumption with certain political agenda 
in the names of modernization, nationalism, and communism. As a result, soft drinks 
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were politicized in particular ways that were responsive to particular historical times and 
Chinese modernity at large was politicalized as well.  
Under the slogan of “rejuvenate the nation by industrialization,” the Chinese state 
in the early twentieth century vigorously supported and promoted modern industries. As a 
result, soft drink companies started to mushroom across the country. In the Second World 
War when the United States became the main ally of the Republic of China, Coca-Cola as 
an important American military supply was warmly welcomed by the Chinese who 
regarded Coca-Cola as a symbol of Westernization. When the United States proposed the 
“Surplus Property Bulk Sale Agreement” in the name of friendship after the war, the 
Nationalist government gladly accepted the agreement, seeing Coca-Cola as an emblem 
of strengthening cooperation with the ally, though they knew the deluge of American 
products would put national industries in jeopardy. However, in the eyes of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), Coca-Cola had a different meaning. It was viewed as 
“imperialism in the bottle” and was eventually driven out of China after the CCP took 
power in 1949. The political war on bottles continued in the Cold War era. With limited 
resources, the communist state promoted a self-developed soft drink called salty soda as a 
sort of social welfare for the working people in summer, which also symbolized a 
Chinese socialist form of modernization. Meanwhile, Coca-Cola’s capitalist label was not 
removed until China’s reform era starting from 1978. In post-Mao China, Coca-Cola 
once again became a political symbol: this time it signaled the dawn of China’s economic 
reform and opening up to the world.  
 The fact that the state intervened business and politicized soft drinks leads to the 
question of the relationship between the state and the society in modern China: how did 
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businessmen and consumers respond to the state interventions? In the state and the 
society relationship, business people organized themselves as a type of civil society, 
which, depending on the situation of a given time, collaborated, negotiated, or confronted 
with the state. Aside from the state’s support on modern industries in the twentieth 
century, Coca-Cola’s success in China was largely due to the great effort made by 
Chinese businessmen. In respond to the government’s call for industrialization and 
modernization, Chinese businessmen opened modern factories, imported modern 
machinery, and adopted modern marketing strategies. More importantly, they creatively 
integrated Chinese cultural elements into modern business, which not only effectively 
promoted their products but also positively responded to the state-sponsored National 
Products Movements. 
 The visible hand of the state exerted a profound influence on the development of 
soft drink market in modern China, but the impact was not always from top to bottom and 
the process was not always smooth. While politics was the central concern of the state, 
profits and business interest were the focus of pragmatic businessmen. When politics and 
business profits reinforced each other, the state and the businesses collaboratively 
boosted the modern soft drink industry and promoted National Products Movements. 
When the Nationalist Government imported a large volume of American military surplus 
in a name of national interest, “nationalism” became the reason for protest for Chinese 
businessmen. Although the state argued that Coca-Cola symbolized Sino-US friendship, 
Coca-Cola in the eyes of Chinese businessmen was the biggest rival to Chinse soft drink 
business, as what happened in the Shanghai Coca-Cola protest in 1947, “nationalism” 
was used as a tool for business competition.  
 315 
Soft Drinks in Contemporary China 
 The state, businesses, and consumers continued to play an active role in shaping 
consumption in contemporary China. After China’s reform of 1978, Coca-Cola as a 
foreign luxury and a modern commodity was reintroduced to mainland China. As what 
happened in the early twentieth century, Coca-Cola imitations under the banner of 
nationalism and modernity once again mushroomed on the market. Since the middle of 
the 1980s, there were Huang Shan Cola 黄山可乐, Jin Jin Cola 津津可乐, Wei Le Cola
唯乐可乐, Shao Lin Cola 河南少林可乐, Xing Fu Cola 上海幸福可乐, and so forth. 
Ginseng Cola (人参可乐) produced by Shanghai Food and Drink Company, for example, 
was said to contain ginseng that relieves fatigue, refreshes the mind, and facilitates 
metabolism.565 Tian Fu Cola 天府可乐 collaboratively developed by Chongqing 
Beverage Company and the Institute of Chinese Medicine of Sichuan Province was the 
most successful national cola brand. It was a product of the combination of modern 
Chinese medicine and modern industrial production technology. In 1985, it replaced 
Coca-Cola to become the beverage served at state banquets.566 As advertisement of soft 
drinks in the early twentieth century, advertisement on Tian Fu Cola in the 1980s was 
replete with scientific terms. It was said that Tian Fu Cola contains natural herbs. 
Scientific experiments showed that these herbs could increase blood flow in coronary 
artery and myocardium, improve myocardial microcirculation, and detoxify aflatoxin B1 
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and Carbon tetrachloride (toxins that cause liver cancer).567 Although there were 
numerous popular national cola brands as well as other soft drinks on the Chinese market, 
none of them were able to compete with Coca-Cola. By the middle of the 1990s, almost 
all Chinese soft drink brands were defeated by Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola, which once 
again placed national soft drink industry in jeopardy.    
 In twenty-first-century China, political ideology has been receded in economic 
consumption, but new challenges have come along. The age of totally adoring Coca-Cola 
has gone and Chinese consumers are now more levelheaded about this imported 
commodity. One major concern is the relation between obesity rate and soft drink—in 
particular, Coca-Cola—consumption in the country. While Coca-Cola sale achieved 
double-digit growth in China in nine consecutive years in the 1990s, China’s obesity rate 
also increased every year during the same period.568 In 1996, 12.6% of the Shanghai 
population was over-weighted. What was worse is most of them were children between 
nine and twelve years old.569 A survey of 1998 shows that 20% of young people in 
Shanghai were over weighted and the youth’s obesity rate was 11.3%.570 In 2012 the 
number of obese youth under the age of 18 across the county reached to 1.2 billion, and 
12% of Chinese children were over weighted. Among them, 1.9%, that is 1.7 million 
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children, had diabetes; 14.9%, that is 27 million had early-stage diabetes symptoms such 
as increasing of blood glucose and blood pressure.571   
Research shows lack of exercise and taking too much high-calorie soft drinks and 
snakes were the two major causes for youth obesity.572 The so-called little 
emperor/empress syndrome in China derived from the government’s one-child policy 
further disrupted consumers’ rationality on food consumption. The only child in the 
family gains excessive amounts of attention from parents and grandparents who try every 
effort to meet all demands of the child.573 Western fast food such as McDonald, KFC, and 
Coca-Cola capitalized on the phenomenon, treating children as independent decision 
makers and targeting them as the major consumer group.574 Without parents’ control, 
many children refuse to drink water but only soft drinks.  
As obesity is becoming a social problem and a global problem, western scientists 
warn people to control calories especially sugar intake in everyday diets. Chinese experts 
suggest the public to maintain a healthy lifestyle and drink less soft drink, because these 
drinks contain too much sugar, its carbonic acid will cause osteoporosis and tooth decay, 
and pigment and caffeine are not good for health. Under this condition, traditional 
Chinese drinks such as sour plum juice and tea present their advantages. They are not 
only considered as healthy beverages because of containing less sugar, as a cultural 
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identity they also arouse nostalgia among the Chinese public in the globalizing context. 
The changing attitude toward soft drinks and tea provide extraordinary opportunities to 
Chinese businessmen to explore market for traditional Chinese drinks.  
In the battle against soft drinks, one of the most successful brands of Chinese 
drinks is Wang Lao Ji 王老吉, an herbal tea brand that has over 170 years of history in 
Guangdong. Relying on the idea of “getting fire evil,” a concept in traditional Chinese 
medicine, which revives and becomes increasingly popular in the twenty-first-century 
China, Wang Lao Ji went out of Guangdong in 2003 and soon became a well-known new 
star on the Chinese soft drink market. Its success was significantly boosted by SARS 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) broke out in 2002. The epidemic first appeared in 
Guangdong and soon spread out across all over China. When searching for treatment, 
Zhong Nanshan, a doctor and an academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 
Guangdong, who later became famous during the epidemic battle, said “Cantonese’s 
favorite drink—herbal tea—could effectively prevent SARS.”575 Seizing this opportunity, 
Wang Lao Ji, launched extensive advertising campaigns in the language of tradition, 
health, culture, and nationalism.  
Backed up by rich Chinese medicine texts as well as health preserving theory of 
Taoism, Wang Lao Ji rapidly expanded its market. Its sales increased from 180 million 
RMB in 2002 to 3 billion RMB in 2003. By 2011, Wang Lao Ji has exceeded sales of 
Coca-Cola and Pepsi in China, becoming the most successful soft drink company. It 
claimed that the company is aiming to build Wang Lao Ji into a Chinese Coca-Cola, 
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introducing Chinese herbal tea to the world. The Company said both Coca-Cola and 
Wang Lao Ji were initially invented as a medicine and both of them were bottled in red. 
While Coca-Cola representing American culture, Wang Lao Ji is also not simply a drink, 
but a symbol of Chinese culture, Chinese dream and honor. 576 Along with China’s 
increasing integration into the global world, Wang Lao Ji carrying a “Chinese dream,” 
which is also a political slogan proposed by China’s new president, Xi Jinping, expands 
its market overseas.  By 2013, Wang Lao Ji has registered in 58 countries around the 
world and exported their products to 19 countries.577  
Epochal changes in early twentieth-first-century China engraved soft drinks with 
new symbolic meanings. While the state and businesses continued to shape the consumer 
culture, Chinese masses now have more money in their pockets and have a wider choice 
than ever before in the new century. Today, choosing Coca-Cola or Wang Lao Ji during 
the meal or in the party totally depends on individuals’ preference. It is also no longer a 
big deal to treat girl friends or friends with Coca-Cola or Wang Lao Ji. However, soft 
drinks continue to witness and adapt themselves to the changes in the society: a rising of 
Chinese consumer power. The power is so overwhelming that Karl Gerth commented that 
“Chinese consumers, with help from their counterparts in other industrialized countries, 
are already shaping the future we will all share… China can save the world by doing its 
                                                 
 
 
576 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Lao Ji: a Chinese 
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part to consume goods and resources faster.”578 Although the influence of consumer 
power today is larger and more apparent than it was in the past, there is room for further 
examining how Chinese consumers helped to shape consumption. Questions like how 
gender and consumers’ age played a role in the history of soft drinks, how soft drink 
consumption in inland cities were different from treaty-port cities, and what soft drink 
consumption or consumption in general in rural China looked like are still worth for 













                                                 
 
 




Liang, Nianrong, “the secret of the Zhengfuji’s suanmeitang,” The Shanghai Archive, 
Q275-1-1947.  
The Qingdao Archive, B0038-001-01494. 
The Qingdao Archive, B0038-001-01495:0105.  
The Qingdao Archive, B0038-001-01496:0025.  
The Qingdao Archive, B0049-001-00612:0022.  
The Qingdao Archive, B0049-0010618.   
The Qingdao Archive, D000021/00021. 
The Qingdao Archive, D000029/00034.  
The Qingdao Archive, D000068/00057. 
The Qingdao Archive, D000253/00033. 
The Qingdao Archive, D000311/00011. 
The Qingdao Archive, D000311/00054. 
The Qingdao Archive, D000311/00084. 
The Qingdao Archive, D000311/00114. 
The Qingdao Archive, D000443/00005.  
The Qingdao Archive, D00149/00014.  
The Shanghai Archive, A66-1-92.  
The Shanghai Archive, B112-5-39-147. 
The Shanghai Archive, B134-6-290-7. 
The Shanghai Archive, B134-6-440-15.  
The Shanghai Archive, B163-1-135-58. 
The Shanghai Archive, B163-1-230. 
 322 
The Shanghai Archive, B163-1-234.  
The Shanghai Archive, B186-1-28.  
The Shanghai Archive, B5-2-120-82. 
The Shanghai Archive, Q275-1-1947. 
The Shanghai Archive, Q275-2-1947. 
The Shanghai Archive, Q90-2-133. 
The Shanghai Archive, Q90-2-537. 
The Shanghai Archive, Q90-2-619 . 
The Shanghai Archive, S117-3-1. 
The Shanghai Archive, S356-1-9.  
The Shanghai Archive, U1-12-316. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-1556. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-1556:0382. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-1556:0384. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-1556:386. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:0759. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:730. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:765. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:781. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:792. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:807. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:855.  
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:862. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:866. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2031:879. 
 323 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2033. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2033:1115. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-2033:1148. 
The Shanghai Archive, U1-16-316. 
The Tianjin Archive, J0084-1-000910-007. 
The Tianjin Archive, W0026-1-000127. 
The Tianjin Archive, W0026-1-000129. 
The Tianjin Archive, W0026-1-000132.  
The Tianjin Archive, W0026-1-000189. 
The Tianjin Archive, W0026-1-000334. 
The Tianjin Archive, W0026-1-000474.  
The Tianjin Archive, W0026-1-000573. 
The Tianjin Archive, X0283-C-000790-002. 




Chun Feng (Spring Breeze). Ningbo: 1947, 2(3), the Shanghai Library, microfilm J-
3835:0081. 
Dian sheng. 1937, 1938. The Shanghai Library, microfilm J-0378/02:0538. 
Guo huo ping lun kan (national products review). 1927. The Shanghai Library, 
microfilm, J-5155:0320.  
Jian kang sheng huo (healthy life). 1(2), 1934. The Shanghai Library, microfilm, J-
5282/01-0042. 
Jing hua. 1946 (2). The Shanghai Library, microfilm J-1465:0145. 
Qing fang xun kan (textile quarterly). 1948. The Shanghai Library, microfilm, J-
3332:0330. 
 324 
Shangye yuebao (business monthly). 1939, 1947. The Shanghai Library, microfilm, J-
4747/15 and J-477/17. 
Shehui jingji yuebao (society and economy monthly). 1936. The Shanghai Library, 
microfilm, J-3199/01:1679. 
Shen, Zhongmou. “Shanghai shi qingliang yinliao diaocha” (Inspections on Shanghai soft 
drink market). She hui yi yao (Social medicine). 1937, 4(9), -812, microfilm in the 
Shanghai Library, J-3211:1505. 
Shi zheng gongbao fu kan, ge qu yewu huibao (Municipal Bulletin), Shanghai, 1927. The 
Shanghai Library, microfilm, J-0234:0063. 
Yü, D.T. “Yin bingqilin yu qishui you lie bi jiao” (a comparison between ice-cream and 





Beijing morning news. February 9, 2012. Accessed October 11, 2015. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/food/2012-02/09/c_122676548.htm.  
Business online. July 8, 2009. Accessed October 12, 2015. 
http://www.shangjie.biz/html/2009-07-08/142808.shtml.  
Chinese center for disease control and prevention. Accessed October 11, 2015. 
http://www.chinacdc.cn/mtbd_8067/201503/t20150311_112117.htm.  
“Coca-Cola at Home.” Accessed May 6, 2011. 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~class/coke/coke1.html.  
“Code of Safety and Health in Factories.” May 25, 1956, Accessed December 8, 2011. 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Newlaw2002/Slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=117.  
Dollardaze. “Hyperinflation in China 1937-1949.” March 6, 2007. Accessed November 
13, 2012. 
http://www.financialsensearchive.com/fsu/editorials/dollardaze/2007/0306.html.  
 “Have you ever drunk yanqishui?” Accessed December 11, 2011. 
http://bbs.qianlong.com/thread-1724917-1-1.html.  
Interviews with a Coca-Cola employee conducted by Netease. Accessed August 25, 
2012. http://money.163.com/09/0828/14/5HQFDNT300253JPE.html. 
“meng hui 1927: ershi shiji chu nian kekoukele zai zhongguo”梦回 1927： 二十世纪初
年可口可乐在中国. Accessed December 3, 2012. 
http://www.ccctrip.net/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=65183&extra=page%3D1.  
 325 
“Nostalgia, yanqihsui.” Accessed December 11, 2011. 
http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0805/07/600524_43759847.shtml.  
Picture China 照片中国. Accessed January 12, 2013. 
http://www.picturechina.com.cn/bbs/thread-142229-5-1.html. 
Schoenbart, Bill and Ellen Shefi. “Traditional Chinese Medicine Causes of Illness.” 
Accessed March 22, 2013. http://health.howstuffworks.com/wellness/natural-
medicine/chinese/traditional-chinese-medicine-causes-of-illness5.htm.  
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. “Wang Lao Ji: a 
Chinese symbol of honor and dream.” Accessed October 12, 2015. 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/32621/32629/Document/1442472/1442472.htm.  
Wang, Hexi. “Saccharin and the unfairness in the sixties.” Accessed October 20, 2012. 
http://hi.baidu.com/wanghexi58/item/ad357e18766ffa7e7b5f25ec.  
“zhongguo qinshaonian feipang zhuangkuang kan you, yiliao he jingji fudan jiazhong” 中
国青少年肥胖状况堪忧 医疗和经济负担加重. Accessed August 4, 2014. 
http://edu.china.com.cn/2012-08/31/content_26386081.htm.  
 
Other References:  
Adas, Michael. Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of 
Western Dominance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. 
Afen. “Wei wang de yin xiang”(Memory cannot be forgotten). Xingmin Evening News, 
October 11, 1957. 
Allman, N. F. “Translation of ‘Coca-Cola’ Trade-Mark to Chinese Characters.” Coca-
Cola Overseas, published by Coca-Cola Export Corporation, June 1957. 
Amelung, Iwo. “Historiography of Science and Technology in China.” in Tsu, Jing and 
Elman, Benjamin A ed. Science and technology in Modern China, 1880s-1940s. Brill 
Academic Pub; Lam edition, 2014.  
Anderson, E. N. The Food of China. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1988. 
Appadurai, Arjun ed. The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Baker, Russel. “The Cola War.” New York Times, December 23, 1978.  
 326 
Bao, Siwen and Zhang, Debao. “Han shi yi shan song qing liang” (Work hard for the 
coolness of workers: story of soft drink workshop in Shanghai number 5 steel plant). Wen 
Hui Bao, Shanghai: August 4, 1983. 
Beijing local history editorial board ed. Beijing zhi: Business—yinshi fuwu (history of 
Beijing: Business—history of food and service industry). Beijing: Beijing Press, 2008. 
Burke, Timothy. Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and 
Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.  
Cai zheng ri kan (financial daily). 1935. 
Cai zheng yue kan (financial montyly). 1921, 1928.  
Cao, Xueqin (Qing). Dream of the Red Chamber. Beijing Press, 2006.  
Caplan, Pat, ed. Food, Health and Identity. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Chang, K.C., ed. Food in Chinese Culture, Anthropological and Historical Perspectives. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977.  
Chen bao fu kan. 1926.  
Chen, Duxiu. “Xin qing nian zui Zhuang zhi da bian shu” (response to the critiques on 
the New Youth journal). The New Youth Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, January 1919. Zhongguo 
shudian, 2011. 
Chen, Ji (Yuan). “Ji Ge Zixi Yang Jimin,” collected in Qian Qianyi, ed. lie chao shi ji 
(poems in Chinese dynasties), vol. 14. Beijing: Zhonghua Press, 2007. 
Chen, Jing. “Kai pi yi hou zen yang” (What happened after opening). Xinmin Evening 
News, October 26, 1946. 
Chen, Yong. Chop Suey, USA: The Story of Chinese Food in America. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2014.  
China Newsweek. 2008. 
China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation. History of China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation. 
Published by China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation, 1999. 
Coble, Parks. The Shanghai Capitalists and Nationalist Government, 1927-1937, Second 
Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1986.  
---------------. Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 
1937-1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.  
Coca-Cola Overseas. Published by Coca-Cola Export Corporation, 1948-1957.  
 327 
Cochran, Sherman. Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast 
Asia. Harvard University Press, 2006.  
Cohen, Paul A. China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past. Routledge. 
2003. 
Da Gong Bao. Tianjin: 1911-1949.  
De Grazia, Victoria. Irresistible Empire, America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century 
Europe. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. 
Dikötter, Frank. Exotic Commodities, Modern objects and Everyday Life in China. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006.  
Dr. Saleeby (British). “Yinliao zhi yan jiu” (Studies on beverages). Funnv zazhi 
(women’s magazine), vol. 5, issue 4, 1919. 
Du, Fu (Tang). “Pei zhu gui gong zi zhangbagou xie ji na liang wan ji yu yu, qi yi” 
(caught in the rain in the evening when traveling in zhangbagou with friends and their 
concubines, part I) in Qian, Qianyi ed. Qian zhu du shi. Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 2009.  
Du li ping lun. 1934. 
Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern 
China. University of Chicago Press, 1997.  
Ebeling, Richard M. “The Great Chinese Inflation.” The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty, vol. 
54, No.  12 (December 2004): 2-4.  
Eichenwald, Kurt. “Soda, the life of the party.” New York Times, July 16, 1985. 
Elman, Benjamin A. A Cultural History of Modern Science in China. Harvard University 
Press, 2006. 
Eryi. “Coca-Cola.” Qiu Hai Tang (Begonias), 1946 (10). 
Fairbank, John King and Robert R. Bowie, ed. Communist China 1955-1959: Policy 
Documents with Analysis, vol. 1. Prepared at Harvard University under the joint auspices 
of the center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962. 
Fang zhou monthly, 1937.  
Feng. “Coca-Cola de mo zhang” (evil hands of Coca-Cola). Wen Hui Bao. Shanghai: 
November 8, 1950. 
Ferdinand P. W. von Richthofen. Baron Richthofen’s letter, 1870-1872. Shanghai: North-
China Herald Office, 1903.  
 328 
Foster, Robert J. Coca-Globalization, following soft drinks from New York to New 
Guinea. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.  
Freedman, Paul ed. Food: The History of Taste. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2007. 
Fu, Sinina. Suo wei guo yi (so-called national medicine). Da gong bao, August 5, 1934.  
------------- . Zai lun suo wei guo yi (“talk about the so-called national medicine again). 
Du li ping lun, August 26, 1934.  
 -------------. Fu Sinian quan ji. Hunan education press. 2003. 
Ge, Yuanxu (Qing). Hu you za ji (Travelogue in Shanghai). Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu 
ban she, 1989.  
Gerth, Karl. China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation. Cambridge 
and London: Published by the Harvard University Asia Center and Distributed by 
Harvard University Press, 2003.  
--------------. As China Goes, So Goes the World: How Chinese Consumers are 
Transforming Everything. Hill and Wang. New York. 2010. 
Goodwin, Ralph R.; Francis C. Prescott, and Velma Hastings Cassidy (ed.). Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1948, the Far East: China, vol. vii. United States 
Department of States. 
Gong shang fa gui (Trade and Industry Regulations). Shanghai: 1948. 
Gong ye yue kan (industrial Monthly). Shanghai: 1947-1949.  
Gu, Honglie. “yinliao yu shimin zhi jiangkang guanxi” (Relationship between beverage 
and civil health). Xin Sheng Lu Monthly, 1937 (1), 36-37. 
Guangzhou Municipal Administration Gazette. Guangzhou: 1928, 1930.  
Guo, huiqing. “Tianfu kele chu chuan zhen xiong ji” (天府可乐出川争雄记). Wen hui 
bao, January 19, 1986. 
Guo huo yue bao (national products monthly). Shanghai: 1934.  
Hairen. “Coca-Cola de mimi” (The secret of Coca-Cola). Libailiu (Saturday), Issue 88, 
1947. 
Han, Shangyi. “Yanqishui” (salty soda). Xinmin Evening News, July 28, 1989. 
Hao, Ze. “Tan leng shi shui” (Comments on the cold food tax). Xinmin Evening News, 
July 24, 1951. 
 329 
Hargrove, James L. “History of the Calorie in Nutrition.” The Journal of Nutrition, vol. 
136, no. 12 (December 2006): 2957-2961. 
Ho, Ping-Ti. “The Introduction of American Food Plants into China.” American 
Anthropologist, New Series, vol. 57, no. 2, part 1 (April, 1955): 191-201. 
Hou, Yan and Jiang, Jian-Guo. “Origin and Concept of Medicine food Homology and Its 
Application in Modern Functional Foods.” Food & Function, (December 2013): 1727-
1741. 
Hu, Jilin. “Meiguo bing tui chu zhi qian, da jia bu mai meiguo huo” (Don’t buy American 
products unless American troops were withdrawn). Xinmin Evening News, October 16, 
1946. 
Hu, Liang. “Hong Kong Herbal Tea: A Study of Intangible Cultural Heritage.” The Hong 
Kong Anthropologist, vol 1, 2007, pp. 91-104. 
Hu, Shiu-ying. Food Plants of China. Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 2005.  
Huangdi and Qibo. Huangdi Nei Jing, vol. 51 “Ling Shu.” Jilin University press, 2009.  
Huang, H. T. (Huang Hsing-Tsung), Science and Civilisation in China: Volume 6, 
Biology and Biological Technology, Part 5, Fermentations and Food Science. Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
Huang, Kailai. “American business and the China trade embargo in the 1950s.” Essays in 
Economic and Business History: the Journal of the Economic and Business Historical 
Society, vol. 19, 2001: pp. 33-48.  
Huang, Sha. Shanghai funv zhi (history of Shanghai women). Shanghai: Shanghai 
People's Publishing House, 2000.  
Huang, Xiexun. Song Nan Meng Ying Lu. Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing 
House, 1989. 
Huang, Yingdai. “Xiaji yinliao shichang de jianyue”(Investigation on the soft drink 
market in Shanghai). Shanghai sheng huo (Shanghai life), 1930(7). 
Ip. Hung-Yok, Tze-Ki Hon and Chiu-Chun Lee. “Review: The Plurality of Chinese 
Modernity: A Review of Recent Scholarship on the May Fourth Movement.” Modern 
China, vol. 29, no. 4 (Oct., 2003): 490-509. 
Ji, Baocheng. Qing dai shi wen ji hui bian (A collection of poems of the Qing). Shanghai: 
Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2010.  
Jia ting chang shi (general knowledge for a family), Shanghai: 1918. 
 330 
Jie. “Zhizao Coca-Cola de shanghaiguan qishui gongsi” (The Coca-Cola bottler—Crystal 
Mineral Water Company), gong ye yue kan (industrial Monthly), vol. 5, no.7, July 1, 
1948. 
Jin, Peng. “Jie chuan Coca-Cola Rendan de X” (Expose the X of Coca-Cola and Rendan). 
Xinmin Evening News, July 3, 1958. 
Ke xue hua bao (Science Illustrated). Shanghai: 1948.  
Ke, Lingzhen. “Coffee and Modern Shanghai.” master thesis, National Taiwan Normal 
University, 2011.  
Kirby, William C., Man-houng Lin, and James Chin Shih, ed. State and Economy in 
Republican China: A Handbook for Scholars, Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.  
Kleinfield, N.R. “Coca-Cola to Go on Sale in China: As U.S. and Peking Expand Ties.” 
The New York Times, December 20, 1978. 
Kopytoff, Igor. “The cultural biography of things: commoditization as process.” in Arjun 
Appadurai ed. The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Kroes, Rob. “American empire and cultural imperialism.” A view from the receiving end, 
23(3), 1999, pp. 463-477. 
Lao, Shiguang. “Xiaji zui shiyi zhi yinliao ji qi zhi fa”( make the ideal summer drinks). 
Xin sheng lu monthly, vol. 1 (1937): 31-32. 
Latham, Michael E. Modernization as Ideology, American Social Science and “Nation 
Building” in  the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000. 
Levenstein, Harvey. Paradox of Plenty: A Social History of Eating in Modern America. 
University of California Press, 2003.  
--------------. Revolution at the Table: The Transformation of the American Diet. 
University of California Press, 2003.  
Li, Jiaqi ed. Shanghai gong yun zhi (Chronicles of Shanghai labor movement 上海工运
志). Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House, 1997.  
Li, K.H. “Public health in Soochow.” Zhonghua yixue zazhi, 9, no. 2, (June, 1923): 122-
131.  
Li, Shizhen (Ming). Ben Cao Gang Mu (Compendium of Materia Medica). Chongqing 
University press, 1994.  
Li, Yuanbo. Nan Ting Bi Ji. Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House, 2000. 
 331 
Li, Zhisui. The Private Life of Chairman Mao. New York: Random House, Inc. 1994.  
Liang, Qichao. Yin bing shi zhuan ji. 1989. Vol. 2. Shanghai zhonghua shu ju, 1941.  
------------. Liang ren gong xueshu yanjiang ji. Vol. 1. Shangwu yin shu guan, 1926.  
------------. Ou you xin yin lu. Shangwu yin shu guan, 2014.  
------------. My medical case and Peking Union Medical College Hospital. Chen bao fu 
kan. June 2, 1926. 
Liang, Qixun. “Hospital notes.” Chen bao fu kan. May 29, 1926. 
Liang, Shiqiu. Ya She Tan Chi. Nanjing: Jiangsu Literature and Art Publishing House, 
2014. 
Liang you (The Young Companion). Shanghai, 1926-1945. 
Lili. “Er shi de shanghai zhi xia” (Summer in childhood). Xinmin Evening News, July 21, 
1988. 
Lin, Jiali ed. Chu Ci. Beijing: zhonghua shu ju, 2009.  
Liu, Changxi. “Liu Changxi’s Memoirs.” History of China Oil and Foodstuffs 
Corporation. China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation, 1999. 
Long, Changxiang. “Coca-Cola fa ji shi” (History of Coca-Cola). Renmin Ribao 
(People’s Daily), June 20, 1982. 
Long, Xiang. “Tianfu kele bei yu wei yi dai ming yin” (天府可乐被誉为一代名饮) Wen 
Hui Bao, December 6, 1985. P. 1. 
Lu, Hanchao. Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth 
Century, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
Lu, Shutian. “Quan yong ben guo huo, qing caiqu xingdong”(Please use Chinese 
products, actions needed immediately). Xinmin Evening News, October 17, 1946. 
Lu, Xun. Na han. Renmin wenxue press, 2006.  
Malasong. “Coca-Cola feiji yun hu”(Coca-Cola arrived at Shanghai). Hai Tao. Shanghai: 
1946(26). 
Mang. “Shui shang hongshizi” (Red cross on the water). Xinmin Evening News, October 
7, 1945. 
Mann, Jim. Beijing Jeep, A Case Study of Western Business in China. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997.  
 332 
Mao, Jiaqi; Huang, Shengqiang; and Ma, Zhendu ed.  Zhongguo jiu haiguan shi liao 
(Chinese Maritime Customs Historical Material). Beijing: Jinghua press, 2001.  
Mao, Tse-Tung. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Volumes 1, 2, 3 and 4, Beijing: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1967.  
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. I. Translated by Ben Fowkes. 
New York: Penguin Classics, reprint edition, 1992.  
--------------. “The fetishism of the commodity and its secret.” Juliet Schor ed. The 
Consumer Society Reader. The New Press, 2000, 331-342. 
McDowell, Edwin. “The Shoot-out in Soda Pop.” New York Times, October 19th, 1980. 
Meng, Xianzhang. “Nei zhan xia jingji, jingrong, caizheng de weiji”(The economic crisis 
in the Civil War). Xinmin Evening News. January 19, 1947. 
Meng, Yuanlao (Song). Dongjin meng hua lu. Zhengzhou: zhong zhou gu ji chu ban she, 
2010.  
Min zhong jiao yu (People Education). Semiweekly. Education Bureau of Special 
Municipal Government of Hankou, May 22, 1930. 
Mintz, Sidney. Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern history. New York: 
the penguin group, 1986. 
Mo, Fei. “The return of Coca-Cola.” Bian Yi Can Kao. Beijing: The foreign language 
press, issue 3, 1979.  
Mok, Vincent; Xiudian Dai and Godfrey Yeung. “An Internalization Approach to Joint 
Ventures: The Case of Coca-Cola in China.” Asia Pacific Business Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 
Autumn 2002, pp. 39-58.   
Mokyr, Joel. The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. 
New York: OUP, 1990. 
Mu, Gu. Gumu huiyilu (Gu Mu’s Memoir). Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2009.  
Municipal Monthly. Anqing: 1928. 
Nanjing Municipal Administration Gazette. Nanjing: 1928. 
Nanjing zhengfu gong bao (Nanjing Government Gazette). Nanjing: 1932. 
Needham, Joseph. “Science and Society in East and West.” Science & Society. Vol. 28, 
No. 4 (Fall, 1964), pp. 385-408. 
 333 
Needham, Joseph and Lu Gwei-djen, Science and Civilisation in China. Vol. 6, pt. 6. 
Medicine. Edited and with an Introduction by Nathan Sivin, Cambridge University Press, 
2000. 
Nongyin. “Jiating zhong de yinliao” (Beverage at home). Funv zazhi (women’s 
magazine). 1927 (1), vol. 13, issue 1. 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: 
Public Affairs, 2004. 
Ou, Guanyun. “Yuexiulou wan jian dazongtong” (just like meet the President in Yue Xiu 
Lou). Xinmin Evening News, April 7, 1986. 
Paltemaa, Lauri and Juha A, Vuori. “Regime Transition and the Chinese Politics of 
Technology: From Mass Science to the Controlled Internet.” Asian Journal of Political 
Science. Vol. 17, no. 1, April 2009. 1-23. 
Pan, Junxiang. Jin dai zhong guo guo huo yun dong yan jiu (a study on the national 
products movement in modern China). Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science 
Press, 1998.  
-------------. Zhong guo jin dai guo huo yun dong (The National Product Movement in 
Modern China). Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe (Chinese Literature and History 
Press), 1996.  
 
Pan, Ronglun and Fucha, Dunchong (Qing). di jing sui shi ji sheng, yan jing sui shi ji, 
(annual customs and festivals in Peking).  Beijing: Beijing gu ji press, 1983. 
 
People’s Daily. Beijing: 1961. 
Pinminbao. Qingdao: 1948.  
Qian, Gang and Qingguo Geng. Ershi shiji zhongguo zhong zai bai lu (Epidemics in 
twentieth-century China). Shanghai people press, 1999.  
Qing Bao (evening edition). Qingdao: 1947, 1948.  
Qingdao Morning News. 1923. 
Qingdao Municipal Administration Gazette. 1946, issue 12. 
Qingdao Times. 1931. 
Rajan, S. Ravi. “Science, state, and violence: an Indian critique reconsidered.” Science as 
Culture, 2005, 14:3, pp. 265-281. 
Rogaski, Ruth. Hygienic Modernity, Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port 
China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.  
 334 
Schoenhals, Michael ed., China's Cultural Revolution, 1966-69: Not a Dinner Party 
(East Gate Reader). Routledge, September 2, 1996. 
Schoppa, R.Keith. Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese 
History. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 2010. 
Schor, Juliet ed. The Consumer Society Reader. The New Press, 2000. 
Schwartz. Benjamin I. “The Limits of ‘Tradition versus Modernity’ as Categories of 
Explanation: The Case of the Chinese Intellectuals.” Daedalus, vol. 101, No. 2 (Spring 
1972):71-88. 
Scott-Stokes, Henry. “Big Macs and Cokes: New Chinese Foods?” The New York Times, 
December 11, 1978.  
Shang Bao (business daily). Shanghai, 1947. 
Shang ye za zhi (Business journal). Shanghai, November 1, 1926. 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Shanghai jie fang qian hou wu jia zi liao hui bian, 
(A Collection of price data before and after the liberation of Shanghai), 1921-1957. 
Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1959. 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. 1933. 
Shanghai Times. 1940. 
Shao, Changfu. “Qishui de zhang gu ji qi ta” (anecdotes about soft drinks). Xinmin 
Evening News, August 11, 1956. 
Shao, Qin. “Tempest over Teapots: The Vilification of Teahouse Culture in Early 
Republican China.” Journal of Asian Studies, vol.57, no. 4 (November, 1998): 1009-
1041. 
Shen shi jing ji qing bao (Economic report on Shanghai). Shanghai, 1937-1938.  
Shen, Jialu. Shanghai Lao Wei Dao. Shanghai Culture Publishing House, 2007. 
Shen, Jing. “Mei huo tan fan qu di yi hou”(After banning American products stalls). 
Xinmin Evening News, October 17, 1946. 
Shen, Zhi. Shanghai lao dong zhi (Chronicles of Shanghai Labor). Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences Publishing House, 1998.  
Sheng bao. Shanghai: 1929.  
Sherwood, John B. “Incident in Shanghai.” Coca-Cola Overseas, October, 1948. 
Shi Jing (Classic of Poetry). Beijing: Yanshan Press, 2001.  
 335 
Shi zhao yuebao (shizhao monthly). 1935.  
Shiyu. “Qishui he shi you?” (when did soft drinks appear?).  Shanghai shenghuo 
(Shanghai Life), 1939. 
Shui, Miao. Thousands of Proverbs about Health (qian yan wan yu hua yang sheng). 
Beijing: Chinese women’s press, 2008. 
Shuyun. “Qishui tie hua lun.” Bei yang hua bao (the Beiyang Pictorial). May 1932 (781). 
Simoons, Federick J. Food in China: A Cultural and Historical Inquiry. Boca Raton: 
CRC Press, 1991.  
Song, Ninghua. “Ershi shiji shanghai di yi bailing”(The first white-collar in Shanghai, a 
record on the celebration of an old Coca-Cola employee’s 100 year-old birthday). Xinmin 
Evening News, November 28, 1999. 
Speakman, Harold. Beyond Shanghai. New York: Abingdon Press, 1922. 
St. John Daily, Sunday, January 4, 1904. 
Sterba, James P. “Coke Brings ‘Tasty Happiness’ to China.” The New York Times, April 
16, 1981. 
Swislocki, Mark. Culinary Nostalgia: Regional Food Culture and the Urban Experience 
in Shanghai. California: Stanford University Press, 2013.  
Tang, Lusun. Zhongguo chi. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2013.  
The Beijing News. 2008. 
The Beiyang Pictorial News. 1932. 
The Economic Observer, ed. Kaifang zhongguo: Gaige de sanshinian jiyi (Open China, 
Thirty Years Memory of Reformation). Beijing: China Citic Press, 2008. 
The Global and Mail. Toronto, 1978, 1979. 
The New York Times. 1981.  
The New Youth Journal, vol.6, no.1, January 1919. Zhongguo shudian, 2011. 
The Police Monthly. 1948. 
The Second Historical Archive of China. Zhongguo minguo shi dang’an ziliao hui bian 
(Comprehensive Collection of Archival Papers on History of Republic of China). 
Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House, 1994.  
The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. October 16, 1933. 
 336 
The Spartanburg Herald. Spartanburg, SC. Thursday Morning, November 4, 1943. 
The Tianjin Archive. Tianjin shanghui dang’an huibian, (Comprehensive Collection of 
Archival Papers on Chamber of Commerce in Tianjin). 1912-1928. Tianjin People’s 
Press, 1992.  
Tian, Mu. “Gong shang jie jiyi you xin: mei huo fanlanchengzai de gushi”(Remain fresh 
in the memory of the business community, the story of the influx of American products). 
Xinmin Evening News, Novomber 11, 1950. 
Tianxuwosheng. “Xiao zhi qishui zhi yan jiu” (study on making soft drinks). Ji lian hui 
kan, 1934 (100).  
Time Magazine. 1984. 
Townsend, James. “Chinese Nationalism,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs. 
No. 27 (January, 1992): 97-130. 
Tsu, Jing and Elman, Benjamin A ed. Science and technology in Modern China, 1880s-
1940s. Brill Academic Pub; Lam edition, 2014.  
Tuo, Tuo (Yuan). Song Shi, vol. 385 (history of the Song). Beijing: Zhong Hua Press, 
1985.  
Wagnleitner, Reinhold. translated by Diana M. Wolf. Coca-Colonization and the Cold 
War, The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War. 
Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origin of the European-World Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011. 
Waley-Cohen, Joanna. “Taste and Gastronomy in China.” in Paul Freedman ed., Food: 
The History of Taste. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. 
Wang, Di. The Teahouse: Small Business, Everyday Culture, and Public Politics in 
Chengdu, 190-1950. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.  
Wang, Dingfang and Fengzhen Chang. “Bai nian feng yu zhengguanghe” (a hundred 
year’s history of Aquarius Mineral Water Company). Gong ye yue kan (industrial 
monthly), Shanghai, 2004 (7). 
Wang Luping. Hua shuo lao Beijing. 画说老北京 renmin mei shu chu ban she, 2008.  
Wang, Q. Edward. Chopsticks: A Cultural and Culinary History. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Wang, Shi ed. Yan fu Ji. zhonghua shu ju, 1986. 
 337 
Wang, Tao. Ying ruan za zhi (Miscellany on Shanghai, 瀛壖杂志). Shanghai Ancient 
Books Press, 1989. 
Wang, Xiang (Qing). Qian jia shi ping zhu, vol. 2, Nanjing: Phoenix Press, 2006.   
Wang, Xiaojian ed. Shanghai xian zhi (local history of Shanghai). Shanghai People's 
Publishing House, 1993.  
Wang, Zihui. Pin wei tan chi. Jinan: Shandong Pictorial Publishing House, 2009.  
Wang, Zuoyue. “Saving China through Science: the Science Society of China, Scientific 
Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China.” Osiris, 2nd series, vol. 17 (Science 
and Civil Society), 2002, 291-322. 
------------------. “The Cold War and the Reshaping of Transnational Science in China” in 
Naomi Oreskes and John Krige eds.Science and Technology in the Global Cold War, The 
MIT Press, 2014, 343-371.  
Watson, James L., ed. Golden Arches East, McDonald’s in East Asia, second edition. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
Weijuan. “Meiguo jing yun tie mu de wajie” (The collapse of American embargo policy). 
Wen Hui Bao, June 10, 1957. 
Wen Hui Bao. 1938-1950. 1984-1986. 
Weng, Meijing. “Dutch water and Dutch beans.” Shipin yu Shenghuo (food and life), vol. 
1, 1998. 
Wenqi. “History of soft drinks.” Xinming Evening News, August 4, 1960. 
Wu, David Y. H. and Sidney C. H. Cheung ed. The Globalization of Chinese Food. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.  
Wu, Han. “About Zhu Ziqing refused to eat American relief food.” Renmin Daily. 
November 20, 1960. 
Wu, Jianxi and Yiping Tian ed. Shanghai shenghuo (life of Shanghai), 1937-1941. 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House, 2006.  
Wu, Liang. “Hong Kong Herbal Tea: A Study of Intangible Cultural Heritage.” The Hong 
Kong Anthropologist, New Series. vol. 1, 2007, pp. 91-104. 
Wu, Mu, meng liang lu, Zhejiang renmin press, 1980. 
Wu, Shunkang. “Cong duo shengchan yanqishui kan shengchan mudi” (The goal of 
producing more salty soda). Wen Hui Bao, August 6, 1975. 
 338 
Wu, Zimu (Song). Meng liang lu 梦梁录. Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1983.  
Wu, Zuguang. “Tou sheng” (drag out an ignoble existence). Xinmin Evening News, July 
15, 1946. 
Xia,Xingshou. “Qishui zi zhi fa”(make soft drinks at home). Shao nian (Juvenile), issue 
7, 1924. 
Xiao, Qian. Beijing chen za yi (memory of Beijing). Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing 
Company, 2014.  
Xiaochun. “Coca-Cola shang zhan qi shu” (Coca-Cola’s excellent strategy in the 
commercial war). Hai Chao, issue 44, April 13, 1947. 
Xiaopengyou (children). 1933-1948.  
Xiaosheng. “Yangzhong, yangzhong! Guo huo ye mian lin zhe shen yuan” (Serious! 
Serious! The Crisis of the national products). Xinmin Evening News, September 15, 1946. 
Xiazhiqiu. “Soft drinks in Shanghai.” Xinmin Evening News, September 5, 1996.  
Xie, Jiuxiang. “Yinliao zhi yan jiu”(Study on beverages). Funnv zazhi (women’s 
magazine), vol 5, issue 4, 1919. 
Xietiansha. “Ni zhidao helanshui ma?” (Do you know Dutch water?). Xinmin Evening 
News, July 11, 1982. 
Xin Min Bao. Qingdao, 1940, 1947. 
Xinming Evening News. Shanghai. 1946-1999. 
Xin Sheng Lu Monthly. 1947. 
Xin wen bao. 1929.  
Xu, Weijiao. “Lingdao qin lin di yi xian, fang shu jiang wenn zhua de jin” (Leaders went 
to the forefront of production, urging to take actions on heat stroke prevention). Wen Hui 
Bao, July 22, 1983. 
Xue, Liyong. “Coca-Cola zai Shanghai” (Coca-Cola in Shanghai). Wen Hui Bao, April 
11, 1998. 
Y.T. Sun. “Cosmopolitan Shanghai.” Coca-Cola Overseas. Published by Coca-Cola 
Export Corporation, August 1948. 
Yan, Chen (Qing). “Yi jing du ci” 忆京都词. Collected in Zhang Shanpei. Lao Beijing de 
ji yi. 老北京的记忆(memory of old Beijing). Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian chu ban she, 
2010.  
 339 
Yan, Fu. “lun shi bian zhi ji” 论世变之亟, in Wang, Shi ed. Yan fu Ji, vol. 1. zhonghua 
shu ju, 1986.  
------------. “lun jin ri jiaoyu ying yi wuli kexue wei dang wu zhi ji.” In Wang, Shi ed. Yan 
fu ji, vol.2. zhonghua shu ju, 1986.  
Yang, Fang and Chen Hou. “The Effect of Baihu Decoction on Blood Glucose Levels in 
Treating Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome.” Chinese Journal of Integrative 
Medicine, 2010 October 16(5): 472-479. 
Yang, Mou. “Lengyin shi li” (in cold drink shops). Wen Hui Bao, May 13, 1939. 
Yang, Tianyu ed., Zhou li yi zhu, Shanghai ancient book press, 2005.  
Yao, Liang. “National Prestige and Human Spaceflight: A Chinese Perspective,” Quest: 
The History of Spaceflight Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 3, (2012). 18-30. 
Yao, Zhonglu translate. “Coca-Cola wai zhuan” (The legend of Coca-Cola). Nanqing, 
vol.2, issue 6, November 20, 1948. 
Yi Wen Hua Bao. issue 1, 1947.  
Yin Ye Xie Zhen Bai Tu. 营业写真百图 Shanghai Hongwen shu ju, vol. 2, April 1919. 
Yinhang zhoubao (bank weekly). 1941.  
Yong an. 永安 vol. I and II. National Library Microfilm Center, 2006.  
Yü, D.T. “Qishui zong ping”(Comments on soft drinks). She hui yi bao (Social 
Medicine). Issue 190, May 5th, 1934. 
Yu, Qian. “Coca-Cola zhan zheng” (Coca-Cola War). Guangmin Daily. August 26, 1961. 
Yu, Xincai. “Yi ping Coca-Cola de wei li” (The power of a bottle of Coca-Cola). Xinmin 
Evening News, July 26, 1958.  
Yu, Xinzhong; Xiaohai Zhao; and Xiaochuan Zhang. Wenyi xia de shehui zhengjiu 
(social solutions in epidemic periods). Beijing Zhongguo press, 2004.  
Yuan, Shuyi, Li Hongzhang zhuan, renmin press, 1994.  
Zhang, Lu (Qing). Ben Jing Feng Yuan. Beijing: China medico-pharmaceutical science & 
technology publishing house, 2011. 
Zhang, Min and Dingxing Chen. “Coca-Cola and the Steering Wheel.” People’s 
Liberation Army Literature and Art, May, 1982.  
 340 
Zhang Pei. “xin hai geming qian hou xinwen manhua chuanbo de shehui gongneng.” 
Dang Dai Chuan Bo, vol. 5, 2009, 85-86. 
Zhang, Shanpei. Lao Beijing de ji yi. 老北京的记忆(Memories of old Beijing). Beijing: 
shehui kexue wenxian chu ban she. 2010.  
------------. Beijing Daily. June 12, 2012.  
Zhang, Shuguang. Economic Cold War, America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-
Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Standard 
University press, 2001. 
Zhang, Zhengxu. “Shanghai huo wu shui ju juzhang Fang Dong” (The director of the 
Bureau of commodity tax—Fang Dong). Xingmin Evening News, October 7, 1947. 
Zhang, Zhongjing (Han). Shanghan lun (treatise on febrile disease caused by cold), 
Beijing: Scientific and Technical Documentation Press, 2010.  
Zhao, Lin, Kexue yangsheng, vol. 8. 2005, 40. 
Zhen, Zhiya, ed., Zhongguo Yixue Shi (A History of Chinese Medicine). Nanchang: 
Jiangxi Kexue Jishu, 1987. 
Zhenzi. “He Lan Shui.” Xinmin Evening News, July 16, 1983.  
Zhibai. “Qishui de renshi” (understanding soft drinks). Min Zhong Jiao Yu (People 
Education), Semiweekly, published by Education Bureau of Special Municipal 
Government of Hankou, May 22, 1930. 
Zhikun. “Coca-Cola de niang jia men: quchengshi qishui gongsi” (Coca-Cola’s home: 
Watson’s Mineral Water Co.). Shi Shi Xin Bao (Current Daily News ), August 23, 1947. 
Zhiwei. “Coca-Cola.” Xinmin Evening News, August 29, 1957. 
Zhong wai jingtong zhoubao (finance home and abroad weekly). 1929. 
Zhongshan Daily, Oversea Edition, vol. 203, March 15, 2009. 
Zhu, Minyan. Shanghai fang yi shi jian (The History of Shanghai Epidemic Prevention), 
Shanghai kexue puji Press, 2003. 
Zhu, Shui. “Mai xianggua de nvren”(A woman who sells muskmelons). Xinmin Evening 
News, August 2, 1947. 
Zhu, Sujun. “Guangxu chu nian de Shanghai zhi xia” (summer of Shanghai in the early 
years of Guanxu). Xinmin Evening News, June 30, 1959. 
Zidan. “Qingdao zhi xia”(Summer of Qingdao). Xingmin Evening News, August 7, 1948. 
 341 
Zuo, Xuchu. Zhongguo shangbiao shi hua (History of Chinese trademarks). Tianjin: 
Baihua Literature and Art Publishing House, 2002. 
Zuowen. “Huo shui: Coca-Cola” (The evilness—Coca-Cola). Xinmin Evening News, 
September 6, 1957. 
